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STATUTES 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 




U.C.A. § 78-12-25.5 (1997) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to correctly determine and apply the 
appropriate version of the relevant statute of limitations? 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court correctly applied the appropriate 
statute of limitations period and whether the discovery rule applies is a legal 
question, which is reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the trial 
court. See Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, Tf 4, 979 P.2d 823; Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT 
App 78, % 18, 132 P.3d 63; Russell Packard Development, Inc., v. Carson, 2005 
UT 14,1(18, 108P.3d74. 
Issue Preserved at: Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (filed February 26, 2001). [Attached hereto as Addendum "1"]. 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (filed May 6, 2003). [Attached hereto as Addendum "2"]. 
Memorandum in Support of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for Directed Verdict 
(filed March 10, 2004). [Attached hereto as Addendum "3"]. Motion and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion under Rule 50 for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for Remittitur (filed 
March 23, 2005). [Attached hereto as Addendum "4"]. Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment in Accordance 
with Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (filed April 19, 2005). [Attached hereto as Addendum 
l 
"5"]. 
Did the trial court err when it submitted questions of law to the jury for 
decision in a special verdict? 
Standard of Review: The improper submission of a legal question to the jury by a 
trial court is a question of law that is reviewed under a correction-of-error 
standard. Ralston v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co., 62 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1936). 
Issue Preserved at: The issue is one of plain error. 
Did the trial court err in ruling that the discovery rule extended the period 
for Plaintiffs' breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure claims against 
Defendants? 
Standard of review: Whether the trial court correctly applied the appropriate statute 
of limitations period and whether the discovery rule applies is a legal question, 
which is reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the trial court. See 
Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, \ 4, 979 P.2d 823; Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78, \ 
18, 132 P.3d 63; Russell Packard Development, Inc., v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, \ 18, 
108P.3d74. 
Issue Preserved at: Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (fried February 26, 2001). [Attached hereto as Addendum "1"]. 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (fded May 6, 2003). [Attached hereto as Addendum "2"]. 
Memorandum in Support of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for Directed Verdict 
(filed March 10, 2004). [Attached hereto as Addendum "3"]. Motion and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion under Rule 50 for 
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Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for Remittitur (filed 
March 23, 2005). [Attached hereto as Addendum "4"]. 
4. Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure 
claim against Defendants pursuant to various motions made by Defendants 
throughout the course of litigation? 
Standard of review: Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness. See Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, 
% 10, 100 P.3d 1200. When reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict, 
this Court must "review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly 
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party moved against, and will 
sustain the denial if reasonable minds could disagree with the ground asserted for 
directing a verdict. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f^ 12, 82 P.3d 1064, 
cert, denied, 541 U.S. 960, 124 S.Ct. 1716, 158 L.Ed.2d401 (2004) (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
Issue Preserved at: Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (filed February 26, 2001). [Attached hereto as Addendum "1"]. 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (filed May 6, 2003). [Attached hereto as Addendum "2"]. 
Memorandum in Support of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for Directed Verdict 
(filed March 10, 2004). [Attached hereto as Addendum "3"]. Motion and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion under Rule 50 for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for Remittitur (filed 
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March 23, 2005). [Attached hereto as Addendum "4"]. Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment in Accordance 
with Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). [Attached hereto as Addendum "5"]. 
5. Whether the trial court erred in applying the fraud exception to the merger 
doctrine? 
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. See Selvage v. J J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 
1252, 1257 (Utah Ct.App. 1996). 
Issue Preserved at: This issue will become relevant if this Court reverses and/or 
remands this case and if Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants appeal the following Orders and the Special Verdict and Judgment 
entered by Judge Donald J. Eyre, Fourth District Court-Millard, Millard County, State of 
Utah: 
1. the Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
entered on August 16, 2001; 
2. the Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
entered on September 29, 2003; 
3. the Special Verdict and Judgment entered on March 10, 2005 for the amount 
of $30,680.00 against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiffs; 
4. the Order denying Defendants' Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment Not 
Withstanding the Verdict entered on July 6, 2005; 
5. the Order denying Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
entered on July 19,2005; 
6. and the Order awarding attorneys'fees to Plaintiff entered on August 25, 
2005. 
As more fully set forth herein, Defendants assert that the trial court erred in failing 
to determine and apply the appropriate statue of limitations to Plaintiffs' claims for breach 
of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure against Defendants. The trial court further erred 
by incorrectly applying the "discovery rule" to extend the statute of limitations period for 
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure. The trial court erred 
by submitting questions of law related to the statute of limitations period to the jury for 
decision. In addition, the trial court failed to apply governing legal precedent to Plaintiffs' 
fraudulent nondisclosure claim. Finally, the trial court improperly granted Plaintiffs an 
award of attorney's fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs' home ("Home"), which is the subject matter of the litigation, is located 
at 155 West 300 South, Filmore City, Millard County, Utah. [R. 442:13-17].1 
2. Defendants built the Home for their residence in 1993 and lived in the Home prior to 
selling the Home to Plaintiffs in 1994. [R. 440:32; 442:24]. 
3. The Home's construction was inspected and approved by the Fillmore City Building 
Inspector, Jack Peterson ("Peterson"), throughout the course of construction. [R. 
1. Citations to the trial transcript will be designated by page number followed by a colon 
and the line number(s). 
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371:9]. 
4. Defendants obtained a Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance 
("Certificate of Occupancy'') on or about January 28, 1994. [See Certificate of 
Occupancy and Zoning Compliance, attached hereto as Addendum "6"]. 
5. At the time of final inspection, the ground around the home was so muddy that 
finish grading was impossible. [R. 375:20 through 375:25]. 
6. Peterson, who conducted the final inspection, and who signed the Certificate of 
Occupancy, gave Defendants permission to finish the grading in the spring when 
the weather had cleared. [R. 378:16 through 379:8]. 
7. An Earnest Money Sales Agreement ("EMSA") was executed between Defendants 
and Plaintiffs on February 15, 1994 for the sale of the Home. [See Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement, attached hereto as Addendum "7"]. 
8. The relevant provisions of the EMS A for purposes of this appeal are: 
\l(e) Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property subject to Section 1(c) 
above and 6 below, accepts in its present physical condition, except: (BLANK) 
\ 6. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, 
the following 
\ B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is 
purchasing said property upon Buyers own examination and judgement and not 
by reason of any representation made by to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or 
Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, 
income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" 
condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event that 
Buyer desires an additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller 
but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
\ C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no 
claim or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which 
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has not or which will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against 
the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances 
of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances 
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing. 
9. Plaintiffs walked through the Home on February 11, 1994 before executing the 
EMSA on February 15, 1994. [R. 87:18 through 100:21]. 
10. Defendants read the "as is'Vno warranties clauses with Plaintiffs at the time the 
EMSA was executed by both parties. [R.462:15-21]. 
11. On February 15, 1994 Defendant Dan Smith discussed with Plaintiff William 
Moore the footings and the grading and told Plaintiff Moore that he should avoid 
moving dirt so as to avoid exposing the footings and that additional dirt was on the 
property to complete the grading. [R. 448:2 through 449:22]. 
12. Plaintiffs closed on the Home on or about May 2, 1994. [R. 104:23-25]. 
13. Plaintiffs had the opportunity, but decided not to have the Home inspected. [R. 
198:12-15]. 
14. Plaintiffs did not request any additional warranties of any kind. [R. 199:16-18]. 
15. Almost six years later in April 2000 while Plaintiffs were having gate posts 
installed on the property, Plaintiffs were informed that the footings were not deep 
enough. [R. 121:5], 
16. Plaintiffs subsequently contacted Jason Bullock of Sunrise Engineering in 
approximately August 2000 who walked through the house as though he were 
performing a final inspection and discovered the thirty (30) alleged code violations 
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identified by the Plaintiffs. [R. 128:10-12; 131:11-17]. 
17. Jason Bullock admitted that he easily discovered the lack of topsoil and grading and 
the exposed footings by "basically walking around the house." [R. 137:19]. Jason 
Bullock admitted that he did not need to do any digging to see the alleged grading 
violation because "the top of the frame was exposed." [R. 138:14]. 
18. An additional twelve (12) alleged code violations identified by the Plaintiffs were 
later added by Lloyd Steenblik's inspection. 
19. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on August 24, 2000, more than six years 
from the May 2, 1994 closing date. 
20. Plaintiff William Moore deceased in 2001 and Plaintiff Mary Moore became his 
successor in interest. 
21. Defendants filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment on February 26, 2001 
[see Addendum "1"] in which they argued that: (1) Plaintiffs' breach of contract 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Plaintiffs' claim of rescission 
was barred by the statute of limitations; (3) Plaintiffs' claim for violation of the 
Consumer Sales Practices Act was barred by the statute of limitations; (4) 
Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud and misrepresentation; (5) Punitive damages should 
be dismissed because all underlying claims are subject to summary judgment. 
22. On August 16, 2001, the trial court entered a ruling on Defendants' first Motion 
for Summary judgment and held that: (1) Plaintiffs' claim for negligent 
misrepresentation in this case was precluded as a matter of law by the merger 
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doctrine ; (2) That the claims of fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent 
misrepresentation had been pled with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (3) That there were genuine issues of material 
fact with respect to claims of fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent 
misrepresentation that precluded summary judgment; (4) Defendants may have had 
a legal duty to disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material defects in the home or 
building code violations, of which they were aware; (5) The discovery rule should 
be applied to toll the statutes of limitations in situations where its application was 
not otherwise expressly prohibited by law; (6) The discovery rule does apply to 
those defects that would be considered latent and that there were issues of fact 
with respect to when the defects should have reasonably been discovered; (7) 
Plaintiffs elected rescission rather than monetary damages for breach of contract. 
[See August 16, 2001 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "8"]. 
Defendants filed their next motion for summary judgment on May 6, 2003 arguing 
that: (1) Plaintiffs' claims were barred inasmuch as the Plaintiffs failed to have the 
home inspected and inasmuch as the applicable statute of limitation ran before the 
suit was filed; (2) Plaintiffs admitted that the majority of their claims were patent 
defects and should therefore be dismissed. [See Addendum "2"]. 
On August 29, 2003, the trial court held that: (1) the Defendants were only legally 
obligated to disclose defects that were not discoverable by reasonable care; (2) that 
summary judgment was appropriate for all admittedly patent items and that 
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summary judgment was not appropriate for defects 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, and 39; 
(3) that there were disputed material facts regarding Plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent 
misrepresentation; (4) that there were disputed material facts regarding 
Defendants' statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, the trial court granted 
summary judgment only as to the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim of fraudulent 
nondisclosure as to all defects except 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 39. [See August 29, 
2003 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "9"]. 
25. Finally in November 2003, Defendants filed four (4) additional motions for 
summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract; Consumer Sales 
Practice Act; mutual mistake of fact; and fraudulent misrepresentations. 
26. On April 26, 2004, the trial court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims under the Consumer Sales Practice Act and 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation, but denied the motion as to Plaintiffs breach of 
contract claim. During the hearing on the motions, Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to 
the dismissal of the claim for mutual mistake. 
27. In addition, on April 26, 2004, the trial court also denied Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider its prior ruling on Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure and Negligent 
Misrepresentation causes of action. 
28. At the time of trial the Plaintiffs had dismissed all their claims except their two 
claims for fraudulent nondisclosure regarding the improper grading and the alleged 
improper insulation of windows and Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim with 
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respect to the violation of the building code for grading. 
29. Plaintiffs previously elected to proceed on rescission and subsequently changed the 
remedy they were seeking to seek monetary damages. 
30. The case was heard at a three day trial March 7-9, 2005. 
31. At the conclusion of trial the jury was asked to respond to special verdict 
questions. [See Special Verdict, attached hereto as Addendum "10"]. 
32. The jury found Defendants liable for breach of contract and for fraudulent 
nondisclosure with respect to the improper grading, but not for the insulation of 
the windows. The jury awarded $30,680 in monetary damages. The jury also found 
the causes of action were not barred by the statute of limitations. 
33. During trial on March 9, 2005, Defendants' counsel made an oral motion for a 
directed verdict and submitted a memorandum in support of the motion on March 
10,2005. [See Addendum "3"]. 
34. The trial court entered final judgment against Defendants in the amount of $30,680 
in compensatory damages pursuant to the directed verdict on March 10, 2005. 
[See Final Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum "11"]. 
35. On March 23, 2005, Defendants' counsel file a motion and memorandum for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. [See Addendum "4"]. 
36. The trial court denied both of Defendants' Rule 50 motions in an order entered 
July 6, 2005. [See July 6, 2005 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "12"]. 
37. Defendants then filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
l l 
Motion for Relief from Judgment in Accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) on 
April 19, 2005 [see Addendum "5"] which was denied by the Court in a July 18, 
2005 order. [See July 18, 2005 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "13"]. 
38. The trial court ultimately awarded Plaintiffs attorney's fees under section "N" of 
the EMSA in the amount of $40,000.00 and costs in the amount of $10,000.00. 
[See Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Awarding Attorney's Fees, 
Expenses and Costs, attached hereto as Addendum "14"]. 
ARGUMENT 
L The trial court erred in failing to correctly determine the appropriate version 
of the relevant statute of limitations. 
The trial court erred by failing to first establish when Plaintiffs knew or should 
have know of their causes of action against Defendants. Whether a statute of limitations 
has run on a cause of action and whether the discovery rule applies, are both questions of 
law. See Russell Packard Development, Inc., v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, f 18, 108 P.3d 741 
("The applicability of the statute of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule 
are questions of law, which [the appellate court] reviews for correctness." (citing Spears 
v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, f 32, 44 P.3d 742); Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 
1990) ("Whether the discovery rule applies to a cause of action is, like the statute of 
limitation, a question of law, not of fact.") 
The applicability of the statute of limitations or the discovery rule to any given 
cause of action, however, first requires that the fact-finder determine when the claimant 
discovered or should have discovered the facts supporting their alleged cause of action. 
12 
See Sevy v. Security Title Co, of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995) ("The 
issue of when a claimant discovered or should have discovered the facts forming the basis 
of a cause of action is a question of fact." 
Accordingly, a trial court's legal determination of the applicability of the statute of 
limitations and the discovery rule must, by necessity, rely upon the factual determination 
of "when a claimant discovered or should have discovered the facts forming the basis of a 
cause of action." Id, 
As discussed hereinafter, the trial court's failure to adhere to the aforementioned 
tripartite analysis has led the trial court and jury to commit error. The trial court erred by 
non-discriminately applying the 2004 version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 to Plaintiffs claims. 
[See Addendum "8"; see Addendum "9"]. 
Importantly, the trial court's final Judgment and the Special Verdict are devoid of 
any specific factual finding by the jury concerning the date on which Plaintiffs knew or 
should have known of their cause of actions for breach of contract or fraudulent 
nondisclosure as to the grading and windows. 
As will be explained, without such a finding, as determined by a trier of fact, the trial 
court could not properly determine the date on which Plaintiffs' causes of action 
"accrued." Without establishing an "accrual" date, the trial court could not properly 
determine which version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 to apply (the 2004 version, or one of the 
three possible earlier versions) to Plaintiffs' causes of action. As will be demonstrated, 
application of the correct version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 has a determinative impact on 
13 
whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred and whether the discovery rule becomes relevant to 
Plaintiffs' claims. 
A. The trial court could not properly determine what version of the statute of 
limitations applies to Plaintiffs' claims because the trial court failed to 
instruct the jury to determine when Plaintiffs knew or should have known 
of their cause of action against Defendants, 
The jury in this case should have specifically determined when Plaintiffs knew or 
should have known of the facts forming the basis for their causes of action before the trial 
court may make the legal determination concerning what version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 
applied. 
Several different versions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 existed during the years 
between the sale of the property to Plaintiffs on May 2, 1994 and the date that Plaintiffs 
finally filed suit on August 24, 2000; however, only one version of the statute should be 
applied to Plaintiffs' claims. 
The first possible version was enacted in 1991 and was designated Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25.5. [Attached hereto as Addendum "15"]. Subsection (10) of the 1991 
version provides that "[t]his section applies to all claims and causes of action that accrue 
after April 19, 1991, notwithstanding that the act, error, omission, or breach of duty 
occurred, or the improvement was completed or abandoned before April 29, 1991." 
Relevant to this appeal are Subsections (3) and (4) of the 1991 version which provide: 
(3) An action against a provider shall be commenced within two years from 
the date of discovery of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or the 
date upon which the act, error, omission, or breach of duty should have 
been discovered through reasonable diligence. If the act, error, 
omission, or breach of duty is discovered or discoverable before 
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the 
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two year period begins to run upon completion or abandonment. 
(4) Subject to Subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty 
may be commenced against a provider more than six years after 
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the 
event the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the 
sixth year of the six year period, the injured person has two additional 
years from the date of discovery to commence an action. 
The 1991 version appears to contain an obvious inconsistency that was remedied 
by the legislature in the 1999 version. Subsection (3) incorporates a two year "discovery 
rule" provision as to most claims. Subsection (4) specifically carves out an exception for 
claims based on breach of contract or breach of warranty and requires the filing of the 
claim within six years after "completion of the improvement or abandonment of the 
construction" unless the breach is discovered in the sixth year (at which point, the 
claimant is allowed an additional two years from the date of discovery of the breach). 
The inconsistency is that Subsection (4) unambiguously sets the date of the "date of 
completion of the improvement or abandonment of the construction" as the time at which 
the six year time period begins to run while Subsection (3) (which Subsection (4) is 
subject to) allows a party two years from the date that the act, error (etc.) was discovered 
or should have been discovered through reasonable diligence. Thus, whether the six year 
statue of limitations for breach of contract and breach of warranty claims commences on 
the date of completion or abandonment (as specifically stated in Subsection (4)) or 
whether the six years commences at the time the breach was discovered or could have 
been discovered (as stated in Subsection (3)) is unclear. 
The 1991 version was effective until it was superseded in 1997 by U.C.A. § 78-12-
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21.5 [Attached hereto as Addendum "16"]. Section 10 the 1997 version states that "This 
section applies to all claims and causes of action that accrue after April 29 1991." In the 
1997 version, Subsections (3) and (4) 
(3)(a) An action against a provider shall be commenced within//ve years from 
the date of discovery of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or the date 
upon which the act, error, omission, or breach of duty should have been 
discovered through reasonable diligence. 
(b) If the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered or discoverable 
before completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the 
five year period begins to run upon completion or abandonment. 
(4) Subject to Subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty may 
be commenced against a provider more than six years after completion of the 
improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event the act, error, 
omission, or breach of duty is discovered in first through the sixth year of the 
six year period, the injured person has five additional years from the date of 
discovery to commence an action (emphasis added). 
The 1997 version primarily modified the two year period for filing to a five year 
period and granted claimants five years from the date of discovery (instead of two) if the 
act, error (etc.) was discovered at any point within the six years on breach of 
contract/warranty claims. Again, the same internal inconsistency as existed under the 
1991 version still exists in the 1997 version. 
The 1999 version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 that superseded the 1997 
version indicates in Subsection (11) that it applies "to all causes of action that accrue after 
May 3, 1998, notwithstanding that the improvement was completed or abandoned before 
May 3, 1999." [Attached hereto as Addendum "17"]. The 1999 version contains 
significantly different language than its predecessors. Former Subsections (3) and (4) are 
combined under a single Subsection (3) in the 1999 version. Furthermore, the caveat for 
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actions based in contract or warranty is made preeminent as subpart (a) and is no longer 
''subject to" the codified two-year discovery rule provision as in previous versions: 
(3) (a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be 
commenced within six years of the date of completion of the improvement or 
abandonment of construction. Where an express contract or warranty 
establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated within 
that limitations period. 
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two 
years from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date 
upon which a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable 
diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable before 
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year 
period begins to run upon completion or abandonment. 
Finally, subsection (11) of the 2003 version which superseded the 1999 version 
applies "to all causes of actions that accrue after May 3, 2003, notwithstanding that the 
improvement was completed or abandoned before May 3, 2004." [Attached hereto as 
Addendum "18"]. 
Subsection (3) of the 2003 version retains the exact same language as Subsection 
(3) of the 1999 version. 
It is readily apparent that application of either the 1991 version, the 1997 version, 
or the 1999 version could result in a very different outcome for Plaintiffs' claims 
depending on which version is applied. As will be argued in a subsequent section of this 
brief, the 1999 version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 plainly rejects the application of the 
discovery rule for causes of action based on breach of contract or breach of warranty. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure claim as to the grading and windows 
could be barred depending on when Plaintiffs discovered or reasonably could have 
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discovered the alleged fraud and depending on which version of the statute is applied. 
As a preliminary matter, the jury (as fact-finders) should have first determined the 
date on which Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their injuries in order for the court 
to correctly establish an "accrual" date. Only by establishing an ^accrual" date could the 
trial court have decided which version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 to apply. 
"A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when a reasonable 
person knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of both the 
injury and its governing cause." Matson v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 
1235 (10th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). "'Generally, a cause of action accrues upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.'" Spears v. Warr, 
2002 UT 24, f 33, 44 P.3d 742 (quoting Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 
1996)) (other internal quotations and citation omitted). 
Because neither the jury nor the trial court ever established a date on which 
Plaintiffs breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure claims accrued, the trial court 
could not properly determine which version of the statue of limitations should have been 
applied to Plaintiffs claims. Furthermore, without the factual determination of when 
Plaintiffs' knew or should have known of the alleged injuries and their cause(s), no court 
of law can review whether the trial court applied the proper version of the statute of 
limitations in the first instance. 
Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error in assuming that the 2003 
version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 applied to Plaintiffs' causes of actions and this Court 
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should reverse the trial court's rulings and remand the issue for further proceedings. 
B. The trial court could not properly determine whether the discovery rule 
applies to Plaintiffs1 claims without a specific determination concerning 
when Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their cause of action against 
Defendants, 
Before a trial court may properly apply the discovery rule to extend a statute of 
limitations period, "an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know of and 
could not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a 
claim." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). In fact, the entire 
purpose of the discovery rule is to ensure that an applicable statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until a party knows or should have known of the existence of a particular 
cause of action. Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 
1995) (stating that, 'the discovery rule is an exception to the general rule, and it delays 
the running of the limitation period 'until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the 
cause of action.'") (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a court cannot properly 
determine the applicability of the discovery rule without first allowing a factual 
determination concerning the date a party knew or should have known of the existence of 
a particular cause of action. 
In the instant case, the trial court committed reversible error by deciding to apply 
the discovery rule to Plaintiffs claims without first allowing the jury to determine when 
Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their claims. As argued hereinafter, Defendants 
believe that the trial court committed a fundamental legal error in finding that the 
discovery rule applied to the six-year statute of limitations on breach of contract claims 
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under U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5. However, this substantive issue is secondary to the principal 
concern that the trial court did not even correctly decide which version of the statute to 
apply. 
In addition to the foregoing pertinent discussion, "the discovery rule simply does 
not apply where the plaintiff, at some point during the limitations period, has knowledge 
of the facts underlying his claim." Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah 1998). 
Accordingly, if Plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts underlying their claims within the 
appropriate limitations period, Plaintiffs could not invoke any non-statutory extensions 
under a discovery rule theory. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on the 
application of the statue of limitations to Plaintiffs' claims, as found in the trial court's 
September 29, 2003 Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, in the trial 
court's July 6, 2005 Order Denying Defendants Rule 50 Motion. The trial court should 
also find as reversible error inasmuch as the Special Verdict form contains no finding as 
to the date on which Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their alleged injuries. 
"It has long been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be predicated 
upon and find support in the findings of fact." Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah 
1993). Otherwise, "[t]he failure to enter adequate findings of fact on material issues may 
be reversible error." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). 
Until there is a specific factual determination made as to when Plaintiffs knew or 
should have known of the facts creating a cognizable cause of action, an "accrual" date 
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cannot be determined; nor can the trial court determine which version of the statue of 
limitations should have applied and whether the non-statutory discovery rule defense is 
applicable. 
2. The trial court erred committed reversible error when it submitted questions 
of law to the jury for decision in a special verdict 
The trial court committed reversible error when it submitted questions of law to 
the jury in the Special Verdict. "In the case of a special verdict, the jury only finds the 
facts, and the court applies the law thereto and renders the verdict." Dishinger v. Potter, 
47 P.3d 76, 80 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). In Dishinger, this Court quoted Justice Ellett of the 
Utah Supreme Court in explaining the function of a special verdict. 
This Court noted that, "the special verdict was devised to relieve the jury of 
attempting to apply the law in a complicated case to the facts in arriving at a verdict. 
Instructions to the jury are thus simplified, and the jurors may, therefore, concentrate 
upon the functions which belong to them, viz., to find the facts in the case." Id. (quoting 
Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970). 
Rather than simply requesting the jury to determine when Plaintiffs knew or should 
have known of the facts giving rise to their claims for breach of contract and fraudulent 
nondisclosure, and then make a legal determination concerning applicability of the statute 
of limitations and the discovery rule, the trial court disregarded the entire function and 
purpose of a special verdict form by improperly requesting the jury to make complicated 
legal determinations without first deciding upon the necessary predicate facts. 
Utah courts have long held that a jury should not make any determinations 
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concerning questions of law as such questions are the sole province of the courts. See 
Ralston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1936) (holding that a 
question of law submitted to the jury was improper thereby allowing the Utah Supreme 
Court to reverse and remand the matter to the trial court for a proper determination of the 
legal issues); Bailey v. Spalding-Livingston Investments Co., 136 P. 962, 964 (Utah 1913) 
(stating that a court may not require the jury to construe a contract because such 
determination "is a matter of law for the court"). This Court should follow the rule 
endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court and hold that the trial court's submission of the 
question of law as to whether Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and fraudulent 
nondisclosure were barred by the statute of limitations constitutes reversible error. 
It is further worth noting that the applicability of the discovery rule and the statute 
of limitations to the instant matter did not concern the jury in any way. In Beck v. 
Coalition Mines Co., 269 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1954), the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
"[t]here was no need, however, for the [lower] court's explanation of the statute of 
limitations to the jury since it was a matter of law which did not directly concern them, 
and by the [trial] court's own admission nothing that he could say to them in explanation 
of the statute of limitations could aid them in determining the several questions of fact 
submitted to them." 
The trial court in the instant case committed reversible error and prejudiced 
Defendants by requiring the jury to decide a complicated question of law pertaining to the 
statute of limitations and to the discovery rule. Specifically, the trial court prejudiced 
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Defendants by requiring the jury to make a legal determination beyond the scope of the 
jury's powers without the necessary findings of fact (i.e. "at what point did Plaintiffs 
discover or could they reasonably have discovered the alleged breach of contract or the 
code violations") to support such determination. 
Finally, the Court should also reverse the trial court's final Judgment order in the 
instant matter because "it has long been the law in this state that conclusions of law must 
be predicated upon and find support in the findings of fact." Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 
431, 436 (Utah 1993). Otherwise, "the failure to enter adequate findings of fact on 
material issues may be reversible error." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 116 P.2d 896, 
899 (Utah 1989). 
For the foregoing reasons the Court should reverse the trial court's final Judgment 
order and specifically hold that the trial court committed reversible error when it 
submitted the legal question of the applicability of the statute of limitations to the jury for 
determination. This mistake was plain error on the part of the trial court. 
3- The trial court erred in finding that the discovery rule extended the period for 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure claims against 
Defendants, 
The jury in the district court trial ultimately awarded Plaintiffs $30,680.00 in 
compensatory damages. The grounds for the damage award are found in the Special 
Verdict form completed by the jury. Although the Special Verdict form provided three 
possible bases for Plaintiffs recover (breach of contract, fraudulent nondisclosure as to 
the footings and fraudulent nondisclosure as to defective windows) the jury found 
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Defendants liable only under the first two bases and awarded Plaintiffs the amount of 
$30,680.00 for breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure as to the footings (but not 
for fraudulent nondisclosure of the window defect). [See Addendum "10"]. 
Relevant to this section of Defendants' appeal is the fact that subpart (c) under 
each of the three enumerated bases on the Special Verdict form specifically requested that 
the jury determine whether each claim was barred by the statute of limitations. According 
to the Special Verdict, the jury apparently found that neither Plaintiffs' breach of contract 
claim, nor their fraudulent nondisclosure claim as to the footings was barred by the statute 
of limitations. As argued in the preceding sections of this brief, the jury had no authority 
to determine whether the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims. This question 
and the question of whether the discovery rule should be applied are both legal questions 
and outside the purview of the jury. The trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine 
whether the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims. 
The question the jury should have answered is "when did Plaintiffs discovery, or 
when could they have reasonably discovered the facts supporting their alleged causes of 
action?" Unfortunately, this central question was never asked or answered. 
Defendants assert that from the earliest stages of the lawsuit and continuing 
through the post-trial motion phase, the trial court failed to properly interpret and enforce 
settled law on the issue of whether Plaintiffs claims were barred by the applicable statutes 
of limitations. Because application of the appropriate statute of limitations period is a 
legal question, this Court should review the trial court's orders for correctness. 
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As argued in the first sections of this brief, the trial court first and foremost erred 
in failing to consider which version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 should apply. Nevertheless, 
because the Court relied upon the 2003 (or possibly 1999) version of the statute as it 
applied to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, Defendants will argue against the trial 
court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 accordingly. 
A. The trial court repeatedly failed to correctly interpret and apply the 
statute of limitations rules to Plaintiffs1 breach of contract and fraudulent 
nondisclosure claims. 
Defendants first raised the statute of limitations defense (among other defenses) 
against Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim in their Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (filed February 26, 2001). [See 
Addendum "1"]. Therein, Defendants argued that U.C.A. § 78-12-23(2) governed the 
breach of contract claim and that under that provision's six-year statue of limitations 
period, Plaintiffs were required to bring their action within six years of the date that 
Plaintiffs closed on their purchase of the home from Defendants. The undisputed closing 
date was May 2, 1994. Accordingly, Plaintiffs should have filed their complaint no later 
than May 2, 2000. Because Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until August 24, 2000, 
Defendants asserted that the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract was barred. 
Plaintiffs responded in their Memorandum in Opposition (filed March 12, 2001) 
that the "discovery rule" applied and argued that application of the discovery rule should 
extend the statute of limitations period for Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. In their 
Reply Memorandum (filed March 26, 2001), Defendants argued that in Utah, governing 
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case law precluded application of the discovery rule for breach of contract claims. 
In its final written order, the trial court ordered the following: 
.. .the discovery rule should be applied to toll the statue of limitations, even as 
to contract-based claims, in situations where its application is not otherwise 
expressly prohibited by law. Accordingly, the Court concludes, as a matter of 
law, that the discovery rule does apply in this case with respect to those defects 
that would be considered latent, and that there remains issues of fact with 
respect to when those defects would be considered latent, and that there remain 
issues of fact with respect to when those defects should have been reasonably 
discovered. Therefore summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to 
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, rescission, and violations of the 
Consumer Sales Practices Act. [See Addendum "8"]. 
After more than two years of additional discovery, Defendants were finally able to 
submit another Motion for Summary Judgment (filed May 6, 2003). At that juncture, 
Defendants asserted that the statue of limitations periods set forth in U.C.A. § 78-12-
21.5(3) governed Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. 
In the trial court's August 29, 2003 Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the court nebulously ruled: (1) that U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 did apply; (2) that 
subsection (3)(a) of that provision imposes a six year statue of limitations on breach of 
contract claims; and (3) that subsection (3)(b) provides that all other causes of action 
against a provider be brought within two years of the discovery of a cause of action or the 
date upon which the cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable 
diligence. Inexplicably, though, the court refused to grant Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim because "the discovery rule 
applies in this case." [See Addendum "9"]. 
Defendants' also attempted to raise the statue of limitations defense on March 10, 
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2005 on the final day of trial when counsel for Defendant made oral motion under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 50(a) for a directed verdict. The final judgment was entered later that day 
pursuant to the Special Verdict. Defendants also filed a written Memorandum in Support 
of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for a Directed Verdict C'Rule 50(a) Memorandum") on 
that day. [See Addendum *'3"]. Defendants subsequently submitted a Motion and 
Memorandum for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for 
Remittitur on March 23, 2004 ("Rule 50(b) Memorandum"). [See Addendum "4"]. 
In both the Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b) memoranda, Defendants again argued that 
under the plain language of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(3)(a), Plaintiffs' breach of contract 
claim should have been barred by the six year limitations period running from the earliest 
of either the date that the original Certificate of Occupancy was issued to Defendants 
(January 28, 1994) or the closing of the sale/occupancy date by Plaintiffs (May 2, 1994). 
Because Plaintiffs' complaint was filed in August of 2000, over six years from either 
date, the statute of limitations should bar the contract claim. 
After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Defendants Rule 50 motions. 
[See Addendum "12"]. 
B. The trial court erroneously applied the general discovery rule to ILC.A. § 
78-12-21.5(3)(a). 
The trial court clearly erred in permitting Plaintiffs to invoke the general discovery 
rule in order to extend the time for the filing of their breach of contract claim. Subsection 
(3) of both the 2003 and 1999 versions provides: 
(3) (a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be 
commenced within six years of the date of completion of the improvement or 
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abandonment of construction. Where an express contract or warranty 
establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated within 
that limitations period. 
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two 
years from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date 
upon which a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable 
diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable before 
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year 
period begins to run upon completion or abandonment. 
As previously argued by Defendants, the juxtaposition of these two paragraphs 
clearly implies that only the non-contract claims are subject to the discovery rule. 
Contract claims exist for six years and no more. This is to allow builders some certainty 
and peace of mind that they will not be afflicted with stale contract claims. 
Importantly, Subsection (4) of the 2003 version specifically refers only to 
Subsection (3)(b) (not to Subsection (3)(a) governing breach of contract actions) in 
providing a general nine year limit (plus two years if the injury is discovered in the eighth 
or ninth years) from the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of 
construction on all actions other than breach of contract/warranty claims. The exclusion 
of Subsection 3(a) from the general nine year limitations period indicates that the 
legislature intentionally meant to preserve a strict six-year limit on all claims based on 
breach of contract or warranty. 
Subsection (4) of the 1999 version is different only in that it allows a maximum of 
twelve years (plus two) for claims arising under Subsection 3(b). The 1999 version still 
excludes Subsection 3(a) from the general twelve year limitations period. 
The legislative preamble language in both the 2003 and 1999 versions explains the 
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legislative purpose of drawing definite limitations periods and refers to the fact that "the 
possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven [or "ten" 
for the 1999 version] years following completion [of the building]. Clearly the intent of 
this six year: statute of limitations is that it be construed in favor of the builder. 
Surprisingly, the trial court submitted Jury Instruction 31 to the jury which 
provides in relevant part: "Utah law provides that an action for construction defect based 
in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of the closing of 
the sale of the house." [See Jury Instruction #31, attached hereto as Addendum "19"]. 
Such a plain and clear instruction is painfully at odds with the trial courts insistence that 
the discovery rule applies to U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 Subsection 3(a). 
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs filed their claim more than six years after they 
closed on the home on May 2, 1994. The trial court's unsupported extension of the 
statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim was clearly erroneous when 
considered in light of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5. Moreover, without a jury finding as to 
"when" Plaintiffs knew or should have known about the alleged fraudulent disclosure, it 
is impossible to determine whether that claim, too, is barred by the appropriate statute of 
limitations. 
This Court should reserve the trial court's numerous incorrect orders extending the 
statute of limitations in contravention of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5. 
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4. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure 
claim against Defendants pursuant to various motions made by Defendants 
throughout the course of litigation. 
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, \ 10, 100 P.3d 1200. 
When reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict, this Court must "review the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable minds 
could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
Inc., 2003 UT 41, ! 12, 82 P.3d 1064, cert, denied, 541 U.S. 960, 124 S.Ct. 1716, 158 
L.Ed.2d 401 (2004) (quotations and citation omitted). 
The trial court erred in failing to grant Defendants' various motions for summary 
judgment or in the alternative for failing to grant Defendants' Rule 50 Motions on the 
issue of the viability of Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim. 
In all three of the aforementioned motions, Defendants argued that under Utah 
law, Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim should be dismissed as a matter of law 
because Plaintiffs failed to obtain a home inspection on a home that was expressly sold 
"as is" and without any warranty. In its August 29, 2003 Order on Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as 
to most of the alleged violations except for five of the enumerated defects. [See 
Addendum "9"]. Ultimately, only two of those violations survived to reach the trial stage 
(the grading claim and the window claim). Because the jury found Defendants liable only 
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for fraudulent nondisclosure as to the grading claim, Defendants address only that 
remaining alleged violation for purposes of this appeal. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that prior to purchasing the Home that they had an 
opportunity to both inspect the Home and have an inspection performed. Plaintiffs do not 
dispute that Section 6 of the EMS A expressly disclaimed all seller warranties other than 
those contained in Section "C" without exception. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Section "C" of the General Provisions of the EMS A 
warrants only that "(a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning 
violation concerning the property which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; 
(b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or 
other encumberances of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) 
the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical systems, and 
appliances shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing." 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Section "B" of the General Provisions of the EMS A 
provides in relevant part that "[ujnless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is 
purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage [...] 
Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in 
Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection said inspection shall be 
allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer." [See Addendum "7"]. 
Plaintiff Mary Moore does not dispute that neither she nor her deceased husband 
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sought a home inspection at the time she purchased the Home. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that most of the alleged code violations including the 
grading violation was discovered in August 2000 by Jason Bullock who discovered the 
grading violation by ''basically walking around the house" and observing the "footing 
exposed at grade level" without any intrusive or destructive testing. 
Based on the foregoing admitted facts, the trial court should have granted summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on their Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 6, 
2003. 
Maack v. Resource Design and Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Ut. App. 1994) is 
the governing case for this issue on appeal. As the plaintiffs did in Maack Plaintiffs in 
this case alleged (among other things) fraudulent nondisclosure. As with the plaintiffs in 
Maack, Plaintiffs in the present case, did not obtain a home inspection before purchase. 
Id. at 573. Similarly the Maack sales agreement and Plaintiffs' EMSA at issue in this 
case contained an "as is" clause "without any warranties as to its condition." Id. 
In Maack this Court assumed for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had 
brought a fraudulent nondisclosure claim (although the plaintiffs did not distinguish 
between fraudulent concealment and fraudulent nondisclosure). In lawsuit at bar, 
Plaintiffs claim for fraudulent nondisclosure has been explicit pleaded. 
Ultimately, this Court found that the plaintiffs in Maack were unreasonable in 
failing to obtain a home inspection or insisting on express rights in the agreement. This 
Court also found that no duty to disclose exists where the buyer could discover the facts 
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by exercise of reasonable diligence. Id. at 579. 
Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), is also relevant to 
Defendants' position on appeal inasmuch as it conveys the general application of the rule 
of caveat emptor in Utah: 
The responsibility to observe patent, and any discoverable latent, defects falls on 
the buyer of the home and is usually accomplished by hiring a knowledgeable 
home inspector to scrutinize the home before finalizing a sale. Oftentimes, 
however, real estate agents and sellers are understandably unaware of latent 
defects in the home at the time of sale. This is an inherent risk involved in 
purchasing a home. Id. at 1390 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The Schafir court further went on to note: 
Generally, absent some express agreement between the parties—which is absent 
here—the doctrine of caveat emptor precludes a home buyer from bringing suit for 
discoverable defects in the home. Especially when the sale of a used home is 
involved, the purchaser is on notice that the residence is not new and may contain 
defects affecting the home's quality or condition. In the case of latent defects, a 
home buyer's best resort against the seller is to sue for either fraudulent or 
negligent misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Id. at n.12. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that in August 2000, Jason Bullock observed 
the alleged violation related to the grading by mere visual observation. 
In Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, % 24, 48 P.3d 235, the Utah Supreme Court 
cited extensively to its former decision in Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, ^ [ 9, 31 
P.3d 572 in discussing the burden that a plaintiff must meet in proving fraudulent 
nondisclosure as to reasonably discoverable information: 
To support a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure a plaintiff must prove the 
following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the 
nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) 
there is a legal duty to communicate. Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, \ 9, 
31P.3d572. 
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In Mitchell, the plaintiffs alleged that at the time of their purchase of the 
defendants' home (1) a swimming pool on the property was leaking, (2) the 
defendants were aware of the leak, and (3) the defendants had a legal duty to 
disclose these defects prior to selling their property to the plaintiffs, which 
they failed to do. 2001 UT 80 at f 4, 31 P.3d 572. The defendants defended 
that they had no duty to disclose defects under the doctrine of caveat emptor. 
Id. at If 5, 31 P.3d 572. We held that sellers of real property owe a duty to 
disclose material known defects that cannot be discovered by a reasonable 
inspection by an ordinary prudent buyer. Id. at \ 12, 31 P.3d 572. 
With this holding, we issued some specific precautions. We first cautioned 
that "if a defect can be discovered by reasonable care, the doctrine of caveat 
emptor prevails and precludes recovery by the vendee." Id. at [^ 11, 31 P.3d 
572. We next instructed that an ordinary prudent buyer would not be required 
to "hire numerous expert home inspectors to search for hidden defects," but 
this does not mean that inspection by an expert will never be required. Id. at ^ 
12-13, 31 P.3d 572. 
Plaintiffs in the instant case were aware that they were buying the Home in an "as 
is" condition, and that the EMSA disclaimed all warranties and representations other than 
those found in Section "C." The alleged defects were discovered by a non-destructive 
inspection in the year 2000, and could have been discovered in similar fashion before the 
sale of the Home in 1994. Governing case law clearly establishes that Plaintiffs had a 
responsibility to protect themselves by having the Home inspected before the sale. 
Plaintiffs did not have the home inspected before the sale; instead Plaintiffs failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence, waiting until August, 2000, over six years after purchasing 
the Home, to have it inspected. Plaintiffs did not exercise ordinary diligence to discover 
the alleged defects and, therefore, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to preclude the 
Plaintiffs from bringing suit for the alleged defects in the Home. 
Defendants again raised these arguments in their Rule 50 motions [See Addendum 
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"3"; see Addendum "4"]; the trial court again denied Defendants' motions on the issue. 
[See Addendum "12"]. Defendants again argued that the fraudulent nondisclosure claim 
should be dismissed pursuant to Utah case law when Defendants made their Rule 60(b) 
Motion. [See Addendum "5"]. The court again refused to accept Defendants' argument. 
[See Addendum "13"]. 
Even applying the standard of review which requires this Court to take view the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to Plaintiffs, it is clear that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a 
directed verdict and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Defendants. 
Even admitting that Plaintiffs were unsophisticated buyers, that Defendant Dan 
Smith was an experienced home-builder, and that the Defendants had only lived in the 
home a few months before selling it, Plaintiffs still knew they were buying the home "as 
is," and that they were entitled to have an inspection performed. Even assuming that 
Defendant Dan Smith did not discuss with Plaintiff William Moore that the topsoil 
grading would need to be completed in the spring of 1994, Jason Bullock's easy visual 
discovery the problem in August 2000 demonstrates that Plaintiffs could have discovered 
the grading violation through a reasonable inspection. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's September 29, 2003 Order and the trial 
court's July 6, 2005 Order on the basis that the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
finding that Plaintiffs claim for fraudulent nondisclosure could survive summary 
judgment or a directed verdict based on the undisputed facts of the case. 
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5. The trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs an award of $40,000.00 in 
attorney's fees and $10,000,00 in costs. 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. See Selvage, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct.App.1996). Defendants do not 
dispute that paragraph "N" of the EMS A permits a prevailing party to recover attorney's 
fees in an action under brought to enforce the EMS A. [See Addendum "7"]. However, 
should this Court reverse the trial court and should further proceedings exonerate 
Defendants, or result in a dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants would be entitled to 
recover their attorney's fees and costs from Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the following Orders of the trial court and remand those matters requiring further 
proceedings: 
1. the Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment entered on 
August 16, 2001; 
2. the Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment entered on 
September 29, 2003; 
3. the Special Verdict and Judgment entered on March 10, 2005 for the amount of 
$30,680.00 against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiffs; 
4. the Order denying Defendants' Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding 
the Verdict entered on July 6, 2005 
5. the Order denying Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
36 
entered on July 19, 2005; 
6. the Order entered on August 25, 2005 awarding attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted this l"T day of May, 2006. 
JUSJ^q^lLSWICK, 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C., 
Attorneys far Defendants Dan Smith and Carol Smith 
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ADDENDA 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed 
February 26,2001). 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (filed May 6, 2003). 
Memorandum in Support of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for Directed Verdict 
(filed March 10, 2004). 
Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion under 
Rule 50 for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for 
Remittitur (filed March 23, 2005). 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Relief from 
Judgment in Accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
August 16, 2001 Order 
August 29, 2003 Order 
Special Verdict 
Final Judgment 
July 6, 2005 Order 
July 18, 2005 Order 
Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Awarding Attorney's Fees, Expenses and 
Costs 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1991) 
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16. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1997) 
17. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-21.5(1999) 
18. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 (2003) 
19. Jury Instruction #31 
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ADDENDUM 1 
A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ. (#889) 
NATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ. (#7522) 
DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C. 
192 East 200 North Suite 203 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 652-8000 
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of ] 
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and ] 
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee ; 
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
> FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I Case No. 000700142 MI 
i Judge 
Defendants, by and through their counsel, A. Bryce Dixon, of Dixon & Truman, P.C, 
pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, submit this Memorandum in Support of 
their Motion for Summary Judgment 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
L 
INTRODUCTION 
This litigation arose as a result of the sale of certain improved real property located in 
Millard County, Utah (hereinafter "the subject home") by Defendants Dan and Carol Smith 
(hereinafter "the Smiths") to Plaintiffs William and Mary Moore (hereinafter "the Plaintiffs"). 
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Construction was completed on the subject home in early November 1993. The Smiths 
constructed the house for their own residence and thus moved into the subject home in mid-
November, 1993, The Smiths obtained the Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance on 
or about January 28, 1994, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit " 1 . " Although Mr. 
Smith had a general contractors license, he did not work in this capacity at all during the period 
of time in which the transaction with the Moores was consummated. 
In February of 1994 the Plaintiffs contacted the Smiths about the possible purchase of the 
subject home. An Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered into between the parties on or 
about February 15, 1994. A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "2." The 
transaction closed on May 2, 1994. At this point the Plaintiffs were legally entitled to move into 
the subject home. Copies of the closing documents are attached hereto as Exhibit "3 . " 
The Smiths were not notified of any problems regarding the subject home until 
December, 2000. This was over six years after the Smiths sold the home to the Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for damages on August 24, 2000. The Smiths were not served, 
however, until December 13, 2000. 
II. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Dan and Carol Smith, built the subject home for their own residence. (See, Affidavit 
of Dan Smithy 4). 
2. Construction was completed on the subject home in early November of 1993 and the 
Smiths moved into the home in mid-November of 1993. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, f 5). 
3. Dan Smith was not actively working as a general contractor at the time of 
the construction of the subject home or the sales transaction. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, ^ 6). 
4. The City of Fillmore issued a Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance for 
the subject home on or about January 28, 1994. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, ^ 7). 
5. On or about February 15, 1994, an Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered 
between the Smiths and William and Mary Moore (hereinafter "the Moores") for the sale of the 
subject home. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, |^ 9). 
6. The Smiths moved out of the subject home by the end of March, 1994. (See, 
Affidavit of Dan Smith, f 11). 
7. Dan Smith never went to the subject home to perform any type of construction 
services or repairs any time after the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered between the 
Smiths and the Moores. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, If 12). 
8. The transaction between the Smiths and Moores for the sale and purchase of the 
subject home closed on May 2, 1994. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, ^ 13). 
9. The Smiths were not made aware of any alleged construction defects until December 
of 2000. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, f 15). 
10. The Moores filed their Complaint for damages on August 24,2000. (See, Affidavit 
of Dan Smith, T| 16). 
III. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking. 10 P.3d 338 (Ut. 2000). As will be explained more fully 
below, there is no issue to be adjudicated at trial and the Smiths are therefore entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
A, THE PLAINTIFFS' BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED 
BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Among the causes of action asserted in the Plaintiffs' Complaint is one for breach of 
contract. Since the contract between the Plaintiffs and the Smiths was a written contract and the sale 
of the home was not in Mr. Smith's capacity as a general contractor, the relevant statute of 
limitations is six years as set forth in § 78-12-23(2). Specifically, the statute provides: "An action 
may be brought within six years . . . upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22." The question then, is when did 
the six year period begin to run. 
The general principle regarding when a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of 
limitations begins to run is "upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause 
of action [and that] mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running 
of the statute of limitations." O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Ut. 1991) 
(quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84,86 (Ut. 1981)). The generally accepted rule with regard 
to a claim for breach of contract is that it "accrues, thus causing the statute of limitations to 
commence, only upon breach of the contract." Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson 
Co., 684 P.2d 638, 643 (Ut. 1984). In the instant case, the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is 
premised on the alleged defective construction of the subject home. Therefore, the alleged breach 
occurred, thus causing the statute of limitations to commence, at the very latest, on the date the 
transaction between the parties closed. 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered into between the parties on or about 
February 15, 1994. (See, Exhibit "2"). According to the escrow documents, the closing date was 
May 2, 1994. (See, Exhibit "3"). Furthermore, at no time following May 2, 1994, did the Smiths 
perform any type of construction services or repairs on the home. Therefore, the statute of 
limitations began to run, at the very latest, on May 2, 1994, and the Plaintiffs had until May 2,2000 
by which to file their Complaint. 
It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint for damages until August 24, 
2000. As is readily apparent, this is beyond the six year statute of limitations prescribed by § 78-12-
23(2). Therefore, the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is precluded by the applicable statute of 
limitations and summary judgment is appropriate. 
B, THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF RESCISSION IS BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The claim of rescission is an equitable remedy. Acton v. Deliran,, 737 P.2d 996 (Ut. 1987). 
A cause of action that is not subject to a specific statutory limitations period is governed by the 
residual four-year limitations period found in § 78-12-25(3). Olsen v. Hoolev. 865 P.2d 1345 (Ut. 
1993). § 78-12-25(3) provides: "An action may be brought within four years . . . for relief not 
otherwise provided for by law." Since rescission in a form of equitable relief "not otherwise 
provided for by law," it by default falls into the residual four year limitation period. 
As explained above, typically a statute of limitations begins to run upon the occurrence of 
the last act of negligence or other type of act that would then constitute a cause of action. In the 
instant case, any such act, if it occurred at all, occurred no later than May 2, 1994, the date of 
closing. As the Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint until August 24, 2000, it is patently obvious 
that the applicable statute of limitations has long since expired on the Plaintiffs claim for rescission. 
Therefore, the Smiths are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the Plaintiffs' claim for 
rescission. 
C. THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF THE CONSUMER SALES 
PRACTICES ACT IS BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
The Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that the Smiths violated § 13-11-4 and § 13-11-5 of 
the Consumer Sales Practices Act. This particular Act has its own statute of limitations as 
prescribed by § 13-11-19(8). The statute reads in relevant part: "An action under this section must 
be brought within two years after occurrence of a violation of this chapter[.]" Once again, any 
alleged violation must necessarily have occurred by May 2,1994, the closing date of the transaction. 
Therefore, the statute of limitations expired, at the very latest, on May 2, 1996. The Plaintiffs' 
Complaint was not filed until August 24, 2000. As is readily apparent, this is well after the 
expiration of the limitations period. Therefore, this Court should grant the Smiths' Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' claim for violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
D. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PLEAD THEIR ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD 
AND MISREPRESENTATION WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY AND THE 
SMITHS ARE THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "in all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." This rule 
applies to a cause of action for misrepresentation as well. See e.g., Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 966, 972 (Ut. 1982). Utah courts have stressed, and continue to hold, that "mere 
conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are 
insufficient to preclude dismissal or summary judgment." Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital. 
784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Ut. 1989). See also, Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Ut. 1983). 
To plead fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must allege that there was a false representation 
regarding a material fact which was known to be false or made recklessly without sufficient 
knowledge by the person making the statement. Fraud can also be shown by pleading the omission 
of a material fact when there is a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of 
the other party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party. Taylor v. Gason 
Inc., 607 P.2d 293,294 (Ut. 1980). The reason for the specific pleading requirement is that" [fjraud 
is a wrong of such nature that it must be shown by clear and convincing proof and will not lie in 
mere suspicion or innuendo." Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America. 405 P.2d 339,341 (Ut. 
1965). 
A good example of the application of U.R.C.P. 9(b) is Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 
P.2d 189 (1962). In Heathman, the plaintiff brought suit against the law firm who had represented 
a defendant in another case the plaintiff had previously filed. One of the allegations in his complaint 
against the law firm was that the law firm fraudulently stopped his ability to obtain a default 
judgment against the defendant in that prior case. In support of his claim for fraud he alleged that 
a secretary at the law firm had filed a false affidavit, that the law firm filed false pleadings in 
connection with the affidavit, and that members of the law firm discussed the default judgment with 
judges of the court. Id. at 190. Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the action based upon the 
law firm's motion to dismiss. 
On appeal, the court noted that the plaintiffs complaint contained "no allegation whatever 
of the contents, nature or substance of any alleged false statement in the affidavit or in the 
pleadings[.]" The court further observed that there were not any allegations in the plaintiffs 
complaint of "what was said, or the nature or substance of any conversation between the law firm 
members and any judge or judges." IdL The court concluded that the allegations contained "merely 
broad and general statements that a false affidavit and false pleadings were filed and judges were 
contacted[.]" IcL Accordingly, the court held that the pleading was insufficient and affirmed the 
ruling of the district court. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the Plaintiffs have failed to plead fraud with sufficient 
particularity to withstand a motion for summary judgment. A review of the Plaintiffs' Complaint 
reveals that it contains broad accusations unsupported by any specific facts just as in Heathman. For 
instance, paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs' Complaint states: "Defendants were aware that the Home had 
not been built to code, that certain requirements for occupancy had not been met, and that false 
information had been provided to the city inspector in order to obtain the certificate of occupancy." 
(emphasis supplied). 
No explanation is provided as to how the Smiths were aware the home had not been built to 
code or in what ways the home was code deficient. Such information is vital to the establishment 
of the Plaintiffs' claim of fraud and therefore must be plead with specificity. Instead of providing 
specific facts necessary to establish a claim of fraud, the Plaintiffs have provided a blanket assertion 
that clearly does not meet the specific pleading requirement of U.R.C.P. 9(b). 
Likewise, the Plaintiffs' assertion that "certain requirements" were not met for occupancy 
is clearly lacking. No indication is given as to what these "requirements" were or in what way they 
were not met. Once again, it is a bare bones allegation similar to the ones the court ruled inadequate 
in Heathman. 
Finally, as for the allegation regarding "false information" being supplied to the city 
inspector, no indication is given as to what information was actually provided or how it was false. 
Rather than providing specific detail as required by U.R.C.P. 9(b), Plaintiffs once again make a bare 
bones allegation unsupported by any specific facts. 
As is readily apparent, Plaintiffs have made the type of general accusations that are 
essentially conclusions of the pleader without setting out the basic facts that would constitute the 
charged actions. This is clearly improper under the rules and is legally insufficient to withstand a 
motion for summary judgment. It is not enough to make a few general statements when pleading 
fraud in the hope that it will pass muster. Therefore, the Smiths' Motion for Summary Judgment 
as to Plaintiffs' claims for fraud and misrepresentation should be granted. 
E. THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
BECAUSE ALL OF THE PLAINTIFFS' UNDERLYING CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT 
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiffs' final cause of action is for punitive damages. It is well settled in Utah that 
if all of a party's underlying substantive claims are dismissed, a claim for punitive damages must 
then be dismissed as well. See e.g., U.P.C. v. R.O.A. Gen.. Inc., 990 P.2d 945 (Ut. 1999). Indeed, 
a claim for punitive damages is dependent on the validity of the underlying claims. Because all of 
the Plaintiffs' claims are subject to summary judgment, the Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages 
must be dismissed as well. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants, Dan and Carol Smith, respectfully request that this 
Court grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, 
rescission, and violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act on the basis of the expiration of the 
statute of limitations. The Defendants further request that this Court grant their Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiffs' claims for fraud and misrepresentation on the basis that the 
Plaintiffs have failed to plead those causes of action with sufficient particularity in accordance with 
U.R.C.P. 9(b). Finally, the Defendants request that this Court grant their Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to the Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages on the basis that there is no underlying 
claim left to adjudicate and therefore the punitive damages claim must be dismissed. 
DATED this day of February, 2001. 
DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C. 
A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendants 
A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ. (#889) 
NATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ. (#7522) 
DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C. 
192 East 200 North Suite 203 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 652-8000 
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of ] 
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and ] 
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee ; 
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust, ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF DAN SMITH 
) Case No. 000700142 MI 
) Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) ^  
DAN SMITH, having been duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled case. 
2. I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit. All the statements 
hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my personal 
and direct knowledge of the matter to which said statements pertain. If called as a 
witness by a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able and shall testify as to each 
and all of said matters in the manner hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit. 
3. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Utah and am over 
the age of 18 years. 
4. I built the home located in Millard County, Utah that is the subject of this dispute 
(hereinafter "the subject home"), for the residence of my wife and me. 
5. Construction was completed on the subject home in early November of 1993 and 
we moved into the home in mid-November of 1993. 
6. At the time of the construction and sale of the subject home I was not working as 
a general contractor. 
7. I obtained the Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance for the subject 
home from the City of Fillmore on January 28, 1994. 
8. I affirm that the copy of the Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance 
attached to the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is a true and correct copy of the said original document. 
9. On or about February 15, 1994, an Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered 
between my wife and me and William and Mary Moore (hereinafter "the 
Moores") for the sale of the subject home. 
10. I affirm that the copy of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement attached to the 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is a true 
and correct copy of the said original document. 
11. We moved out of the subject home by the end of March, 1994. 




perform any type of construction or repair services on the subject home. 
The transaction between my wife and I and the Moores for the sale and purchase 
of the subject home closed on May 2, 1994. 
I affirm that the copies of the closing documents attached to the Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment are true and correct 
copies of the said original documents. 
I was not made aware of any alleged construction defects regarding the subject 
home until December of 2000. 
16. The Moores filed their Complaint for damages on August 24, 2000. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this X3 day of February, 2001. 
DAN SMITH 
i^ yim -J 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 
<% 3 day of February, 2001. 
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said 
County and State. 
LOUISE SEMMENS 
H0TM PUBLIC'STATE ol UTAH 
192 E 200 N STE203 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
C0MM.EXP 12-9-2003_ 
L V—^ * — H 1 A A J 
Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance 
CITY OF FILLMORE 
Name of Owner:. 
Address of Owner: 
Property described as:. 
Dan Smith 
155 W 300 S 
Legal description 










Altered New W 
.Building No. 
Contractor; _ 
/ Nn of buildings on lot 
TYPE OF OCCUPANCY 
^ FAMILY OCCUPANCY 
Number of families approved to reside per building 
Number of boarders or roomers with automobiles approved to reside on premises with a family 
Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces 
-No. of Units 
BACHING SINGLES OCCUPANCY 
Number of baching singles approved to reside per unit 
-Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces. The number of occupants owning or operating 
vehicles cannot exceed this number. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that i am the owner or authorized agent of the property subject of this request, that the fore-
going statements and answers are true and correct, and that the stated conditions will be maintained on the premises. 
Signature Date 
Any change in intensity of use on the building or premises, or an increase of more than five percent (5%) in the number of occ-
upants in an apartment or multiple residential building will require the issuance of a new certificate. 
&Z. / 7 7 ^ 
T 
Remarks: 
Section 4-4 Zoning Ordinance No. 77-3 Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance. It shall be unlawful 
to use or occupy or to permit the use or occupancy of any building or premises until a certificate of 
occupancy and zoning compliance shall have been issued for the premises and/or building by Fillmore City. 
Failure to comply with any section of this ordinance is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not 
more then $1000 or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or both as is set forth in Chapter 1 
Sec. ii-iOO. 
Legend Yes(X) No(0) TJATF ^JL«JJ *A% /S 11 4 + 
The undersigned Buyer . hereby deposits with DiuKemye 
EARNEST MONkY, the amount of ^ } ffll/V ^ T j . ^ A . ^ i l ^ t r L * ' &~ ' ^ / / q t i Dollars ($ * / ( 9 ^ Q 7V? ) 
the form of (1 , f j ^ C ^ -= 
nch shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law r\ « 
YUTK^ ^ Received by A / <£*l $ ' /irlYi^kL 
okerage Phone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of trjeproperty situated at 
in the City of 3'-lMyrr^^^K^ _ County of fYl t^La/l^ , Utah, 
bject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations utiltULor other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
cordance with Section G Said property Is owned by K / (2J)\ yynZA' as sellers and is more particularly described 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY Q Vacant Lot Q Vacant Acreage _ Other 
^ IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY S Commercial _ f Residential O Condo O Other 
(a) Included Items Unless excluded below this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title 
(b) Excluded items The following items are specifically excluded from this sale _ 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS Seller represents that the property includes the foUowing improvements in the purchase price 
3 public sewer Qrconnected Q well G connected E3 other _J electricity J_conne 
z)  
10 CKc O Q S J 8  conn cted 
O septic tank 0 connected IVsirngation water/.secondary system . £2 Ingress & egress by private easement 
@ other sanitary system # of shares /U\ A J_ fl^omffan^P V-^xAAj _T dedicated road _ l paved 
Cf public water m connected Q^JV antenna 0 master antenna O prewired O curb and gutter 
@ private water 0 connected E l natural gas {^connected £ 3 other rights 
(d) Survey A certified survey \J shall be furnished at the expense of _ * prior to closing BT shall not be furnished 
(e) Buyer Inspection Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject fo Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical 
condition except 
2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The total purchase price for the property is XU^My \J'f)AjJ^ v J / l ^ t7 <^ f t r u ( ~ " " — ' 
- . ' " ~~ ^ / / q r ; Dollars {$ ff 3 j OOP' c o ) which shall be paid as follows 
/ A 00(h OO which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
* 7 y fifiO'QQ representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing 
O representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer, 
which obligation bears interest at O % per annum with monthly payments of $ O 
which Include D principal D interest, D taxes, • insurance, • condo fees, D other 
O representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include D principal, D interest, • taxes, D insurance, • condo fees • other 
Q representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows 
O Other 
8l;ooo>0° TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
assume and/or procure same ana* this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees 
) make application within /V / n days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at 
n interest rate not to exceed 'A/ fJ\r % if Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within _ _ days after Seller's acceptance 
f this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Sefler upon written .notice Seller agrees to pay up to __ 
A//A 
_ mortgage loan discount 
otnts, not to exceed $ A/ / / \ In addition, seller agrees to pay $ Af / n to be used for Buyer's other ,-loan costs 
age two of a four page form Seller's I n i t l a l s ^ ^ * i ) Date f * / ^ 5 / f f / Buyer's Init ials (* ) {* *) Date Jl—z. L 
cumbrances and exceptions noted herein, 
in attorney's opinion (See Section H)« need by (J a current policy of title insurance In the ar. of purchase price Igan abstract of title brought current, 
INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing. Buyer 
ct to any existing restrictive covenants, Including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer U has Q)has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing t 
VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: Cl^L d.JL*A eJ* J (*"J CJ^iJ.^ ^ 
shall take title 
this Agreement. 
SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted' 
•~1-LfrK-< _ 
ptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following: 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
to closing: , ___ 
. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before . at a reasonable location to be designated by 
r, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closingsoffice aH documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
\greement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall^be'made as of 0 date of possession Qddate of closing @ other 
. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on f'J )(i *y o y / 4 7H- unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the iisting&gent A/ / fir represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer, 
the selling agent A//A represents ( ) Seller ( ) /buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
in disclosure of the agency relationship^) was provided to him/her. ( ) ( ) Buyer's initials ( ) ( ) Seller's initials. 
, GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
EPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE 
. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall 
until . ? ' 0(3 (AM/pNji J T / ^ i / / , 19 f f , to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse ap_cj the Agent sharf4e^orft7the _fARVNE_-T 
lEYl 
it & dfi WPm v ^ $ T ? T rid H4ew r J 
{to Xfe Buyer/ s
 f j V ' ' / , ^ ^ n i IP O / / •-_> S '?-.„" 
f / dht.f' K h / AfU- S A H o Y J. 3 f f / y./ - (•< xr 
S i g n a t u r e ) ' (Date) " " ( A d d r e s s ) K (Phone) (SSI af'siSignalure) 
(S V ^ M ' / ^ / ; . ^ V vi'ti/tfiufiif /"S.tr- / i'J?j/ (Phone) 
(SSN/TAX ID) 
(S§N/TAX ID) < er's Sf^ nafxire) ate) (Address) 
0KONE 
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above 
REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
asents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until (AM/PM) , 19 to accept the terms 
ecified below. 
-J-Q-
er's^Signature) (Qate) / ' (Time) (Address) 
j____u£ tf, A^zL-1. *>. tslW_ ^'loBm P>Q>&axns 
7V1 • TJ7Q 
(Phone) 
"7^ -? -St7o 
(SSN/TAX ID) 
Jit er's Signature) (Time) (Address] m. 
CK ONE: 
ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
REJECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer's Initials) 
COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
miyU 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
'er's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
ate Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed). 
0 1 acknowledge receipppf a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: 
ATUREOF SELLER ,? / , / / SIGNATURE/OF I ATUREJ3F 
J I acknowledge recei pt a Tinai co 
J J3  /  . / / 
~ZaMi$. £rZK 
SIGNATURE/OF BUYER J 
I' v \- V. 
D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on. 
titled Mall and return receipt attached hereto to the • Seller D Buyer. Sent by 
ie three of a four page form 
/ " / v / 
Date 
Date 
. , 1 9 . -by 
^ J U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 
EXHIBIT 
Form Approved OMB No. 2502 0265 
'ype of Loan 
] FHA 2. a FmHA 3 D Conv. Unins. 
1 VA 5 D Conv Ins 
6. File Number 
29827-M 
7. Loan Number 8. Mortgage Insurance Case Nun 
^ot«: This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are she 
Items marked "(p.o.c.)" were paid outside the closing^  they are shown here for InformaUonaJ Qu/gosjas. an/i a/A oat inrJudA^ 
the totals. 
Name and Address of Borrower 
Jam K. Moore 
/ J. Moore 
. Rt. Box 234 
Lmore, Ut. 84631 
E. Name and Address of Seller 
Dan Irvin Smith 
Carol L. Smith 
P.O. 985 
Fillmore, Ut. 84631 
F. Name and Address of Lender 
Properly Location 
ited in 
Lmore, Ut. 84631 
. of Lot 6, Blk. 32, P la t A, F i l lmore 
r Survey. 
H. Settlement Agent 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF MILLARD COUNTY 
Place of Settlement 
P.O. BOX 658 
F i l lmore , Utah 84631 
I. Settlement Data 
5/02/94 
Summary of Borrower1! Transaction K. Summary of Seller's Transaction 
Grots Amount Due From Borrower 
Contract sales arlce 
. Personal property 
. Settlement charges to borrower (line 1400) 
Adjustments for items paid by teller In adva 
. City/town taxes to 
. County taxes to 
. Assessments to 
i. Qrost Amount Due From Borrower 
i. Amounts Paid By Or In Behalf Of Borrowe 
. Deposit or earnest money 
. Principal amount of new loan(s) 
Existing loan(s) taken subject to 
Adjustments for Items unpaid by seller 
. City/town taxes to 
. County taxes 1 / 0 1 / 9 4 0 S / D ? / q 4 
. Assessments to 
t. Total Paid By/For Borrower 
>. Cash At Settlement From/To Borrower 
. Gross amount due from borrower (line 120) 
Less amounts paid by/for borrower (line 220 
I. Cash D From a To Borrower 
SRS: / ^ / ; / f c > N Jr? 








i<n .7 i 
4,1*3.71 
K3,lfe4,fcU 
( 4 , i y j . 7 J ) 
78,970.89 1 
/m&Wj/ 
4 0 0 . Gross Amount Due To Seller 
4 0 1 . Contract sales price 





Adjustments for items paid by seller in advance 
406. City/town taxes to 
407. County taxes to 





420 . Gross Amount Due To Seller 
500 . Reductions In Amount Due To Seller 
501 Excess deposit (see Instructions) 
502. Settlement charges to seller (line 1400) 
503. Existing loan(s) taken subject to 
504 Payoff of first mortgage loan 





Adjustments for items unpaid by tel ler 
510 City/town taxes to 
511 . County taxes 1 / f ) 1 / q 4 t o S / n ? 








520 . Tota! Reduction Amount Due Sailor 
600 . Cash At Settlement To/From Seller 
601 . Gross amount due to seller (line 420) 
602. Less reductions In amt. due seller (line 520) 
603 . Casjj





i < n . 7 i 





- ^ £ ^ 2 . 1 - 1 IRev.7/e 
vnnoii c\ rr)A#u Cai*ej Jn,y/t C//w..//„ 
Total Sales/Broker's Commission based on price $ 
Division of Commission (line 700) as follows 
$ to 
$ to 
Commission paid at Settlement 










Items Payable In Connection With Loan 
Loan Origination Fee % 
Loan Discount % 
Appraisal Fee to 
Credit Report to 
Lender's Inspection Fee 
Mortgage Insurance Application Fee to 
Assumption Fee 
Items Required By Lender To Be 
Interest from to 
Mortgage Insurance Premium for 
Hazard Insurance Premium for 






3. Reserves Deposited W 
1. Hazard Insurance 
I Mortgage Insurance 
I City property taxes 
I. County property taxes 





months @ $ 
months @ $ 
months <5> $ 
months @ $ 
months <5> $ 
months @ $ 
months <a> $ 









3. Title Charges 
1. Settlement or closing fee 
2. Abstract or title search 
3. Title examination 
4. Title Insurance binder 
5. Document preparation 
3. Notary fees 
1. Attorney's fees 
(includes above Items' numbers* 
3 Title Insurance 
(includes above Items' numbers: 
9 Lender's coverage 














Security T i t l e Company 
.Qpmr^y T i t - i * rnrrtp^ny 










O. Government Recording and Transfer Charges 
1, Recording fees Deed$ 1S.00 : Mortgage tt.no ; Release $f) ,QQ T).nn 
2 City/county tax/stamps Deed $ ; Mortgage $ 
3. State tax/stamps. Deeds ; Mortgage $ 
0. Additional Settlement Charges 
1. Survey to 
2. Pest Inspection to 
^o.q/1 tfcit r>r &^p<^rnpnt-<3 
6 
TTplmnrP hfafrpr I k ^ r q &c-,'-.nr in nn 
p^l lmpr^ M-qt-p-r llqprt; fi.<\<^nr . 13 fiO 
>0. Total Settlement Charges (enter on lines 103, Section J and 502, Section K) 164.60 629,00 
ERS INITIALS'.JlQjlL SELLERS INITIALS: 1121-2 (Rev. 7/87) 
kim 
Order No, 23Q27-M 
DATE. 
—5/02/34 
TO; Security Title Company of Millard County 
180 South Main 
P.O. Box 658 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
These instructions submitted this date, to you as ESCROW ^ F ^ i T d ^y ^ e unc*ersigned 
Seller(s) and Huyer(s), of the following real estate situated in 
County, State of Utah, to-wit; 
Beginning 20 feet West of the Northeast corner of Lot 6, Block 32, P la t A, 
Fillmore City Survey, thence West 89 feet ; thence South 128 fee t ; thence 
East 27 feet; thence South 202 feet more or less to the South l ine of said 
Lot 6; thence East 82 feet ; thence North 165 feet irore or l e ss t o a point 
165 feet South of the North l ine of said Lot 6; thence West 20 f ee t ; thence 
North 165 feet to the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH a l l r i g h t s , p r iv i l eges , easements, r i g h t s of vray, 
improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anyway 
appertaining there to . 
SUBJECT TO covenants, condi t ions , r e s t r i c t i o n s , reserva t ions , easements and 
r igh ts of way of record. 
• ~& 'k% ' :-: & 
LocafeedHnf l i l l rnqfe , Ut 84631 
Property Address: 
WITNESSETH: 
The undersigned parties hereby employ you as ESCROW AGENT to complete the closing 
of this escrow (sale) in accordance with the following instructions. The parties agree to 
deliver to you all properly executed instruments, documents, and funds necessary to comply 
with the terms hereof; and which you may use when you have satisfied the terms and provi-
sions of this agreement, or are in position to do so, on or before the 7 day 
of May_ , 19JL214 and: 
You can issue your Standard Coverage Form Policy of Title Insurance with liability of 
$ 83,000.00, (fee: $ 529,Q0 charged to Seller ) 
covering the hereinafter described property showing title vested in: 
William K. Moore and Mary J . Moore, husband and wife, as jo in t tenants 
To bo free of all liens and encumbrances, except as follows: 
1. Taxes: for the year 1994 now a l i en not yet due. 
2. Special assessments? 
3. Easements: in existence and/or of record. 
4. Other: 
The SALES PRICE IS $ 83,000.00, to be paid as follows: 
EARNEST MONEY $ 4,000.00 
DOWN PAYMENTS 79,000.00 plus closing costs to be paid in fu l l a t the 
time of closing. 
VKVKHHED BALANCE: $ 
0.00 
iSwhuck sid? for GENERAL CONDITIONS) 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
HANDLING OF FUNDS AND DOCUMENTS: Deposit all funds in connection with this 
escrow in any of our escrow accounts in any federally insured depository selected by you and 
disburse same by the issuance of checks from said account. Pay encumbrances in accordance 
with this agreement, prorate all agreed items, and record such escrowed instruments as are 
necessary or proper for commission, and disburse balance of escrowed funds to the party or 
parties entitled thereto. If sale be based on contract of sale, deliver such contract and all related 
instruments to designated escrow collection agent. Cause fire insurance policies to show the 
interest of the respective parties after closing sale. You are hereby relieved of any obligation to 
determine if fire insurance policy is in force and its premium paid. 
TAXKS AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS: It is understood t h a t property taxes are assessed 
nna 'interest on special assessments is charged on a ca'lenaar year-basis, f^ ou are therefore 
instructed to make all prorations thereof on that basis. In prorat ing taxes, if the amount of the 
current year's taxes be unknown, use prior year's taxes as a basis. You are hereby released 
from any and all liability which could arise by reason of any variance between the amount 
payable in taxes on the year of closing and on the said prior year. If parcel being sold be a 
portion of a larger tract and no separate tax assessment is available therefor, no proration 
shall be required to be made in escrow the Buyer and Seller hereby agreeing that they will 
adjust the proration of taxes between themselves. You are to make no proration of unpaid 
principal of special assessments unless specifically instructed to do so. You shall have no 
assessment as may be reported by the various municipal offices involved. 
PRORATIONS: Before prorating items relating to existing encumbrances and in accounting 
for assumed obligations and impounded reserves, obtain from agent or individual making 
collections thereon all needed information, including rate of interest, payment terms and exist-
ing balances. You are instructed to use information in making required prorations and effect-
ing settlement between the parties and are hereby released from any liability or responsibility 
should the information furnished to and used by you prove to be incorrect. 
CANCELLATION OR AMENDMENT: This escrow may not be cancelled or its terms modi-
fied without consent of all the parties hereto. Should either party to this escrow elect to cancel 
the same, you are instructed to notify forthwith the remaining parties by mailing written 
notice of said election to them and the real estate agent at their last known address. In the 
event of cancellation, all documents are to be returned to the respective parties who shall have 
deposited same with you. If cancellation occurs because of the default of seller and not of buyer, 
you ure instructed to refund to buyer all funds escrowed by him, after deducting your charges 
and expenses. However, if cancellation is occasioned by default of buyer and not of seller, you 
are authorized to pay to seller buyer's escrowed earnest money, which shall be forfeited to seller 
and treated as liquidated damages. In the event you have documents executed by both buyer 
and seller, you shall cancel same by marking with the word "void," retaining said documents 
in your files. 
Failure to close this escrow within the period hereinabove provided shall not automatically 
terminate or cancel same. You may continue to regard it as executory until notified to the 
contrary in writing by any of the parties hereto. Should a dispute or controversy arise between 
buyer and seller, you shall hold all monies and documents until such a time as existing differ-
ences shall have been resolved through compromise or a final judicial determination had of the 
rights of the parties. In the event you interplead you may deposit the documents and funds in 
court, deducting all your charges and expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees 
and you will thereupon be relieved of further liability or responsibility in connection with this 
escrow. The parties hereto agree to save you harmless, in the event of any such disagreement 
between the parties, against all liability, costs, damages, expenses and attorney's fees tha t 
may arise or which may be incurred or sustained by you by reason hereof. 
POSSESSION r>ATF, CLOSE OF ESCROW 
PRORATE AND/OR ADJUST THE FOLLOWING AS OF Hay 2, 199^ 
(See General Conditions on reverse side for details.) 
1. Taxes and special assessments. 
2. Fire and casualty insurance and FHA insurance, if applicable. 
3. Interest on all encumbrances. 
4. Rents, if any, per rent statement. 
5. Charge the Buyer and credit the Seller for funds held in impound account, if any, pertaining 
to any loans assumed by Buyer. 
WATER STOCK AND/OR WATER RIGHTS: ' 3 2 s h a r e s o £ F 'W-u-*« ^ t e r stock 
General instructions and conditions set forth on the reverse side hereof are hereby incorporated 
in and made a part of the following instructions. 
At the close of ESCROW you are to deliver or mail all documents, checks, $tc. by regular mail to 
the persons entitled thereto at the addresses provided below, \ ? 
. * P ft f * * 
Failure to close this ESCROW within the period of time.hereinabove provided shall not auto-
matically terminate or cancel the same. You may continue to regard it as executory until 
canceled by notice from any of the parties hereto in writing. 
The SELLER agrees to sell, and the BUYER agrees to buy the above described property upon 
the terms and conditions herein contained. 
SELLER BUYER { 
Dan I rv in Smith 
Ca*jd.J. &>-driL 
SELLER 
Carol L. Smith 
Address: p , o . 985 
Fillmore, Ut 84631 
Phone Number: 743-5170 
Social Security Number: 
William K. Moore 
"VBUYER 
Mary J . Moore 
Address, s t a r Rt. Box 234 
Fillmore, Ut 84631 
Phone Number: 743-6834 
Social Security Number: 
ACCEPTED THIS.J day of. May 
-.19.1214 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
OF MILLARD COUNTY 
BY:. ^<nJh> 
R. Kent Dalton 
(See back aide for GENERAL CONDITIONS) 
Page Two 
General Conditions 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS: Parties hereto agree that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, 
assumes no responsibility or liability of unrecorded tax or mechanic's liens, personal property 
taxes, mining locations, rights of parties in possession of the premises, surveys, location of 
improvement or boundary lines, use of property in compliance with zoning ordinances or 
restrictions and such other matters as are excepted under Schedule "B" of the standard form 
policy or title insurance. It is further agreed that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, makes no 
representation as to the sufficiency or validity of the documents deposited herewith nor makes 
any representations as to the value, quantity, or condition of the property described herein. In 
the event sale includes furniture or other personal property, it is understood and agreed that 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY has made no search of the records for chattel mortgages or 
conditional sales contracts and does not certify as to title thereto, and buyer accepts the bill of 
sale with understanding. Parties hereto further agree that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
assumes no liability for and is expressly released from any claim or claims whatsoever in 
connection with the receiving, retaining, and delivering of the above papers, except to account 
for payments made thereon, from which it is authorized to deduct its customary collection 
charges and expenses, together with any amount which may be required to pay costs, attorney 
fees and other legal expenses by reason of any litigation or controversy which may arise in 
connection herewith. 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, as ESCROW AGENT and ESCROWEE, assumes no respon-
sibility for determining that the parties to this escrow have complied with the requirements of 
the Truth in Lending, Consumer Credit Protection Act, (Public Law 90-321), Utah Consumer 
Credit Code, or similar laws. 
ADDITION TO GENERAL CONDITIONS 
DISCLOSURE OF TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS: I n t e r n a l Revenue Code 
S e c t i o n 6109(h) imposes requirements for f u r n i s h i n g , d i s c l o s i n g , and 
i n c l u d i n g taxpayer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers i n tax r e t u r n s on the p a r t i e s t o 
a r e s i d e n t i a l r e a l e s t a t e t r a n s a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g s e l l e r - p r o v i d e d f i n a n c i n g . 
The p a r t i e s understand that the d i s c l o s u r e r e p o r t i n g requirements are 
e x c l u s i v e o b l i g a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s to t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n and tha t 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY i s not o b l i g a t e d t o t ransmi t the taxpayer 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers to the I n t e r n a l Revenue S e r v i c e or to the p a r t i e s 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY i s not rendering an o p i n i o n c o n c e r n i n g the e f f e c t of 
t h i s law on t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n , and the p a r t i e s are not a c t i n g on any 
s ta tements made or omit ted by the escrow or c l o s i n g o f f i c e r . 
To f a c i l i t a t e compliance with t h i s law, the p a r t i e s to t h i s escrow hereby 
author ize SECURITY TITLE COMPANY to r e l e a s e any p a r t y ' s taxpayer 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n number to any r e q u e s t i n g par ty who i s a party to t h i s 
t r a n s a c t i o n . The r e q u e s t i n g party s h a l l d e l i v e r a w r i t t e n r e q u e s t to 
escrow. The p a r t i e s h e r e t o waive a l l r i g h t s of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y regard ing 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e taxpayer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers and agree to hold SECURITY 
TITLE COMPANY harmless a g a i n s t any f e e s , c o s t s , or judgments incurred 
and/or awarded in c o n n e c t i o n with the . r e l e a s e of taxpayer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
numbers. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am an employee of DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C. and that on the ^ 3 
day of February, 2001,1 placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support 
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the United States mails at St. George, Utah, with 
1st class postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Gregory B. Hadley 
James K. Haslam 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200 
Provo,UT 84604 
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i MAY " 6 2003 . j 
A. BRYCE DDCON, ESQ (#889) . -;-.-—". •-•.,»" \ 
AARON M. WAITE, ESQ (#8992) '' j _ ""_"_"' ry\\ \ 
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C. ~ " ^ ".TZ—l^fe-. "UEPUjVj 
192 East 200 North, Suite 203 u rr^-r_~ 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435) 652-8000 
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of ] 
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and ) 
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee ) 
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust, ] 
Defendants. ] 
> MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I Oral argument requested 
) Civil No.: 000700142 MI 
) Judge: EYRE 
L 
INTRODUCTION 
In August, 2000, after living in a home for about 6 !4 years, the Plaintiffs sued the Defendants 
alleging DAN SMITH and CAROL SMITH sold them the home in February, 1994, with 
construction defects. A previous motion for summary judgment was filed by the Smiths. The court 
granted the motion partially and allowed discovery to proceed on the following two issues: 1) 
whether the Smiths failed to disclose "latent and material defects in the home, or building code 
violations, of which [the Smiths] were aware," and 2) "when those defects should have reasonably 
been discovered'1 by the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiffs own testimony and discovery responses show that all of the 30-42 
construction defects that they allege in this case could have been discovered by a home inspection 
before they bought the house. The Utah law of caveat emptor, therefore, demands dismissal of all 
claims based on said defects. 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-21.5, the applicable statute of limitations, bars all claims 
brought by the Plaintiffs. Pursuant to Section 21.5, the period for commencing an action for breach 
of a written contract is six years and the date for commencing an action for all other claims is two 
years from the date Plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered, through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, the alleged defects. Here, Plaintiffs commenced their lawsuit more than six 
years after the completion of construction and the date of contract. In addition, discovery has 
revealed that Mary Moore had notice of the major alleged defects some five and six years before she 
filed suit, though she chose not to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the defects until the year 
2000. 
At Plaintiffs' request, in August, 2000, Jason Bullock inspected the home and prepared a list 
of 30 alleged defects. Most of these alleged defects, even if proven, are too insignificant to warrant 
discussion. For example, item number 7 in Bullock's list alleges that an electrical outlet that was 
covered by kitchen cabinetry had no cover plate. Even the Plaintiffs' own experts acknowledge that 
the cost of an outlet cover plate is merely a dollar-although Plaintiffs' expert, Lloyd Steenblik, thinks 
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it would take an electrician one hour, at $45 an hour, to screw the cover plate onto the outlet (See 
page 8, Item #7, of the report of Project Analysts, one of Plaintiffs' experts Copies of the pages of 
Project Analysts report cited herein are annexed as Exhibit 1 ) In addition, item number 25 alleges 
that the electrical control panel was not labeled, although the wires next to the panel were labeled 
It would take mere minutes for any person to fix this so called "defect" by transferring the 
information from the labels on the wires to the stickers on the panel However, Plaintiffs' expert 
Lloyd Steenbhk estimated that it would take an electrician 6 hours at $45 an hour to label the 
electrical panel See page 30 of Exhibit 1 A third example is item number 29 which alleges that 
outlets in the garage are not GFCI This could have been remedied by the installation of an outlet 
costing a few dollars according to the Smiths' expert, Michael Barrett * See Item 29 of Michael 
Barrett's report, the pertinent pages of which are annexed hereto as Exhibit 2 Most importantly, 
every one of these alleged defects were obvious and not latent 
The house is not threatened by the alleged defects The roof does not leak There is no 
known damage to footings or foundation The best the Plaintiffs' experts can do is say that these are, 
technically, building code violations and, if not corrected, might do harm m the future despite the 
fact that the Plaintiffs lived m the home contentedly for over six years without a single complaint 
to the Smiths 
1
 These are just a few of the many examples of how the Plaintiffs' experts have inflated 
the repair costs of alleged defects. It is not necessary for this motion for summary judgment to 
treat that issue, however 
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IL 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for damages on August 24, 2000, alleging 
separate causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Rescission; (3) Fraudulent Nondisclosure; 
(4) Misrepresentation; (5) Violation of Consumer Sales Practices Act; and (6) Punitive Damages. 
See Complaint. They amended the complaint to mutual mistake. 
2. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the Smiths knew their home was not built to code 
when they sold it to the Plaintiffs. They call this "fraudulent nondisclosure." See Complaint, at 
Third Cause of Action, p. 4. 
3. The fourth cause of action of Plaintiffs complaint alleges that the Smiths 
misrepresented that their home was "built in compliance with applicable building codes," was "safe 
for occupancy, and able to be lawfully occupied." See Complaint, at p. 5. 
4. Soon after the Smiths were served with the Complaint they submitted their first 
Motion for Summary Judgment. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5. On August 16,2001, the Court entered an Order on The Smiths' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. See Court's August 16, 2001, Order annexed hereto as Exhibit 3. 
6. The Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim. See Court's 
August 16, 2001, Order at p. 2. 
1. The Court's Order also reflects that the Plaintiffs were required to elect their remedies 
between the breach of contract claim and the rescission claim. See Court's August 16, 2001, Order 
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at p. 3. 
8. Plaintiffs elected the remedy of rescission as their sole remedy in this action and the 
Court ordered that the Plaintiffs could not seek damages under their breach of contract claim. See 
Court's August 16, 2001, Order at pp. 3 - 4 . 
9. The Court concluded "that the Smiths . . . may have a legal duty to disclose to 
Plaintiffs any latent and material defects in the home, or building code violations, of which [the 
Smiths] were aware." See Court's August 16, 2001, Order at pp. 2-3. 
IIL 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs7 home, which is the subject matter of this litigation, is located at 155 West 
300 South, Fillmore City, Millard County, State of Utah (hereinafter the "Home"). 
2. The Smiths built the Home for their own residence. Deposition of Dan Smith, p. 71, 
the pertinent pages of which are annexed hereto as Exhibit 4. A^ 
3. The Smiths obtained a building permit for the construction of the Home. See 
Building Permit and Building Permit Application annexed hereto as Exhibit 5. t^" 
4. The Home's construction was inspected and approved by the appropriate agencies 
throughout its construction. See May 4, 2001, letter from Fillmore City annexed hereto as Exhibit 
6. Also see p. 89 of Peterson deposition annexed hereto as Exhibit 7. \ ^ 
5. The Fillmore City Building Inspector, Jack Peterson, discussed the amount of roof 
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ventilation with Mr. Smith and approved the as-built ventilation. See Deposition of Jack Peterson 
at p. I l l , Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5 to his deposition, annexed as Exhibit 7a. 
6. The City Building Inspector expressly approved the height of the stairs even though 
they were not in technical compliance with the code. See Exhibit 7, Peterson Deposition at pp. 65, 
66. 
7. During one of the construction inspections, the City Building Inspector observed the 
felt paper that served as flashing for the windows. See Peterson Deposition at p. 54, Exhibit 7. 
8. The Smiths obtained a Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance on or about 
January 28, 1994. See Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance annexed to Peterson 
deposition as Exhibit 7, found here as Exhibit 8. 
9. The City Building Inspector signed off on the certificate of occupancy and the final 
inspection. See Peterson Deposition, at p. 88, Exhibit 7. 
10. An Earnest Money Sales Agreement ("Agreement") was entered into between the 
parties on or about February 15, 1994. See Agreement annexed hereto as Exhibit 9. 
1L The Agreement states in pertinent part that: 
Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above 
and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical condition, except: (this space 
was intentionally left blank by the parties). 
See Agreement at J^ 1(e). 
SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the 
following items are also warranted: none (handwritten). 
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See Agreement at ^  6 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES This offer is made 
subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be 
satisfied pnor to closing closing fees to be paid half by buyer + half by seller 
(handwritten) 
See Agreement at ^  7 
GENERAL PROVISIONS UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE 
GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE 
BEEN ACCEPTED BY BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED 
INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE 
See Agreement at ^ 11 
12 The General Provisions (also Exhibit 9) state 
B INSPECTION Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is 
purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by 
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling 
Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income 
herefrom or as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition 
subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event that Buyer desires 
an additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for 
and paid by Buyer 
See General Provisions at f B 
C SELLER WARRANTIES Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim 
or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
or which will not be remedied pnor to closing, (c) the plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning and ventilating systems, electncal system, and appliances shall be sound 
or in satisfactory working condition at closing 
See General Provisions at f C 
COMPLETE AGREEMENT - NO ORAL AGREEMENTS This instrument 
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constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements 
between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this 
agreement 
See General Provisions at ^ j L 
13 Plaintiffs did not condition the purchase of the property on the outcome of a home 
inspection See Agreement (Exhibit 9) at j^ 6 
14 Plaintiffs did not have an independent home inspection performed prior to purchasing 
the Home See Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants1 First Set of Requests for Admissions to 
Plaintiffs, Response Number 6, and the Smiths First Set of Requests for Admission, Request Number 
6 The pertinent request and their responses are annexed hereto as Exhibit 10 
15 Plaintiffs walked through the house before purchasing it but never considered hiring 
a home inspection to determine whether there were any unsatisfactory conditions See Moore 
Deposition, Vol I, pp 72-73 
16 Plaintiffs had the opportunity to have a home inspection conducted and the Smiths 
did not prevent them from doing so See Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendants Second Set of Requests 
for Admission dated February 14, 2003, Response Number 2, 3 and 4 , and the Smiths Second Set 
of Requests for Admission, Request Number 2, 3 and 4 Annexed as Exhibit 10 
17 Since May 2, 1994, the Plaintiffs made improvements to the Home and the lot, 
including landscaping, and installation of water softener, air conditioning, doors and water line, and 
enjoyed the benefit of living m the Home and complete control over the Home and lot See 
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Deposition of Mary Moore, pp 50-52, 144-151. (Exhibit 11) 
18. Plaintiff admits that: 
Neither my husband or I have ever been a contractor or an engineer, nor do we have 
any special knowledge concerning building codes, home construction, safety 
inspections, or anything like that. 
See Affidavit of Mary Moore (Exhibit 12) at % 7. 
19. The alleged code violations identified by Plaintiffs were all discovered in the year 
2000 by a home inspection, which did not involve destructive testing. See Exhibit 10, Response 
Number 5, Request Number 5. See Deposition of Jason Bullock p. 33, Exhibit 13. See Deposition 
of Lloyd Steenblik p. 77-78, copies of the pages cited herein are attached hereto as Exhibit 14. See 
Project Analysts report (Exhibit 1) at p. 3. 
20. Jason Bullock prepared a list of 30 alleged code violations that he found upon 
performing the home inspection in the year 2000, for which Mary Moore was charged merely $60. 
See Deposition of Jason Bullock, p. 31-33. Exhibit 13. 
21. Jason Bullock discovered all of the alleged defects as he walked through the house 
as though he were performing a final inspection. See Bullock Deposition, p. 30. Exhibit 13. 
22. Steenblik's inspection added 12 minor items to the list but the major alleged defects 
were all in Bullock's original list. See Project Analysts report, summary sheet, Exhibit 1, p. 2. 
23. Plaintiffs discovered, or, were placed on notice of, many of the alleged defects long 
before the home inspection in 2000: 
a. Mary Moore knew of the alleged window defects almost immediately upon 
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moving into the house when she saw flaking of paint caused by water at the end of 
the first winter. See Moore Deposition, Vol I, pp. 41-42. Exhibit 11. 
b. Mary Moore also saw exposed footings the first spring when she moved into 
the house while doing landscaping. See Moore Deposition, Vol I, pp. 46,47. Exhibit 
11. 
c. Defect Number 4 on Steenblik's list, alleging water damage and cracking to 
the southeast corner of the foundation, was known to Mary Moore the first spring 
after she moved into the house. See Moore Deposition, Vol. I, pp. 107-108. Exhibit 
11. 
d. Some allegedly bad shingles on the garage roof were called to Mary Moore's 
attention on November 7, 1997, when she had the shingles inspected by the shingle 
manufacturer and was told that they were damaged by inadequate ventilation. See 
Moore Deposition, Vol. II, p. 167 (Exhibit 11), and Exhibit 6 to her deposition. 
(Annexed here as 11 A). 
e. Defect Number 41 in Steenblik's list, alleging plumbing defects, were known 
to Mary Moore six months after she moved into the Home. See Moore Deposition, 
Vol. I, p. 27. Exhibit 11. 
f. Defect Number 12, alleging that the smoke detectors were omitted from the 
bedrooms, was known to Mary Moore approximately one year after moving into the 
Home. See Moore Deposition, Vol. I, pp. 94,95. Exhibit 11. 
g. The various minor electrical problems alleged by Plaintiffs were known to 
Mary Moore in December, 1997, when she was given notice of the need to check the 
circuit breaker after the furnace stopped working. See Moore Deposition, Vol. I, p. 
104. Exhibit 11. See also Exhibit 11 A. 
24. Plaintiffs have admitted that all of the 42 alleged defects could have been discovered 
by a home inspection before they bought the house. See Plaintiffs5 Answers to Second Set of 
Admission, Exhibit 10, Response Number 7, and the Second Set of Requests for Admission, Exhibit 
10, Request Number 7. 
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25. Plaintiffs have admitted that all of the alleged defects are patent except items 9, 12, 
26, 27, 38 and 39.2 See Plaintiffs' Answers to Second Set of Admission, Response Number 9, and 
the Second Set of Requests for Admission, Request Number 9. Exhibit 10. 
26. There is no evidence of serious damage to the integrity of the house. There is no 
allegation that the roof leaks. See Mary Moore deposition, p. 20. Exhibit 11. There is no known 
damage to footings or foundation. See Mary Moore deposition p. 45. Exhibit 11. 
27. Lloyd Steenblik at first alleged that Dan Smith attached the window flashing 
to the outside of the aluminum siding. Exhibit 1, Project Analysts report, item 9 at p. 10. Later his 
superior showed him that he was mistaking a molding strip for the window nailing fm and that he 
was wrong on that opinion. Steenblik depo. p. 45. Exhibit 14. 
28. Jack Peterson says he saw on inspection the felt paper that served as flashing for the 
windows. Peterson depo. p. 54. Exhibit 7. He also testified that the slight water damage is caused 
by mere condensation that sometimes forms on cold days because of the thin aluminum on the 
windows. Pp. 57-58, Exhibit 7. 
2
 The Smiths propounded to the Plaintiffs a request for admission intended to establish 
which defects were admittedly patent and which were considered by the Plaintiffs to be "latent," 
as the latter term is used in the Court's August 16, 2001, Order. Request Number 9 stated: 
Admit that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru 42 in your 
expert witness report at the time of the sale of the house were not a latent defects 
as the phrase "latent defecf'is used in the court's order regarding the Smiths' 
motion for summary judgment." 
In response, Plaintiffs admitted that all of the defects were not latent except items 9, 12, 26, 27, 
38 and 39. 
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29. Allegation of Overspanning of Floor Joists- Peterson testified that the code calls 
for a 13 foot one inch span. Peterson measured the span and found in his report, Exhibit 4 to his 
deposition, annexed hereto as Exhibit 7B, that no joists exceeded that span. P. 75. 
30. Alleged lack of dirt covering the footings. At the time of the final inspection the 
ground around the house was so "muddy" that the finish "grading was impossible." Peterson depo. 
p. 148. Exhibit 7. With Jack Peterson's permission and the expectation that they would do the finish 
grading in the spring when the weather cleared up, the Smiths were given a final inspection approval. 
Depo. Peterson, p. 77. Exhibit 7. 
31. Allegation of Inadequate Roof Ventilation. The undisputed evidence is that Dan 
Smith and the building inspector, Jack Peterson, had a discussion about the roof ventilation. Jack 
Peterson testifies that he accepted Dan Smith's opinion that the amount of ventilation was adequate. 
He did not "red tag" the ventilation. In Exhibit 5 to his deposition he said, "I also visited the job site 
another occasion and Dan and I discussed the venting of the attic. Dan felt that it was adequate." 
Exhibit 7A. Thus, Peterson "accepted it." Peterson depo. p. 111. Exhibit 7. 
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ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS ARE BARRED INASMUCH AS THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED 
TO HAVE THE HOME INSPECTED AND INASMUCH AS THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION RAN BEFORE SUIT WAS FILED. 
This case is ripe for adjudication and disposal through summary judgment. Summary 
judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
matenal fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." URCP 56(c). 
hi this case, there are no latent defects because all of the defects alleged by Plaintiff were 
discoverable by a home inspection. Indeed, all of the alleged defects in this case were literally 
discovered by a home inspection. Utah law clearly holds that failure to obtain a home inspection in 
these circumstances requires dismissal. Moreover, the applicable statutes of limitation ran before 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this case. The Smiths should no longer be required to defend 
themselves and incur attorney fees because "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and 
the Smiths are "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," 
A. The doctrine of caveat emptor applies to preclude Plaintiffs' claims inasmuch 
as Plaintiffs had a duty to have the home inspected and had they done so, the 
alleged defects could have been discovered before the sale. 
Plaintiffs walked through the house before purchasing it but never considered hiring a home 
inspection to determine whether there were any unsatisfactory conditions. They admit having the 
opportunity to do so and that the Smiths did not prevent them from doing so. Plaintiffs also admit 
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that the defects could have been discovered by a home inspection before they bought the house. 
The alleged code violations were discovered in the year 2000 by a home inspection which 
did not involve destructive testing. Jason Bullock created a list of 30 alleged code violations that 
he found upon performing a $60 home inspection. 
Maack v. Resource Design and Construction, Inc. 875 P.2d 570 (Ut. App. 1994) disposes of 
this case. It holds that where a home inspection would have revealed the defects, failure to obtain 
a home inspection is fatal to the plaintiffs case. 
In Maack the plaintiff alleged fraudulent concealment, nondisclosure, and negligent 
misrepresentation. (Footnote of causes of action alleged by Plaintiffs here) P. 574. As here, Maack 
did not obtain a home inspection before purchase. P. 573. As here, the Maack sales agreement 
contained an "as is" clause "without any warranties as to its condition." P. 573. In Maack the trial 
court found that the plaintiffs' failure to ask for a warranty and to have a home inspection performed 
"fell below the level of ordinary diligence." P.574. The trial court granted summary judgment. P. 
574. 
Similarly, in this case, Plaintiffs alleged fraud, fraudulent nondisclosure, and negligent 
misrepresentation.3 Plaintiffs knew when they purchased the Home that they lacked knowledge 
concerning construction and, therefore, would need assistance to reasonably determine the condition 
of the home. As in Maack, Plaintiffs chose to forego a home inspection, even though the sales 
3
 The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim in 2001. 
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contract expressly permitted the Plaintiffs to do so. As in Maack, the sales contract contained an "as 
is" clause. 
The Maack court, discussing the fraudulent concealment claim, quoting Atherton 
Condominium Bd. v. Blume Dev.. 115 Wash. 2d 506, 799 P.2d 250, 261 (Wash 1990) stated that 
a "fraudulent concealment cause of action requires, inter alia, that ca careful, reasonable inspection 
on the part of the purchaser would not disclose the defect'." P. 578. Then the Maack court disposed 
of the nondisclosure claim, noting that the Maacks were unreasonable in failing to obtain a home 
inspection and, quoting from Horsch v. Terminix Infl Co., 19 Kan. App. 2d 134, 865 P.2d 1044, 
1048 (Kan. App. 1993), held that a "party to [a] contract has [a] duty to disclose facts material to 
[the] transaction and not within [the] reasonable reach of the other party if the other party could not 
discover these facts by exercise of reasonable diligence." P. 579.4 
Therefore, Maack holds that failure to obtain a home inspection disposes of both fraudulent 
concealment and nondisclosure. In this case, a $60 home inspection prompted this lawsuit which 
is based strictly on allegations of technical code violations. Mary Moore's deposition and the reports 
of the Plaintiffs' experts annexed hereto show that the alleged defects were not discovered by a 
precipitous event. For over six years, Plaintiffs lived contentedly in the Home without a single 
complaint to the Smiths. There was no subsidence causing cracking of stucco or instability of the 
4
 The Maack court observed at footnote 8 that twice in their appellate brief plaintiffs 
admitted that an inspection by a general contractor ... would have revealed the defects in the 
stucco and other parts of the residence." Similarly, in this case Plaintiffs admit that a home 
inspection would have revealed the alleged defects before the sale of the Home. 
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foundation. There was no roof leak that made the home suddenly uninhabitable. The ceiling did not 
cave in. A review of Plaintiffs' expert report says almost nothing of damage caused by any of the 
alleged defects. Every alleged defect was discovered by a very basic home inspection performed 
over six years after the sale of the Home-a home inspection which, had it been done before purchase, 
would have disclosed the alleged defects to the Plaintiffs. 
There are many issues as to whether the alleged defects were caused by the Plaintiff 
inasmuch as numerous construction and remodeling changes were done by the Plaintiffs. There are 
issues whether the alleged defects actually complied with the building code applicable in 1993. 
Nonetheless, there is no issue but that every alleged defect could have been discovered by a home 
inspection before the Plaintiffs purchased the Home because that is how these alleged defects were 
discovered over 6 years later. 
Maack is not the only Utah case on this point. In Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah 
App. 1994), plaintiff home-buyers sued the sellers of the subject home, among others, for defects 
in the home. The trial court granted the defendant sellers' motion for summary judgment, and the 
plaintiffs appealed. The Schafir opinion is replete with statements of law regarding Utah's caveat 
emptor doctrine and the duties of home buyers to have the homes inspected prior to purchasing the 
homes. 
The Schafir court held that: 
The general rule in this state is that the doctrine of caveat emptor still applies to the 
sale of real estate. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the "doctrine [of caveat 
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emptor] has eroded in the sale of new residential housing. However, the doctrine 
appears to prevail in the sale of used property whether homes or commercial." 
Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 645 
(Utah 1982). Additionally, "one of the reasons for retaining the doctrine of caveat 
emptor in the area of real estate transactions is the assumption that the vendee 
has a reasonable opportunity to inspect the premises." Loveland v. Orem City 
Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 779 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting). 
Schafir at 1389 (emphasis added). The Schafir court further stated that: 
The responsibility to observe patent, and any discoverable latent, defects falls 
on the buyer of the home and is usually accomplished by hiring a 
knowledgeable home inspector to scrutinize the home before finalizing a sale. 
See Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 
645 (Utah 1982). Oftentimes, however, real estate agents and sellers are 
understandably unaware of latent defects in the home at the time of sale. This is an 
inherent risk involved in purchasing a home. 
Schafir at 1390 (emphasis added). Even in its footnotes, the Schafir court restated its position, 
stating that: 
Generally, absent some express agreement between the parties—which is absent here-
-the doctrine of caveat emptor precludes a home buyer from bringing suit for 
discoverable defects in the home. Especially when the sale of a used home is 
involved, the purchaser is on notice that the residence is not new and may contain 
defects affecting the home's quality or condition. In the case of latent defects, a home 
buyer's best resort against the seller is to sue for either fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 
Schafir at n.12 (emphasis added). 
The Schafir court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the defendant 
home-sellers. Schafir clearly places the responsibility to discover defects on the buyer, not the seller. 
Schafir holds that defects discoverable by a home inspection are not actionable. In the case at bar, 
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since all defects are of the discoverable type, summary judgment should be granted 
In accord is a recent Utah Supreme Court opinion Hermansen v Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 
P 3d 235 (citing Mitchell v Chnstensen. 2001 UT 80 at P11, 31 P3d 572 held "With this holding, 
we issued some specific precautions We first cautioned that 'if a defect can be discovered by 
reasonable care, the doctrine of caveat emptor prevails and precludes recovery by the vendee " 
The Hermansen case noted that numerous home inspectors are not required but a basic home 
inspection is required to exercise ordinary diligence Id at P 26 Neither Hermansen nor Mitchell 
overrule this requirement laid down m Maack and Schafir 
In the mstant case, the alleged defects were discovered by a non-destructive inspection in the 
year 2000, and could have been discovered in similar fashion before the sale of the Home m 1994 
The Maack, Schafir, and Hermansen decisions all make it clear that the Plaintiffs had a duty to 
protect themselves by having the Home inspected before the sale Plaintiffs did not have the home 
inspected before the sale, instead Plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence, waiting until 
August, 2000, over six years after purchasing the Home, to have it inspected5 In this case, Plaintiffs 
did not exercise ordinary diligence to discover the alleged defects and, therefore, the doctnne of 
caveat emptor applies to preclude the Plaintiffs from bnnging suit for the alleged defects in the 
Home 
D
 If "reasonable diligence" were construed to permit a person to wait as long as the 
person wanted before having a home inspected, these types of lawsuits could be brought at any 
time after the closing of the sale, even fifty years later 
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B. Plaintiffs claims are also barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. 
This is a construction defect case. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Dan Smith constructed 
the house in violation of building code provisions, thus making the house unfit for human 
occupation6 The Plaintiffs contend that these code violations constitute defects Construction defect 
cases are governed by UCA §78-12-2 5. Subsection (3) provides 
(a) An action by or against a provider (builder) based m contract or warranty shall be 
commenced within six years of the date of completion of the improvement or 
abandonment of construction Where an express contract or warranty establishes a 
different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated within that limitations 
period 
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years 
from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which 
a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable diligence If the 
cause of action is discovered or discoverable before completion of the improvement 
or abandonment of construction, the two-year period begins to run upon completion 
or abandonment 
The Plaintiffs have alleged breach of contract as their first cause of action Thus, the six year 
time limitation established by subsection 3(a) applies to bar Plaintiffs' claim The cause of action 
accrues when the house is completed In this case the house was built in November of 1993. The 
complaint was initially filed on August 24, 2000, well over six years later While subsection 3(b) 
allows for all other causes of action a tolling of the limitations period until the plaintiff should have 
6
 Plaintiffs make this argument notwithstanding the obvious fact that they have lived m 
the house for 9 years, the last three after the home inspection which purportedly revealed that the 
house was not fit to inhabit They also ignore the fact that the building official signed a 
Certificate of Occupancy. 
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discovered the alleged defects, subsection 3(a), covenng breaches of contract, does not Subsection 
3(a) clears states that a cause of action for construction defect arising from contract accrues on the 
completion of the construction or the date of the contract It does not accrue upon discovery of the 
defect 
In Bngham Young University v Paulsen Construction. 744 P 2d 370 (I Jt Sup Ct 1987) the 
court held m a construction defect case that the six year limitation barred BYXTs claim But BYU 
argued for tolling of the period BYU claimed "that it is entitled to have the statute tolled until BYU 
discovered that it had a claim against Paulsen " Id at p 1373 The court rejected that argument 
holding "In construction contract cases [that is, breach of contract cases], an owner's claim of 
defective construction against a general contractor is generally considered to accrue on the date that 
construction is completed We adopt this general rule and hold that B YU's causes of action accrued 
upon completion " Thus, this case, though decided before UCA §78-12-21 5, holds m accordance 
that the six year period for written contracts is not subject to discovery tolling7 
Subsection 3(b) provides that all other claims for relief against a builder for construction 
defect are to be brought WLthin two years of the time when a plaintiff should have discovered the 
defects The limitations period began to run on Plaintiffs' second claim, fraudulent non-disclosure, 
its third claim, fraud, its fourth claim rescission based on mistake, and its fifth claim based on the 
7
 In any event, assuming arguendo, that the discovery rale applied to the six year statute 
of limitations for breach of contract, as set forth above, had Plaintiffs exercised reasonable 
diligence, the alleged defects could have been discovered prior to their purchase of the home 
Therefore, the six year statute of limitation would have accrued upon the closing of the sale 
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Consumer Sales Practices Act when Plaintiffs should have, by exercising reasonable diligence, 
discovered the alleged defects. Thus, the question is whether Plaintiffs can raise a genuine issue as 
to when Plaintiffs should have reasonably discovered the alleged defects. The Smiths assert that 
there are no genuine issues of fact for the following reasons: 
1. The Plaintiffs could have had a home inspection performed prior to buying the Home. 
This is essentially the same argument as made above but with application to the statute of limitations 
as distinguished from reasonable reliance in the nondisclosure context. A home inspection would 
have discovered all of the alleged defects because there were none hidden from a non-destructive 
modest home inspection performed by Jason Bullock for $60. If the exercise of reasonable diligence 
demanded an inspection, then all claims are barred. Certainly, "reasonable diligence" cannot be 
construed to allow a buyer to toll the running of the limitations period while that buyer waits as long 
as he/she wants before having a home inspected. 
2. Even though they waited until 2000 to get a home inspection, Plaintiffs received notice 
of the alleged defects long before the inspection and shortly after moving into the house. For 
example, Mary Moore knew of the alleged window defects almost immediately upon moving into 
the house. She saw flaking of paint caused by water at the end of the first winter. Mary Moore also 
saw exposed footings the first spring when she moved into the house while doing landscaping. 
Defect Number 4 in Steenblik's list notes alleged water damage and cracking to the southeast comer 
of the foundation. Mrs. Moore said she noticed this the first spring after she moved into the house. 
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In addition, some allegedly bad shingles on the garage roof were called to her attention on November 
7,1997, when she had the shingles inspected by the shingle manufacturer and was told that they were 
damaged by inadequate ventilation. In relation to Defect Number 41 in Plaintiffs' list of defects, 
alleging plumbing defects, Mary Moore testified she had toilet problems six months after she moved 
into the Home. Defect number 12 alleges that smoke detectors were omitted from the bedrooms. 
Mary Moore testified that she discovered this alleged code violation about a year after moving into 
the Home. In addition, Plaintiffs allege various minor electrical problems; but Mary Moore admits 
that in December, 1997, when the furnace quit, she was given notice of the need to check the circuit 
breaker. 
All of these alleged defects were discovered more than 2 years before Plaintiffs filed suit 
Thus, these alleged defects are barred by the applicable two year statute of limitation contained in 
UCA §78-12-2.5 (3)(b). 
Moreover, knowledge of these defects placed Plaintiffs on notice as early as 1995 that there 
may be other unsatisfactory conditions in the Home. Accordingly, Subsection 3(b) required that 
Plaintiffs exercise reasonable diligence to discover the other alleged defects.8 Instead, Plaintiffs were 
dilatory and refrained from hiring a home inspection until five years later. Defendants should have 
had an inspection done earlier that would have revealed the remaining alleged code violations. Thus, 
all alleged defects are barred, not just those that were actually discovered more than two years before 
8
 As we know, a $60 home inspection would have discovered the alleged defects. 
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the filing of suit. The statute provides that if, through reasonable diligence, the defects could have 
been discovered, they are barred. Plaintiffs are not entitled to willful ignorance in order to toll the 
limitation period. 
C. PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT 
COMPLIED WITH THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR CASE REQUIRED BY THE ORDER ON 
DEFNDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Soon after the Smiths were served with the Plaintiffs' Complaint, they submitted their first 
Motion for Summary Judgment. On August 16, 2001, the Court entered an Order granting, in part, 
the Smiths' Motion, and limiting the issues remaining for trial. With respect to Plaintiffs5 remaining 
claims, the Court "concluded] that the Smiths . . . may have a legal duty to disclose to Plaintiffs any 
latent and matenal defects in the home, or building code violations, of which [the Smiths] were 
aware." The Court also stated that "the discovery rule does apply in this case with respect to those 
defects that would be considered latent, and that there remain issues of fact with respect to when 
those defects should have reasonably been discovered" by Plaintiffs. A copy of the Order is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 3, for the Court's convenience. 
In other words, Plaintiffs must show that the alleged defects were 1) latent, 2) material, 3) 
known to the Defendants, and 4) not discoverable through the exercise of reasonable diligence by 
the Plaintiffs. Smiths in this section intend to show that irrespective of the arguments made above, 
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Plaintiffs case fails to satisfy these four elements. As to the latency requirement, Plaintiffs have 
admitted under rule 36 that all but six of the defects are patent. 
The Plaintiffs have admitted expressly that most of the alleged defects were not latent. 
The Smiths propounded the following request for admission to Plaintiffs: "Request number 9: Admit 
that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru 42 in your expert witness report at the 
time of the sale of the house were not latent defects as the phrase 'latent defect' is used in the 
court's order regarding the Smiths' motion for summary judgment." As shown in the annexed 
Exhibit 10, Plaintiffs admitted that all defects were not latent except numbers 9 (no counter flashing 
at windows or doors), 26 (overspanned joists), 27 (Footings do not meet minimum 30" frost line 
depth) and 38 and 39 are obviously not material. The other item was 12 which is also deemed not 
material: whether the smoke detectors were hard wired or battery operated. Thus, by Plaintiffs own 
express and binding admissions, even if there were no issue as to a reasonable home inspection or 
as to the statute of limitation, only these alleged three defects can be raised at trial. 
The Plaintiffs have no proof of the requisite knowledge that the Smiths were aware that the 
alleged condition was defective. 
1. Windows. Item 9 (no counter flashing at windows or doors). 
The Plaintiffs' experts have been confused about this issue. Lloyd Steenblik at first alleged 
that Dan Smith attached the window flashing to the outside of the aluminum siding. Exhibit 1. 
Project Analysts report, item 9 at p. 10. Later his superior showed him that he was mistaking a 
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molding strip for the window nailing fin and that he was wrong on that opinion. Exhibit 14, p. 45. 
The other experts still insist that something must be wrong with the flashing or else water would not 
get on the sills. However, as shown above, they have done no destructive testing to show whether 
the flashing exists or how it was installed incorrectly. Jack Peterson says he saw on inspection the 
felt paper that served as flashing for the windows. Peterson depo. p. 54. Exhibit 7. Both Dan Smith 
and Jack Peterson testify that the slight water damage is caused by mere condensation that sometimes 
forms on cold days because of the thin aluminum on the windows. The only evidence of defect here 
is speculation based on slight water damage. There is simply no evidence that Dan Smith knew there 
was a defect in the flashing. 
2. Item 26. Alleged Overspanning of Floor Joists. 
Here again, the code calls for a 13 foot one inch span. That was what the building inspector, 
Jack Peterson, required. Peterson measured the span and found in his report , Exhibit 4 to his 
deposition, that no joists exceeded that span. P. 75. Exhibit 7. How then would Dan Smith be 
aware of a building code violation? 
3. Item 27. Alleged lack of dirt covering the footings. 
At the time of the final inspection the ground around the house was so "muddy" that the 
finish "grading was impossible." Peterson depo. p. 148. Exhibit 7. With Jack Peterson's 
permission and the expectation that they would do the finish grading in the spring when the weather 
cleared up, the Smiths were given a final inspection approval. Depo. Peterson, p. 77. Id. Once 
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again, this alleged defect (which, by the way, has caused no damage to the house) was approved by 
the building inspector. 
Other Alleged Defective Items That the Building Inspector Passed off. 
By way of further illustration to show what total lack of evidence supports the Plaintiffs' bad 
faith allegations against the Smiths the following defects are mentioned in connection with this 
requisite element of knowledge. 
Allegation of Inadequate Roof Ventilation. The undisputed evidence is that Dan Smith 
and the building inspector, Jack Peterson, had a discussion about the roof ventilation. Jack Peterson 
testifies that he accepted Dan Smith's opinion that the amount of ventilation was adequate. He did 
not "red tag" the ventilation. In Exhibit 5 to his deposition he said, "I also visited the job site another 
occasion and Dan and I discussed the venting of the attic. Dan felt that it was adequate." Thus, 
Peterson "accepted it." Peterson depo. p. 111. Exhibit 7. 
If the building inspector passes off an item, how can Plaintiffs in good faith claim that Dan 
Smith knows that the item was in violation of the code? 
V, 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs own testimony and discovery responses undeniably demonstrate that all of the 
42 construction defects that they allege in this case could have been discovered by a home inspection 
before they bought the house. Accordingly, not only does the doctrine of caveat emptor apply to 
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preclude Plaintiffs' claims in this case, but the six year and two year statutes of limitation bar 
recovery for Plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot prove that the Smiths knew of any code 
violations because the building inspector approved the very items alleged as code violations. 
DATED this 5+^ day of May, 2003. 
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, a P.C. 
By: 
A. BRYCE/piXON, ESQ. (#889) 
AARON m. WAITE (#8992) 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am an employee of DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER and that on this 
of May, 2003,1 placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing in the United States 
mails at St. George, Utah, with 1st class postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Gregory B. Hadley 
James K. Haslam 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200 
Provo,UT 84604 
([jfiQMT^ 0 ^ £ ^ 
An Employee of Dixon, Truman & Fisher, a P.C. 
F \A Office\A-Clienls\Smith Dan\Drafts\aaa8Memo for MSJ home inspect and SL \vpd 
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Introduction 
Engagement 
Project Analysts was engaged to determine the costs to correct code violations in the 
residence of Mary Moore 155 West 300 South, Fillmore, Utah 84631. Project 
Analysts reviewed documents, correspondence, reports, exhibits, and bids relative to 
the construction of the home. Project Analysts visited the home and observed the 
actual construction conditions. We reviewed the appropriate Uniform Building, 
Codes. Project Analysts determined the estimated cost of making repairs to code 
violations we confirmed. Project Analysts has not reviewed the contract between 
Mary Moore and Dan Smith to determine or assign contractual responsibility for any 
code deficiency correction costs. 
Background 
Mary Moore purchased the home from Dan Smith in 1994. Defects in the home 
construction were discovered six years after the home was purchased. Mary Moore 
requested an inspection of her home by Jason Bullock of Sunrise Engineering 
("Sunrise"). Jason Bullock inspected the home on August 8, 2000. Mark O. Barr, 
also of Sunrise, conducted an additional inspection of the home, on October 9, 2000. 
Project Analysts was asked in October 2001 to estimate the cost of repairs to items 
found not to comply with building codes that were in effect when the home was 
constructed. Project Analysts performed an on site inspection of the home 
November 20, 2001. 
Summary Conclusion 
Project Analysts has determined that there are several building code violations that 
require correction and repair in the Mary Moore residence. 
The estimated total cost to repair the listed defects is $110,730 as itemized in 
Table 01 - Summary of Repair Costs. 
i 
Mary Moore 
Summary of Repair Costs 
Table 01 
Item # Description Est. Repair Cost 
2 Ledger to rear deck has not been fastened properly with bolts. 
3 Joists that bear over header for deck have not been anchored. 
4 Foundation on SE Corner is cracked and breaking apart. 
5 All handrails must return to wail at top and bottom. 
6 No soffit venting has caused roof shingles to deteriorate 
7 Open outlet box under kitchen cabinets with exposed electrical wiring. 
8 Attic opening does not meet required code opening of 22" X 30". 
9 No counter-flashing at windows or doors, has caused water damage. 
10 Bathroom Fixtures not caulked 
12 No smoke detectors in bedrooms, smoke del In home not compliant. 
13 Stair risers exceed 8" max with 3/8 variance. (Interior) 
13a. Concrete Entrance Stairs. Stair rise exceed 7" max & 3/8" variance. 
14 No 5/8 type X sheetrock under stair lids. 
15 No pressure reducing valve has been installed. 
16 Copper lines in house are not grounded. 
17 2x6 window header \o basement bedroom is over spanned. 
17a 2x6 headers @ interior doorway is over spanned. 
18 Missing nuts and washers on anchor bolts for sill plate \n basement. 
19 4' cantilever at front of house requires doubled up end joists. 
20 No combustion air, vent clearance problems. 
22 Water heater is not seismically strapped to foundation. 
23 Kitchen required to be on 2 - 20 amp GFCI circuits w/12/2 AWG. 
24 Bathrooms required to be on separate 20 AMP circuits for GFCI's. 
25 Electrical panel has not been labeled. 
26 House has over spanned joists throughout the house. 
27 Footings do not meet minimum 30" frost line depth. 
28 Grading not 2% slope for first 10 feet away from house (Incl. in 27) 
29 Outlets in garage are not on GFCI. 
30 No GFCI in basement. 
31 Exhibit C: Item 2 Add duplex for peninsular cabinet. 
32 Exhibit C: Item 3. Add duplex for garbage disposal. 
33 Exhibit C: Add outlet in master bedroom, dining room. 
34 Exhibit C: Ground natural gas to grounding circuit. 
35 Exhibit C: Item 6. Add grounding kit to circuit breaker box. 
36 Exhibit C: Add smoke detector to basement. (Incl. In 12) 
37 Exhibit C: Item 9. Correct wiring at main breaker. 
38 Install insulations baffles to allow ventilation at exterior walls. 
39 Add beam at bearing partition offset from garage beam. 
40 Plates and sills on concrete in basement are not treated lumber. 
41 Costs to implement plumbing code repairs listed by Cox Plumbing 


















































































Grand Total $ 111,045 
2 
Site Visit 
Project Analysts conducted an onsite inspection of the home on November 20, 2001. 
We reviewed the listings of items reported as found not to be in code compliance 
prepared by Sunrise from their previous inspections of the home on August 7, 2000 
and October 9, 2000. During our inspection we observed the existing conditions at 
the home relative to each item listed by Sunrise as, "found not to be in code 
compliance", throughout the remainder of this report the listed items found not to be 
in code compliance will be referred to as "defects". 
Project Analysts took measurements, quantified the existing conditions, observed the 
materials used, and determined the actual conditions at the home relative to the each 
listed defect, and performed non-destructive visual examinations only. We did not 
do an exhaustive inspection looking for additional non-compliant work. However, in 
the course of examination of the defects list prepared by Sunrise, three potential 
additional code compliance problems were observed. The three additional defects 
Project Analysts observed, evaluated and subsequently determined to be violations of 
the 1991 building codes are: 
Item 38. Insulation baffles to allow ventilation at exterior walls. 
Item 39. Add beam at bearing partition offset from garage beam 
Item 40. Plates and sills on concrete in basement are not treated lumber. 
Project Analysts evaluated a repair method and estimated the cost to repair these three 
additional defects to comply with building codes. 
During our site visit we performed the following evaluations: 
• Evaluated the size, span and type of material used for visible joists and 
headers. 
• Sampled the distance from the top of the existing soil to the top of the existing 
footing on each side of the home. 
• Landscaping and grading conditions and materials were noted 
• Examined the orientation of the home on the property. 
• Observed the unfinished basement areas. 
• Reviewed structural, mechanical, plumbing and electrical systems. 
• Observed and quantified the outside dimensions of the home. 
3 
Mary Moore Property 
em 
# Schedule 01 - Repairs Cost Esimate December 11,2001 
7 Open outlet box under kitchen cabinets with exposed electrical wiring. 
Comment: From Exibit C Item 1 NEC Section 370-28 -( C) Page 70-286 
Repair Method: A cover plate needs to be installed on this open rough-in box. The cover plate will need to be modified as there is a 
cabinet frame member covering part of the open rough in box. 
Work Description QTY UNITS $ / Unit L M E S LABORS Mat $ EQUIP. $ SUB $ TOTALS 
Modify Cover Plate & Install Electrician 1 Hr $ 45.00 S $ - $ - $ - $ 45 $ 45 
Cover Plate 1 Ea $ 1.00 M $ - $ 1 $ - $ - $ 1 
Subtotal 
Sales Taxes @ 5 75% 
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Mary Moore Property 
# Schedule 01 - Repairs Cost Esimate December 11,2001 
!5 Electrical panel has not been labled. 
Comment: NEC Section 384-13 Page 70-303. 
Repair Method' Determine the function of each circuit and label existing electrical panel 
Work Description QTY UNITS $/Unit L M E S LABOR $ Mat $ EQUIP, $ SUB $ TOTAL $ 
Electrician 6 Hr $ 45.00 L $ 270 $ - $ - $ - $ 270 
$ - $ _- $ $ - $ 
Subtotal 
Sales Taxes @ 5.75% 
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Mary Moore Property 
# Schedule 01 - Repairs Cost Esimate December 11,2001 
29 Outlets in garage are not on GFCI. 
Comment NEC Section 210-8(A) (2) Page 70 - 39 
Repair Method Replace existing garage circuit breaker with a GFCI circuit breaker and reconnect the electrical for Garage to panel 
Work Description QTY UNITS $ / Unit L M E S LABOR $ Mat $ EQUIP. $ SUB $ TOTALS 
Add 1-20Apm circuit breaker to Electrician 1 Hr $ 45 00 L $ 45 $ - $ $ - $ 45 
the Panel Box 
Wire garage electrical to new Electrician 2 Hr $ 45 00 L $ 90 $ - $ - $ - $ 90 
circuits 
1 - 20 Amp GFCI Breakers 
Subtotal 
Sales Taxes @ 5 75% 




























29. 1993 NEC Articles 210-8, 210-52 (g) 
Additionally, Article 210-8 only requires the OUTLET to be GFCI protected, not the circuit. The garage outlet 
could be easily replaced with a GFCI receptacle. 
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70-38 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CODE 
210-7. Receptacles and Cord Connectors. 
(a) Grounding Typa. Receptacles installed on 15- and 20-ampere branch 
1
 circuits shall be of the grounding type. Grounding-type receptacles shall be 
installed only on circuits of the voltage class and current for which they are 
rated, except as provided in Tables 210«21(b)(2) and (b)(3). 
Exception: Nongrounding-type receptacles installed in accordance with 
Section 210-7 (d), Exception, 
(b) To Be Grounded. Receptacles and cord connectors having ground-
ing contacts shall have those contacts effectively grounded. 
Exception No. 1: Receptacles mounted on portable and vehicle-
mounted generators in accordance with Section 2*0-6. 
Exception No. 2: Ground-fault circuit-interrupter replacement recepta-
cles as permitted by Section 210-7(d), Exception. 
(c) Method* of Grounding. The grounding contacts of receptacles and 
cora connectors shall be grounded by connection to the equipment ground-
ing conductor of the circuit supplying the receptacle or cord connector. 
(FPN): For installation requirements for the reduction of electrical noise, see 
Section 250-74, Exception No. 4. 
The branch circuit wiring method shall include or provide an equipment 
grounding conductor to which the grounding contacts of the receptacle or 
cord connector shall be connected. 
(FPN No. 1): Section 250-91 (b) describes acceptable grounding means. 
(FPN No. 2): For extensions of existing branch circuits, see Section 250-50. 
(d) Replacements, Grounding-type receptacles shall be used as replace-
ments for existing nongrounding types and shall be connected to a ground-
ing conductor installed in accordance with Section 210-7(c). 
Ground-fault circuit-interrupter protected receptacles shall be provided 
where replacements are made at receptacle outlets that are required to be 
so protected elsewhere in this Code. 
Exception: Where a grounding means does not exist in the receptacle 
enclosure, either a nongrounding or a ground-fault circuit-interrupter-type of 
receptacle shall be usecL A grounding conductor shall not be connected from 
the ground-fault circuit-interrupter-type receptacle to any outlet supplied 
from the ground-fault circuit-interrupter-type receptacle. Existing 
nongrounding-type receptacles shall be permuted to be replaced wittx 
grounding-type receptacles where supplied {/trough a ground-fault circuit-
interrupter. These receptacle locations shall be marked "GFCl protected." 
(e) Cord- and Plug-Connected Equipment. The installation of 
grounding-type receptacles shall not be used as a requirement that ail cord-
and plug-connected equipment be of the grounded type. 
(FPN): See Section 250-45 for type of cord- and plug-connected equipment to be 
grounded. 
(f) Nonlnterchangeable Types. Receptacles connected to circuits hav-
ing different voltages, frequencies, or types of current (ac or dc) on the 
same premises shall be of such design that the attachment plugs used on 
these circuits are not mterchangeable. 
ARTICLE 210 — BRANCH CIRCUITS 70-39 
210-8. Ground-Fault Circuit-Interrupter Protection for Personnel. . 
(a) Dwelling Units. 
(1) All 125-voit, single-phase, 15- and 20-ampere receptacles 
installed in bathrooms shall have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protec-
tion for personnel. 
(2) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- or 20-amperestccejrtac&s installed in 
\Hfpttsg«*56hall have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel. 
Exception No. 1 to (a)(2): Receptacles that are not readily accessible. 
Exception No. 2 to (a)(2): A single receptacle or a duplex receptacle for I 
two appliances located within dedicated space for each appliance that in 
normal use is not easily moved from one place to another, and that is cord- \ 
and plug-connected in accordance with section 400-7(a)(6), (a)(7), or (a)(8). 
Receptacles installed under exceptions to Section 210-8(a)(2) shall not be 
considered as meeting the requirements of Section 210-52(g). 
(3) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- and 20-ampere receptacles installed 
outdoors where there is direct grade level access to the receptacles shall | 
have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel 
(FPN): See Section 215-9 for feeder protection. 
For the purposes of this section, "direct grade level access'' is defined 
as being located not more than 6 feet, 6 inches (1.98 m) above grade level 
and being readily accessible. 
(4) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- and 20-ampere receptacles installed 
in crawl spaces at or below grade level and in unfinished basements shall 
have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel. 
For purposes of this section, unfinished basements are defined as por- 1 
tions or areas of the basement not intended as habitable rooms and limited 
to storage areas, work areas, and the like. j 
Exception No. 1: A single receptacle supplied by a dedicated branch 
circuit that is located and identified for specific use by a cord- and plug-
connected appliance, such as a refrigerator or freezer. 
Exception No. 2: T)\e laundry circuit as required by Sections 210-52(f) 
and 220-4(c). 
Exception No. 3: A single receptacle supplying a permanently installed 
sump pump. 
(5) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- and 20-ampere receptacles to serve I 
counter top surfaces, installed within 6 feet (1.83 m) of a wet bar sink or 
kitchen sink, shall have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for per- j 
sonnel. 
(FPN): The intent of this subsection is to permit the exemption of receptacles 
that are located specifically for appliances sucn as refrigerators and freezers from 
ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel. 
(6) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- or 20-ampere receptacles installed in 
boathouses shall have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for 
personnel. 
# 1A 
70-46 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CODE 
Exception No. 3: In addition to the required receptacles specified by 
Section 210-52, switched receptacles supplied from a general-purpose 
branch circuit as defined in Section 210-/0(a)> Exception No. 1 shall be 
permitted 
I Exception No. 4: A receptacle served by a circuit supplying only motor 
loads. ' 
Exception No. 5: Receptacles installed to provide power for electric 
ignition systems or clock timers for gas-fired ranges, ovens, or counter-
J mounted cooking units. 
(2) Receptacles installed in the kitchen to serve counter top surfaces 
shall be supplied by not less than two small appliance branch circuits, 
either or both of which shall also be permitted to supply receptacle outlets | in the kitchen and other rooms specined in Section 210-52(b)(l). Additional 
small appliance branch circuits snail be permitted to supply receptacle out-| lets in the kitchen and other rooms specified in Section 210-52(b)(l). 
(c) Counter Tops. In kitchens and dining areas of dwelling units, a 
I receptacle outlet shall be installed at each walicounter space 12 inches (305 
J mm) or wider. Receptacle outlets shall be installed so that no point along 
the wall line is more than 24 inches (610 mm), measured horizontally from 
a receptacle outlet in that space. 
I A receptacle outlet shall be installed at each island or peninsular counter 
top with a long dimension of 24 inches (610 mm) or greater and a short 
dimension of 12 inches (305 mm) or greater. Receptacle outlets to serve 
island or peninsular counter tops shall be installed above, or within 12 
inches (305 mm) below the counter top. Receptacle outlets shall be 
installed so that no point along the centerline of the long dimension is more 
than 24 inches (610 mm), measured horizontally from a receptacle outlet in 
that space. A peninsular counter top is measured from the connecting 
I edge. 
Counter top spaces separated by range tops, refrigerators, or sinks shall 
I be considered as separate counter top spaces. Receptacle outlets rendered 
I not readily accessible by appliances fastened in place or appliances occu-
pying defeated space shall not be considered as these required outlets. 
I Receptacle outlets shall not be installed in a face-up position in the work 
surfaces or counter tops in a kitchen or dining area. 
(FPN): The 24-lnch (610-mm) dimension is measured along the wall line or cen-
terline. and the intent is that there be'a receptacle outlet for every 4 linear feet 
I (1.2 ra) or fraction thereof of counter lqngth.^ 
(d) Bathroom*. In dwelling units, at least one wall receptacle outlet 
I shall be installed in the bathroom adjacent to each basin location. See Sec-
1
 tion 2108(a)(1). 
I (e) Outdoor Outlet*. For a one-family dwelling and each unit of a two-
family dwelling that is at grade level, at least one receptacle outlet acces-
sible at grade level shall be installed at the front and back of the dwelling. 
I See Section 210-8(a)(3). 
(f) Laundry Areas. In dwelling units, at least one receptacle outlet shall 
be installed for the laundry. 
ARTICLE 210 — BRANCH CIRCUITS 70-47 
Exception No. 1: In a dwelling unit that is an apartment or living area 
in a multifamity buildins where laundry facilities are provided on the pre-
mises that are available to all building occupants, a laundry receptacle 
shall not be required 
Exception No. 2: In other than one-family dwellings where laundry 
facilities are not to be installed or permitted, a laundry receptacle shall not 
be required 
* (Q) Bawnwita and GarftOtt* For a one-family dwelling, at least one 
receptacle outlet, in addition to any provided for laundry equipment, shall 
be installed in each basement and in each attached garage, and in each 
detached garage with electric power. See Sections 210-8(a)(2) and (a)(4). 
(h) Hallways. In dwelling units, hallways of 10 feet (3.05 m) or more in I 
length shall have at least one receptacle outlet. | 
As used in this subsection, the hall length shall be considered the length 
along the centerline of the hall without passing through a doorway. 
210-60. Quest Rooms. Guest rooms in hotels, motels, and similar occu-
pancies shall have receptacle outlets installed in accordance with Section 
210-52. See Section 2108(b)(1). 
Exception: In rooms of hotels and motels, the required number of 
receptacle outlets determined by Section 210-52(a) shall be permitted to be 
located convenient for permanent furniture layout. 
210-62. Show Windows. At least one receptacle outlet shall be installed 
directly above a show window for each 12 linear feet (3.66 m) or major 
fraction thereof of show window area measured horizontally at its maxi-
mum width. 
210-63. Rooftop Heating, Alr-Condrtionlng, and Refrigeration Equipment | 
Outlet A 125-volt, single-phase, 15- or 20-ampere-rated receptacle oudet 
shall be installed at an accessible location for the servicing of nesting, air-
conditioning, and refrigeration equipment on rooftops and in attics and 
crawl spaces, The receptacle shall be located on the same level and within 
25 feet(7.62 m) of the heating, air-conditioning, and refrigeration equip- | 
ment. Tne receptacle outlet shall not be connected to the load side of the 
equipment disconnecting means. 
Exception: Rooftop equipment on one- and two-family dwellings. 
210-70. Lighting Outlets Required. Lighting outlets shall be installed 
where specked in Sections 210-70(a), (b), and (c) below. | 
(a) Dwelling Untt(s). At least one wall switch-controlled lighting outlet 
shall be installed in every habitable room; in bathrooms, hallways, stair-
ways, attached garages, and detached garages with electric power; and at 
outdoor entrances or exits. 
(FPN); A vehicle door in a garage is not considered as an outdoor entrance. | 
At least one lighting outlet controlled by a light switch located at the 
point of entry to the attic, underfloor space, utility room, and basement 
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Civil No. 000700142 Ml 
Judge Fred Howard 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court for decision 
pursuant to a Notice to Submit for Decision filed by the Defendants, and a hearing was 
held before the Court on May 31. 2001. concerning this motion and Plaintiffs' 
Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. Appearing at the hearing were 
James K. Haslam, of Hadley & Associates, on behalf of Plaintiffs, and A, Bryce Dixon, 
of Dixon & Truman, on behalf of Defendants. The Court, having reviewed the motions 
and all memoranda, objections, and other materials filed in support and in opposition 
thereto, and having heard oral arguments from the parties on the motions, and for good 
cause shown, hereby makes the following findings, conclusions, and rulings: 
Pursuant to the common-law merger doctrine, execution and delivery of a deed 
by a seller usually renders any prior contractual terms extinguished and unenforceable. 
Although certain specific exceptions allow a party to avoid application of the merger 
doctrine, a claim for negligent misrepresentation relating to alleged construction defects 
in a building does not fall within any such exception. Accordingly, Plaintiffs1 claim for 
negligent misrepresentation in this case is precluded as a matter of law by the merger 
doctrine as set forth in the case of Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc.. 2000 UT App 200,21 
P,3d 219. 
With respect to Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the Court concludes that those causes of action, though not pleaded 
wrth great detail, have been pleaded in the Complaint with sufficient particularity by 
Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In any 
event, the Court would grant Plaintiffs' motion to amend the Complaint to plead these 
causes of action with greater detail if Plaintiffs desired to do so. Moreover, the Court 
concliides that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to these claims 
that precludes the granting of summary judgment. Finally, the Court further concludes 
that Defendants, as the sellers of the home in question, may have had a legal duty to 
2 
disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material defects in the home, or building code 
violations, of which they were aware. 
With respect to the remaining claims, the Court believes that the discovery rule 
should be applied to toll the statute of limitations, even as to contract-based claims, in 
situations where its application is not otherwise expressly prohibited by law. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the discovery rule does apply 
in this case with respect to those defects that would be considered latent, and that there 
remain issues of fact with respect to when those defects should have reasonably been 
discovered. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to Plaintiffs' 
claims for breach of contract, rescission, and violations of the Consumer Sales 
Practices Act. 
The Court will consider, at the close of all discovery, a motion for summary 
judgment by Defendants, based on their limitations defense, 
Finally, over Plaintiffs' objection, the Court required Plaintiffs to make an election 
of remedies at the hearing between their contract-based claims asserting both a right to 
contractual damages and a right to rescission of the transaction. Plaintiffs elected to 
pursue the remedy of rescission. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs' claim 
of negligent misrepresentation, and that claim is hereby dismissed; 
3 
2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied as to all other claims; 
3. Plaintiffs may not seek monetary damages for breach of contract, but may 
pursue the remedy of rescission; and 
4. No further motions for summary judgment will be considered by the Court 
until after the close of discovery, 
DATED this /£%. day of / ^ ^ T , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
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1 Q. Did you get tired of building houses? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. So what is very little, how many homes or let me ask 
4 this. 
5 | A. Okay. 
61 Q- In the Fillmore area since 1979 have you built other 
7 things in this area besides homes? 
8 A. I built two homes for myself. One home out in Flowell. 
9 In this area. 
10 Q- Yes. 
11 A. I think that is it. 
12 Q. So you built nothing else other than homes in this 
13 area since 1979? 
14 A. Well, now since 1979? 
15 Q. That is my question. 
16 A. Yes, but I built the home that she is living in for 
17 ourselves and this one over here, the other home we built here 
18 in town. 
19 Q. The one that we talked about that you built after you 
20 came back from Cedar City? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. So that is two. 
23 A. And we built the cement block building. 
24 Q. Is that the shop? 
25 A. Yes. 
B T J T I L I ^ i N r G P E R M I T ^S.E>I>1 loisr 
Application N o . f 3 — 3 S 
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^ 
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Ma> 4, 2001 
To Whoai It May Concern 
Filhnore City issues a Certificate of Occupancy for a biding perriLt afte,r :hc final 
inspection has been completed and I find that the construction meets the intent of the building 
code in place at the time of construction 
Sincerely^ 
LKJacK PetersorC^uilding Inspector 
FillmoieCity 
1 getting in there and looking? 
2 A. The only way I know is you take some of the 
3 siding off . 
4 Q. Did you actually see the windows and inspect 
5 them? 
6 A, Yes. I was there when they were putting the 
7 siding on. We had to put a vacuum behind the siding, 
8 which went under that. 
9 Q- So you actually saw that there was --
10 A. Well, the felt that goes over to the 
11 windows. 
12 Q. You saw the felt? 
13 A. On the siding it goes over to the windows. 
14 Q. And the felt is sometimes called a 
15 weather-resistant membrane? 
16 A. Yes. Yeah. 
17 Q. And you saw that these windows had the 
18 weather-resistant membrane, correct? 
19 A, We're talking about two different issues. 
20 Now under the new code they're putting a piece of 
21 material out about this far out from the windows all 
22 the way around, and then they're going in with felt. 
23 But at that time --
24 Q. When you say that far, you were talking 
25 about nearly 12 inches? 
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1 Q And it still hasn't been covered as of this 
2 day'? 
3 A Probably not. It's not where anybody's 
4 going to get into it, I'll tell you You have to work 
5 at it to get there 
6 Q All right. Let's go to No 8, then, the 
7 attic access was brought to Mr. Smith's attention on 
8 the final inspection 
9 Okay What's your recollection of that? 
10 A. Basically it's like — it's a little 
11 smaller. This was a new thing in the code that year, 
12 the 22 by 30. It's still effective today, 22 by 30. 
13 It's not a life safety issue, and there was nothing in 
14 the attic, as far as anything that needed to be 
15 serviced of that nature. So I didn't really consider 
16 it at the time as being a real issue. 
17 Q. So you passed it off? 
18 A. I passed that part of it. 
19 Q. All right. And then let's go to No. 9, the 
20 windows. 
21 Now, I think it's a stipulated fact in this 
22 case that there are — that nobody has done any 
23 destructive testing around the windows. Do you know 
24 how a person would be able to determine that there was 
25 no counter flashing around the windows without actually 
Page 55 
1 A. It's about a foot strip that goes around the 
2 window. And they were using felt as the same 
3 situation, they were running it over to the window. 
4 But that's an interpretation, I guess, whether that 
5 would be acceptable or not 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. But it was required on the siding 
8 Q So what I just want to make sure is the 
9 felt, which was the weather resistive membrane that was 
10 m use at that time, did you actually see that it was 
11 installed in the windows at this house? 
12 A. I saw the felt go along for the sidmg, 
13 yeah. 
14 Q. Okay. When he says counter flashing, there 
15 is no counter flashing, do you have an understanding of 
16 what he means? Do you think he means this one foot 
17 strip? 
18 A. I think he's talking about the one foot 
19 stnp that is required now. And a lot of places still 
20 are not enforcing that. So I don't know 
21 Q. All right. But the one foot weather 
22 stripping was not required by the 1991 building code, 
23 was it? 
24 A. I would have to research it a little more. 
25 But I don't -
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1 getting in there and looking7 
2 A. The only way I know is you take some of the 
3 siding off. 
4 Q. Did you actually see the windows and inspect 
5 them? 
6 A Yes. I was there when they were putting the 
7 siding on. We had to put a vacuum behind the siding, 
8 which went under that. 
9 Q. So you actually saw that there was — 
10 A Well, the felt that goes over to the 
11 windows. 
12 Q. You saw the felt? 
13 A. On the siding it goes over to the wmdows. 
14 Q. And the felt is sometimes called a 
15 weather-resistant membrane? 
16 A Yes. Yeah. 
17 Q. And you saw that these windows had the 
18 weather-resistant membrane, correct? 
19 A. We're talking about two different issues. 
20 Now under the new code they're putting a piece of 
21 material out about this far out from the windows all 
22 the way around, and then they're going in with felt. 
23 But at that time -
24 Q. When you say that far, you were talking 
25 about nearly 12 inches? 
1 MR HADLEY: I'm sorry, I didn't hear your 
2 question. 
3 MR DIXON: I didn't hear his answer. 
4 MR. HADLEY: Okay. 
5 MR- DIXON: 
6 Q Your answer was I don't think so? 
7 A. I would really have to research that to make 
8 sure whether it was or wasn't 
9 MR HADLEY: Robert, would you read m e -
10 I'm sorry, are you talking? I was talking over you. 
11 What was Bryce's question, Robert? 
12 (Whereupon, the record was 
13 read back as follows: 
14 "QUESTION. All right. But the one 
15 foot weather stripping was not 
16 required by the 1991 building code, 
17 was it?") 
18 MR HADLEY: Okay. 
19 MR DIXON: 
20 Q. Let me see what you're talking about, 
21 Mr. Peterson. When you're talking about a one foot 
22 strip, is this a nailing fin that you're talking about, 
23 or is this something in the nature of a 
24 weather-resistant membrane? 
25 A It's a weather-resistant membrane. 
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inspection on the house at 155 West 300 South, the 
house we're talking about here today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this is the inspection that would have 
been checked off all 33 items in order to approve the 
final --
A. It would have either marked okay or not 
applicable, depending on the situation. 
Q. Okay. Let's see, I think I have just one 
little thing here. Oh, Exhibit 7 I'll call -- this 
will be the certificate of occupancy. 
It appears you signed this certificate of 
occupancy, a copy of which is Exhibit 7, correct? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HADLEY: Do you have another copy of 
that? 
MR. DIXON: Yes. 
Q. And this is for the home at 155 West 300 
South that we've been discussing during this 
deposition, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what must a person do in order to 
qualify to receive a certificate of occupancy, pass t 
final inspection? 
A. Yes. 
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1 MR. DIXON 
2 Q Well, the only reason [ ask that question is 1 
3 this, did you ever hear her say she didn't want a smoke 1 
4 detector because she smoked and that set this smoke 
5 detector off? 
6 A No. I don't recall that at all. 
7 Q. I'm not saying that she did I'm just 
8 asking questions You understand that, I'm just trying 
9 to find out. 
10 In any event, you didn't red tag the smoke 
11 detector issue on the final inspection, did you? 
12 A. No As I say, I thought at that time that 
13 would probably be taken care of. I mentioned the 
I 14 deficiencies. They were in the house when I made the 
I 15 inspection. I figured it was their home and they would 
] 16 correct those on the deficiencies 
1 17 Q. Ail right Now, on October — let's see, j 
1 18 No 13. We're slowly getting there. 
19 Do you need to take a break, sir? 
| 20 A. No. I want to get this over with. 
21 Q. Okay. Now, we're talking about the stairs. 
22 Tell me what you remember about the stair issue First 
I 23 of all, tell me about what you remember with Dan Smith, 
24 and then I'll ask you about what you remember about 
25 Mary Moore 
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1 1 A. Well, the stairs were becoming an issue 
2 after the stairs were put in, and Dan called me over 
3 and said the stairs were maxed I have a deal here on 
4 the code that says they can be at eight and nine. But, 
1 5 anyway, the problem it's not even addressed in any of 
I 6 these issues was the fact that it did not have the six 
1 7 foot six head room, and one more tread in the stair 
* 8 would have made it even worse I mean, it was just — 
j 9 it was one of those things that there had to be some 
1 10 give and take where we had an eight, nine required 
1 11 minimum in residential. 
j 12 So a seven, seven eleven, is the best, but 
I 13 there's no way to put it in without a real problem. 
j 14 So at that time we told Dan that the 
1 15 stairs - that would work rather than shrink that -- I 
J 16 think we were minus about — on each, or something — 
1 17 maybe it might have been a couple of inches on the head 
18 room, and if we went one more tread you would be 
I 19 bumping your head going down the stairs. 
I 20 Q. So you went ahead and passed that off? 
21 A. I went ahead and passed that off. That was 
22 before the final. It was one of those special days, 
23 and I don't remember which day it was 
J 24 Q. Now, do you remember Mary Moore ever 




















































bought the house*? h 
A. The stair issue didn't come up. I think ft 
Bill fell dowTi the stairs one time. 1 
THE WITNESS. Didn't he? Or something But i; 
it was brought up later when this thing was measured. fc 
I got the impression that Jason was looking at a lot j ; 
shorter rise. He put a seven something rise, instead L 
of the eight, nine that it can be. h 
MR. DDCON: | 
Q. Okay So the first time you remember Mary h 
Moore complaining about the stairs is after Jason | 
Bullock inspected them, correct? Is that correct? p 
A. I don't recall whether it was or wasn't. [] 
Q. Okay. Let's go on to 14. J? 
A. 14, 14. p 
Q. You just say - that's sheet rock under the L 
stair ledge, and you just say it's not required. h 
A. It wasn't required. I've got a code sheet | 
on that here somewhere. It wasn't required at that fc 
time. That's been a major — I've got that in here I Ji 
put it where it was on these sheets here. h 
Q. You're looking through the Project Analysts ji 
report? h 
A Yeah. This one here I think is it That's fi 
the one, the code issue on that one. | 
Page 68 I* 
Q. Well, I don't think we're going to spend | 
much time on that. You don't think it was required and f 
that's fine. 1 
A. I don't think it was required t 
Q. Now, let's go to 15, Jason Bullock says r 
there was no pressure reducing valve and you also say I. 
that it's not required The water pressure wasn't that L 
high, correct? 1 
A. I've got a deal on that, too. It says right j 
in the code book if it's over 80 pounds, then it's | 
required. And our city water pressure in the area that II 
she's in is about 70 pounds | 
Q. And that's the reason why a water — $ 
A. Yeah, we don't have — we're not putting jj 
them in town most areas, because it is less than — fc 
than is required. Less than 80 pounds. | 
Q. Okay. And you say that the copper lines | 
were grounded, correct? | 
A. Well, the electrical boxes was grounded to | 
copper. I tested all the outlets, and they all show | 
ground. So I don't know where they're coming from. 1 
Q. All right. And No 18, missing nuts and t 
washers on anchor bolts for sill plate. Did you see | 
any — | 
A. I have never been able to find that I p 
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1 Q Are there any additional requirements 
2 besides passing the final inspection? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. And then the last exhibit is Exhibit 8, it's 
5 another to whom it may concern letter dated May 4th, 
6 2001. Was this letter signed by you, sir? 
7 A. Yes. I can see that from here. 
8 Q. Do you know why you wrote this letter? 
9 A. Ho, I do not at this time. 
10 Q. Is it true that you felt that the - or 
11 found, rather, that the construction of the house at 
12 155 West 300 North meant the intent of the building j 
13 code — 300 South, excuse me. Let me start over again. 
14 Strike that 
1 15 Is it true, sir, that you found that the 
16 construction of the house at 155 West 300 South met the 
1 17 intent of the building code in place at the time of 
1 18 construction? 
19 A. I would say yes at this point. 
j 20 Q. Okay. 
21 MR. DIXON: I'll pass the witness. 
22 MFL HADLEY: Okay. 
23 / / / 
24 / / / 
25 / / / 
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1 EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. HADLEY: 
3 Q. Good morning, Jack. 
j 4 A. Good morning. It's still morning 
I 5 Q- IVe been sitting alongside you here for a 
6 couple of hours. Am I sitting too close for you? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Am I m your space? 
9 All right. You can reach over and pop me 
10 one if you think I get out of line. 
11 Why do you think you're here? You've been 
12 here two hours testifying. What's going on? Why are 
J 13 you sitting in this chair and Bryce Dixon has been 
j 14 asking questions of you? 
15 MR DIXON: Objection to the form of the 
I 16 question- Irrelevant. Not likely to lead to the 
I 17 discovery of admissible evidence. Broad. 
18 MR. HADLEY: 
19 Q- When he's done go ahead 
20 A. T would say because two people have a 
21 problem. 
22 Q. You understand that? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q. You heard the saying the truth shall make 
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A. Yes. |. 
Q. Do you believe that7 
A. Yes, I do j " 
Q Do you understand there's a little tussle U 
that's developed between Mary and the Smiths, and we're J 
here to kind of unravel that? You understand that? 1 
A. (Nods head). p 
Q. Okay. What I want to do is I'm going to | 
have to repeat and go through a few of the things that I 
you have discussed with Bryce. And I want you to know 
so you know that I feel that you've been truthful, but l : 
I want to dig a little bit and get into the code some. | 
Is that okay with you? fe 
A. Yes. p 
Q. Okay. | 
MR. DIXON: I don't mean to distract you, I J| 
sometimes worry about the exhibits. r 
THE WITNESS: I thought that was an extra J] 
copy of that one I? 
MR. DIXON: Okay. I just want to make sure |-: 
I haven't — I want to get them all over in the court 
reporter's corner to make sure I haven't kept any. And | 
that's all I was doing. h 
MR. HADLEY: | 
Q Do you mind if I look at your Exhibit 1 If 
i 
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which is your little — U 
A. This? P 
Q. Yes. i 
A. There's not much on there. il 
Q. That's right. When was that first entry? I r 
think you said it was July 29? 
A. I had the corners down. U 
Q. Okay If you don't mind I'm going to rattle : 
off some dates. You and I are going to look at this r 
and Fm going to rattle off some dates. I'm going to fc 
have to put them in the form of the question, otherwise j? 
I'm going to blow some hot air and Bryce is going to j ! 
take me to task on it. 
It has an entry for Dan Smith on the 29th of n 
July; is that correct? [l 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. We'll copy that page; is that okay? H 
A Yes. j 
Q. Okay. We have another one on Friday the j | 
13th, August, of'93, correct? U 
A. Yeah. |j 
Q. Okay. And we'll copy that one. Is that If 
agreed? If 
A. Yes. ? 
Q. Okay. Again on Monday the 16th of August, 
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1 A. Yes, 1 would say that. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. Reputation, too. 
4 Q. Let's talk about item 6. And I think Tm 
5 going to refer here to — I believe it's Exhibit 8. Do 
6 you still have a copy of your letter there? 
7 A. No, he took them all back there. 
8 Q. You didn't get a copy? 
9 MR- DIXON: You want the inspection final? 
10 MR. HADLEY: No. If! wrote this right, 
11 Exhibit 8. 
12 MR. DIXON: I thought you said 6. 
13 Exhibit 8. 
14 THE WITNESS: No, that's different than what 
15 he's got. It's the other one. 
16 MR. HADLEY: Maybe it isn't 8. 
17 MIL DIXON: This is Exhibit 5. 
18 MR. HADLEY: Sorry. All right, Exhibit 5. 
19 Exhibit 5. 
20 Q. Exhibit 5 refers to — is your letter, 
21 correct? 
22 A. That's right. 
23 Q. And No. 6 of Exhibit 4 talks about no soffit 
24 venting, lack of attic ventilation has caused roof 
25 shingles to deteriorate, okay? Hang on just one 
Page 111 
1 Q. Okay. Why did you then - what was it that 
2 caused you to discuss the venting of the attic? Why 
3 did you bring it up to Dan? 
4 A. I think I — that's a long time ago. But, 
5 as I recall, I asked him if he thought that was - if 
6 he calculated or what it needed for the attic, and he 
7 thought that what he had was adequate. 
8 Q. And you accepted that? 
9 A. And I accepted that at the time. 
10 Q. All right. Now, you raise a little point. 
11 When you say "at the time," was there a time that you 
12 thought maybe I shouldn't ~ 
13 A. It started to curl. 
14 Q. Which, of course, was after Mary had bought 
15 it? 
16 A Yeah. 
17 Q. Do you believe that the fact that there 
18 was — I should ask you this: Today now as you sit 
19 here was there inadequate ventilation back when — 
20 during October of 1993? Was there inadequate 
21 ventilation at that time? 
22 A The evidence points, yes, there was. 
23 Q. Do you believe Jack — excuse me, do you 
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second 
Do you know offhand just what the standard 
is for a ventilation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Kind of the ratio? 
A. It's one to one fifty. You got to know what 
the inches of the vents are, and that is put out by the 
manufacturer. You have to reduce it by the fins. You 
have to reduce it by the grill. 
Q. Okay. And I'm referring now to your 
Exhibit 5, your letter, you're saying — I'm looking at 
the last two sentences of your paragraph there of the 
first paragraph. I also visited the job site — the 
job site another occasion and Dan and I discussed the 
venting of the attic. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Dan felt that it was adequate, period. 
Did you feel it was adequate? 
A. I questioned it at the time, I did. But I 
didn't know what the space was for those vents. 
Q. Why didn't you know the space? 
A. Because they weren't written on the — 
there's no specifications on the manufacturer what 
they — they didn't put on it how many square inching 
of venting it would produce. 
A. I don't — that's — I don't know. I would i 
2 say — 
3 Q. Excuse me, did you ask him what the 
4 measurements were of the -- of the attic, of the floor 
5 space, as it pertains to the ventilation? Did you ask 
6 him that? 
7 A. No. But I ~ but we still went back to the 
8 grills as to how big they were. 
9 Q. Did you measure them? Did you go measure 
10 those grills? 
11 A. You can measure them, yeah. That doesn't 
12 tell you. It's less than that measurement 
13 Q. I know that. But I'm just asking if you 
14 measured it? 
15 A. Yeah, we measured at the time what they 
16 were. Yeah. 
17 Q. Okay. Well, then, if you measured them, did 
18 you run a calculation so you would know exactly how 
19 much ventilation — 
20 A I did not. 
21 Q. You didn't? 
22 A I didn't. 
23 Q. Do you think Mr. Smith had a duty to measure 
24 and run the calculation so that he could ensure that 
25 the ventilation was to code? Do you think he had a 
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I Q Okay So the nailing fin -
2 A The nailing fin goes over the top of that 
3 Q Okay And instead of using this one foot 
4 strip that you see used nowadays, Dan Smith used felt9 
5 A Yeah 
6 Q And at the time you felt that was 
7 appropriate, at the time he was building the house, 
8 correct7 
9 A Yes 
10 Q All right Now, you say that the problem 
11 has nothing to do with counter flashing, the windows 
12 are cheap aluminum and they are sweating because the 
13 frames are very cold, correct7 
14 A That's right 
15 Q Now, when did you make that observation 
16 first, the first time7 j 
1 1 7 A Well, when you have a window there's no 
1
 18 thermal break between the outside part of the frame and 
19 the inside part of the frame It condenses — it 
| 20 brings the cold right m on the frame and then it 
21 condenses water on the frame, the window frames itself, 
22 and would come off 
23 Q Did you actually see that -
I 24 A Any humidity in the house would collect on 
25 the windows Yes, I did see that 
Page 58 
1 Q You saw that on Mary Moore's house7 
2 A Yes 
3 Q When did you first see that in her house7 
4 A When I was helping her fix the bathroom 
5 Q When was that, approximately7 
6 A I don't know dates Mary's got dates on 
1 7 that someplace 
8 Q I think she said, I think, that was within 
| 9 the first two or three years after she moved into the 
10 house Would that seem right to you7 
11 A I really don't recall 
12 Q Okay 
13 MR DIXON I don't want to misrepresent 
1 14 her Didn't she say the bathrooms were the first 
1 15 couple or three years7 Is that what you remember 
16 yesterday7 
17 MR HADLEY Within the first two or three 
18 years7 
19 MR DIXON Yeah, the toilets 
20 MS MOORE I don't remember what I said 
21 yesterday 
22 MR HADLEY She did have problems with the 
1 23 toilets within the first two or three years 
24 THE WITNESS The toilet is the next one on 





















































Q All nght \ nd you say the reason vvhy it I 
was constantly plugging up because they were low flush 
toilets, designed to save some water, is that nght7 
A That's nght 1 
Q If I understand you correctly, you J 
actually - 1 
A I pulled it out for her twice and unplugged I 
lt 
Q Now, when you did that, how did she happen J, 
to call you7 Did she know that you were a construction |5 
contractor7 Or did she call you because you were the 1 
building inspector7 Do you know what I mean7 t 
A We've been friends for a long time, and I've 1 
built one other home before this one 1 
Q I see J; 
A We've been acquainted for a long time f 
Q Okay Before she purchased this house of I 
the Smiths, did she ever go to you to talk to you about I 
the house and whether she should buy it7 [ 
A No 
Q Did you know she was going to buy this house I 
before she did7 |: 
A No 
Q How did you meet Mary Moore m the first I 
Page 60 
place7 
A Well, her husband and they were farmers, 1 
raised potatoes down here in the lower sink area 
Fiowell, yeah I was acquainted with all her family, J 
both Bill and his brother 
Q Okay And you were acquainted with them 
You said friends, but did you go out socially, that 
close a friend7 
A No I mean, they were there and we were up 
here 
Q So because you were that kind of friend 
acquaintance, she would call you to help her on this 
around the house, is that correct7 
A She called and I volunteered to go help her 
Q And you didn't charge her for those 
services7 
A No 
Q And you didn't go because you were the 
building inspector7 
A No 
Q You did that because you were her friend, 
nght7 
A We were trying to see if we could solve the 
problems 
Q Okay Now, what kind of construction 
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1 box, correct9 
2 A I can't confirm that because I don't really 
3 recall But I have a tester that tests, and I push the 
4 button to make sure when I'm checking GFI's I know 
5 the garage, and that's coming up later here, I thmk, 
6 anyway, Dan said he was going to put woodworking tools 
7 in there so he didn't want them Then at the time I 
8 thought, well, you know, he can put the plugs in if 
9 it's necessary 
10 When the GFI's first came out, people used 
11 to pull the plug out and pulled because they tripped so 
12 many times Nowadays it's not a problem with the GFI's 
13 the way they are 
14 Q There's been a lot of improvements in the 
15 GFI's9 
16 A Yes And the new GFI plugs are inexpensive, 
17 like I say, $6 But the breaker is still about $30,1 
18 thmk, for each one 
19 Q And then you say the two 20 amp circuits 
20 GFCI protected is a later code change What do you 
21 mean by that9 
22 A In the kitchen That's the kitchen, we 
23 require two separate circuits That came in 
24 Q Okay Are you talking about the 20 amp 
25 circuits, they could have been 15 amp circuits9 
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1 not a big issue, as far as getting it done It should 
2 be labeled so that they're not trying to figure out 
3 which switch went where 
4 Q Sure No 26 he says the house has over 
D house has over spanned headers and joists throughout 
6 the house What's your response to that9 
7 A Weil, that goes back to this He'b saying 
8 that the long span m this report I got here, and I 
9 haven't - I haven't got the blueprints anymore, and I 
10 have no way of measuring the things He said the 
11 longest span was 13 feet And when I we did it, we 
12 did it on this span chart, which allows 13 foot plus 
13 just a little They were fine, as far as I was 
14 concerned 
15 Q Okay 
16 A -- on the spans 
17 Q All right 
18 A He mentions a header m one of these It's 
19 been cut down, or something I don't recall anything 
20 like that 
21 Q Let me ask you about that There is a 
22 header for a basement window that faces to the north 
23 Do you remember that basement window9 
24 A Not particularly There is a basement 
25 window heads the north on that side 
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1 A No, they were still 20 amps before They 
2 required two separate circuits A minimum of two 
3 separate circuits in the kitchen 
4 Q Okay Well, didn't this house have two 
5 separate circuits in the kitchen9 
6 A I thought it did I don't know I would 
7 have to go - it's been they made this after I made 
8 that final, and I'm not sure If it was my mistake, if 
9 I overlooked that, I don't know 
10 Q Well, I don't think you did, because I think 
11 we saw two separate circuits But that's something we 
12 can hash out But I don't want to leave you with the 
13 impression that you made a mistake, because our 
14 expert — 
15 A Well --
16 Q — saw two separate circuits 
17 A — I don't pretend to be perfect I try to 
18 oversee anything 
19 Q Let's go to 24, and that's the bathrooms 
20 A That's basically the same thing 
21 Q Okay And No 25 -
22 A And 
23 Q The electrical panel had not been labeled 
24 A And I don't thmk it is yet That is one 
25 thing on the final, I don't thmk it's labeled It's 
1 Q All right Do you remember ever finding out 
2 that either Mr Moore or Mary Moore or somebody after 
3 they took over the house, cut that header back9 
4 A I wouldn't — I don't know anything about 
5 any of that 
6 Q Okay 
7 A I couldn't say one way or another 
8 Q All right I only ask you that because you 
9 did help her out for some things 
10 A I had nothing to do with anything like that, 
11 if that was done 
12 Q Okay And when you said you made a 
13 reference to this — that chart that you were working 
14 on that said that there was an allowable span of 13 
15 foot 1 inches, you were talking about — 
16 A The floor joists 
17 Q You were talking about --
18 A Yeah, Exhibit 49 
19 Q The handout sheet to the contractors, which 
20 was Exhibit 3, correct9 
21 A Uh huh 
22 Q Is that yes9 
23 A Yes 
24 Q All right So now we're at the footings 
25 appear to be at grade level in some places 
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1 Now, when you passed final inspection, the 
2 final grading to this house had not been done, correct7 
3 A That's right 
4 Q And that was because it was — it was 
5 November and it was muddy and it wasn't a good time to 
6 be doing final grading, correct*? 
7 A That's right 
8 Q And you expected that the final grading 
9 would be done the next spring when the weather cleared 
10 up, correct7 
11 A Yes 
12 Q And that's what you and Mr Smith agreed 
13 upon, correct7 
14 A. Yes 
15 Q Okay At that point in time, to your 
16 knowledge, neither Mr Smith -- Mr Smith had no 
17 intention of selling the house to Mrs Moore, because 
18 Mrs Moore hadn't even come into the picture, right7 
19 A Yes 
20 Q And you state in here that the Moores were 
21 not aware of the 30 inch depth requirement I'm not 
22 following that How do you know that the Moores were 
23 not aware of the 30 inch depth requirement7 
24 A Well, I didn't discuss it with them I 
25 don't know if they knew or not I don't think that she 
Page 79 
1 was never around the house when it was done 
2 Q Okay Do you know whether the Moores, after 
3 they moved in, moved any dirt7 
4 A I couldn't — I didn't witness that 
5 Q Okay Did you ever see them doing any -
6 any of the finish grading that was expected to be done7 
7 A No 
8 MR HADLEY Object Weil, strike that Go 
9 ahead 
10 MR DIXON 
11 Q Did Mrs Moore ever, or Mr Moore, the late 
12 Mr Moore, ever tell you that they had taken some dirt 
13 away from part of the house in order to make a 
14 driveway, or something like that7 
15 A He had a dnveway around the east part of 
16 the house, but he didn't talk to me about that 
17 dnveway He had an access to go back to his corral 
18 So that was his way of getting back there was on the 
19 east side of the house 
20 Q Okay Did you ever notice any changes in 
21 the grade of the house from the time you did the final 
22 inspection until during the time that you would go back 
23 and visit that house periodically to see Mrs Moore7 
24 A When we did the final inspection, it was a 
25 mess It was muddy, muddy, garbagey (sic) There was 
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1 did because she didn't realize they were that shallow 
2 until later on, and she showed me one day when we had 
3 to put a fence in, was trying to put a post in 
4 Q That was the first time that Mrs Moore ever 
5 mentioned to you any problem that she had with the 
6 footings of the house, correct7 
7 A That's when it came up, yeah 
8 Q Now, when you were out there at the house at 
9 the time that — or at the time that the inspection -
10 final inspection was done, was there dirt that could 
11 have been used to accomplish the final grading7 
12 A He had some dirt around the house I don't 
13 know how much 
14 Q Do you remember ever seeing any piles of 
15 dirt around the house, in the back7 
16 A He had dirt piled up when they poured the 
17 footings He had to dig out and for the basement I 
18 don't remember how much 
19 Q Do you remember him ever bringing m a load 
20 of dirt7 
21 A Not to my knowledge 1 wasn't around for 
22 that 
23 Q He could have, but you just don't remember7 
24 A He could have done and I wouldn't have known 
25 about it, that's nght The grading and that stuff I 
1 a lot of change in it after that 
2 Q Okay So it was such a mess that there was 
3 obviously some changes made7 
4 A Obviously pictures would be better than 
5 words on that 
6 Q Okay 
7 A But we don't have them 
8 Q Have you ever told — let's see, have you 
9 ever told anybody that the Moores had done some 
10 movement or some alteration of dirt levels, or anything 
11 like that7 
12 A No 
13 Q Okay All right Well, tell me how you 
14 expected the Smiths that following spring to have 
15 complied with the 30 inch depth requirement7 
16 MR HADLEY Objection Objection, in that 
17 you're clearly leading the witness and you're assuming 
18 a fact that has not been at issue, that the Smiths were 
19 expected to do the landscaping 
20 MR DIXON No, that's a 
21 mischaractenzation He did say that he expected the 
22 Smiths to do the finish grade the following spring when 
23 the weather cleared up 
24 MR HADLEY Let me voir dire 
25 / / / 
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1 Q. Okay. So having stated that — shall we go 
2 to the code, UBC 2517? Because your position was that 
3 is not out of code. I mean, what is your position 
4 regarding this wall and window that are cantilevered 
5 out? 
6 A. I would need to go measure those to make 
7 sure what they are right now. But if they're 4 feet, 
8 whether that's been rated or whether that's correct. 
9 Q. Keep talking to me. What does that mean you 
10 start saying about 4 foot, what are you addressing? 
11 A. Well, there was a formula that the old 
12 contractors used that had a distance of so much back 
13 and so much over you go. 
14 Q. Right 
15 A. And I don't know what that — I don't 
16 remember what it was. I know I've been told and heard, 
17 use that, because we went back to the 3 foot. 
18 Q. Okay. Are you prepared— 
19 A. It was more than that. I mean, it was more 
20 than three. It was allowed more than three. 
21 Q. Are you prepared to say definitely one way 
22 or another that it is within code or outside the code? 
23 A. At this point, no, I'm not. I haven't 
24 really checked out on that. 
25 Q. Okay. Let's bypass it, okay? 
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1 A. Most of them do it in about 10 minutes. 
2 Q. What if we were in a hurry to get the home 
3 sold, may not label it7 
4 A. I don't know. I would be speculating. 
5 MR. DIXON: I sustain the objection. 
6 (Laughter.) 
7 MR. HADLEY: 
8 Q. Did you ever consider law school, Jack? 
9 A. No. I don't want to go to law school. 
10 Q. Okay. I'm trying to just move on here. 
11 Man, here it is No. 27, footings do not meet minimum 30 
12 inch frost line depth. You and Bryce kind of talked 
13 about that one, didn't you? 
14 A. Yeah. I really can't give you the --1 know 
15 at the time the footings were poured, I mentioned to 
16 Dan that they were not deep enough, the whole — 
17 Q. Right when they were pouring you mentioned 
18 it? 
19 A. Right when it was poured. And he told me it 
20 was going to be backfilled. And, of course, that 
21 wasn't done in November when we did that. So that's 
22 basically it. I mean --
23 Q. Why didn't he do it right back when he had 
24 got them poured and — 
25 A. Well, if they planned on filling them out, I 
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1 A. Yeah. 
2 MR. HADLEY: Robert, you're going to get a 
3 longer lunch than maybe needed. 
4 Q. Whoa, do you think I'm just getting picky to 
5 go to No. 25 of Exhibit 4 and say that that electrical 
6 panel has not been labeled? 
7 A. It hasn't been labeled. I know what you 
8 could do. 
9 Q. Do you think I'm being real picky? 
10 A. Brought up on my inspection sheet it says 
11 panel not labeled and that there. 
12 Q. And it's required? 
13 A. It's required for the switches. 
14 Q. What if I built that home for me to live in, 
15 would you still say it's required that I label that 
16 thing? 
17 A. I think at the time of the final -- I don't 
18 know — I can't remember if it was positive, but I 
19 thought I talked about that and it was gonna be done. 
20 But I don't know if it was forgotten. It isn't a big 
21 job, but it needs to be done. 
22 Q. Would it — it isn't a big job, you say? 
23 A. Not really big. 
24 Q. How big a job would it be for a licensed 


























have that quite a bit, they'll backfill to get their 
slope away from the house. 
Q. Okay. Is the milk pale spilled over as 
pertained to these footings, Jack? 
MR. DDCON: Objection to the form of the 
question. 
MR. HADLEY: 
Q. Do you follow my drift? 
MR. DIXON: No, I don't. Objection to the 
form of the question. 
THE WITNESS: The grading was impossible at 
the time I went through there. It was November. It 
•was muddy. But I don't know whose responsibility ic 
was. I don't know what the — I don't know what the 
deals were between the two parties. I have — I really 
can't answer. 
MR. HADLEY: 
Q. Are you aware of when Mary Moore first 
contacted the Smiths about potentially buying the home? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. What if I told you it was in February 
of 1994, some three months after your November 8th 
final inspection? 
A. February of that year was — 
Q. February of '94, yeah. 
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1 A. Yes, I would say that. 
2 Q Okay. 
3 A. Reputation, too. 
4 Q Let's talk about item 6. And I think I'm 
5 going to refer here to — I believe it's Exhibit 8. Do 
6 you still have a copy of your letter there? 
7 A. No, he took them all back there. 
8 Q. You didn't get a copy? 
9 MR. DIXON: You want the inspection final? 
10 MR. HADLEY: No. If I wrote this right, 
11 Exhibit 8. 
12 MR. DIXON: I thought you said 6. 
13 Exhibit 8. 
14 THE WITNESS: No, that's different than what 
15 he's got. It's the other one. 
16 MR. HADLEY: Maybe it isn't 8. 
17 MR. DIXON: This is Exhibit 5. 
18 MR. HADLEY: Sorry. All right, Exhibit 5. 
19 Exhibit 5. 
20 Q. Exhibit 5 refers to — is your letter, 
21 correct? 
22 A. That's right. 
23 Q. And No. 6 of Exhibit 4 talks about no soffit 
24 venting, lack of attic ventilation has caused roof 



























Q. Okay. Why did you then ~ what was it that 
caused you to discuss the venting of the attic? Why 
did you bring it up to Dan? 
A. I think I - that's a long time ago. But, 
as I recall, I asked him if he thought that was — if 
he calculated or what it needed for the attic, and he 
thought that what he had was adequate. 
Q. And you accepted that? 
A. And I accepted that at the time. 
Q. All right. Now, you raise a little point. 
When you say "at the time," was there a time that you 
thought maybe I shouldn't -
A. It started to curl. 
Q. Which, of course, was after Mary had bought 
it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you believe that the fact that there 
was --1 should ask you this: Today now as you sit 
here was there inadequate ventilation back when — 
during October of 1993? Was there inadequate 
ventilation at that time? 
A. The evidence points, yes, there was. 
Q. Do you believe Jack — excuse me, do you 
believe that Mr. Smith knew that the ventilation was 
inadequate? 
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1 second. 
2 Do you know offhand just what the standard 
3 is for a ventilation? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Kind of the ratio? 
6 A. It's one to one fifty. You got to know what 
7 the inches of the vents are, and that is put out by the 
8 manufacturer. You have to reduce it by the fins. You 
9 have to reduce it by the grill. 
10 Q. Okay. And I'm referring now to your 
11 Exhibit 5, your letter, you're saying — I'm looking at 
12 the last two sentences of your paragraph there of the 
13 first paragraph. I also visited the job site -- the 
14 job site another occasion and Dan and I discussed the 
15 venting of the attic. 
16 A. Yeah. 
17 Q. Dan felt that it was adequate, period. 
18 Did you feel it was adequate? 
19 A. I questioned it at the time, I did. But I 
20 didn't know what the space was for those vents. 
21 Q. Why didn't you know the space? 
22 A. Because they weren't written on the — 
23 there's no specifications on the manufacturer what 
24 they -- they didn't put on it how many square inching 
25 of venting it would produce. 



















Q. Excuse me, did you ask him what the 
measurements were of the — of the attic, of the floor 
space, as it pertains to the ventilation? Did you ask 
him that? 
A. No. But I — but we still went back to the 
gnlls as to how big they were. 
Q. Did you measure them? Did you go measure 
those grills? 
A. You can measure them, yeah. That doesn't 
tell you. It's less than that measurement. 
Q. I know that. But I'm just asking if you 
measured it? 
A. Yeah, we measured at the time what they 
were. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Well, then, if you measured them, did 
you run a calculation so you would know exactly how 
much ventilation — 
A. I did not. 
Q. You didn't? 
A. I didn't. 
Q. Do you think Mr. Smith had a duty to measure 
and run the calculation so that he could ensure that 
the ventilation was to code? Do you think he had a 
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To whom it may concern 
[ was contacted by Dan Smith and went over the property and the layout of the home on 
the 1 Ith of August 1993, and inspected the footings on Fnday 13 th It was called to his attention 
at that time that the footings were not at proper depth, but he stated this would be taken care of 
when the back till was put around the house The basement walls were inspected on the 16th and 
the rough plumbing on the 18th. The rough electrical and plumbing, along with the framing 
inspection, was done on the 8^ and 9th of September 1993 I checked the building progress on 
both the 28th and the 29th of October [ also visited the job site another occasion and Dan and I 
discussed the venting of the attic Dan felt that it was adequate 
Dan and Carol were living in the home when we a^ked to do the final inspection on the 
home on the 8^ of November At that time they hadn't built the deck on the back of the house 
and the final grading hadn't been done as well At the time the final inspection was done, [ 
discussed with Dan the fact that the access into the attic did not meet the minimum code 
requirements and that the smoke detectors had not been installed None of these items had been 
corrected at the time that the house was sold to the Moore's The Moore's did the landscaping 




iCjacfc Peterson, Fillmore City Building Inspector 
FILLMORE CITY 
City Building Inspectors response to 30 items from Sunrise Engineering's inspector. 
The home in question was built under the 1991 Building Code 
The fascia that wasn't completed was done by Tom's Roofing when a cold roof was put 
on that section in August of 1998. It had noting to do with the original construction. 
The rear deck was constructed after my last inspection and was not anchored properly. 
Same as r£L 
The south east comer of the foundation is not cracking. The stucco finish on the 
foundation is cracking where it meets the sheeting on the upper floor Ic is not a structural 
problem 
Not applicable. 
The gab^e end vents and turtle vents were installed later -
There is a junction box und^r die kitchen cabinets up next to the counter top Not easy 
access. Needs a cover. This item was missed on the final inspection. 
The attic access was brought to Mr. Smith's attention when the final inspection was 
made. 
This problem has nothing to do with counter flashing. The wmdows are cheap aluminum 
frames v/ith no thermal break and they are sweating because the frames are very cold. 
Bathroom fixtures have been removed many times because of the water saver toilers that 
are plugging and not flushing. I can not confirm if they were not caulked in the 
beginning. 
Can not confirm in attic 
At the time of the final inspection it was noted that smoke detectors were lacking Mr. 
Smith was going to take care of the problem. After tile Moore's moved in the battery 
detector was installed. 
On October 29, 1993, Mr. Smith called me and w anted mc to lock at the stairs. The 
treads measured about 3'8 niche over, but there wasn't enough ceding height, and one 
more tread would make the clearance far below the €6n head room clearance. It would 
take major reconstruction to 
change it, and I felt that the 378 inch over height was the lessor of the two problems. 
14. Not required in an unfinished basement. 
15. Not required Water pressure is not that high. 
16. To my knowledge, the copper lines were grounded. 
17. The spans for 2 x 6 headers in the 1991 code was up to six feet. None exceed that. 
18. Can not confirm. 
19. Cantilever has a 2 to \. There is 13 feet back and 4 feet over. 1991 code did not require 
to be double. 
20. Combusiion air for water heater not required from outside. Plenty of room m basement 
to meet needs of 50 cubic feet, 1000 BTU. Female is 90 piuse bringing its own 
combustion air from outside. 
21. Dishwasher is plumbed right and works fine. 
22. In the 1991 Building Code only water heaters in seismic zone 3-4 were required to be 
anchored. Fillmore is in a 2 B Zone. (1 code 1310 (e) 
23. Kitchen circuits under the 91 code 210-8 (5) Electric Code, with receptacles installed 
within 6 feet of kitchen sink to service counter tops shall be GF1 protected. This was 
done with a GFCI breaker in panel box. The two 20 amp circuits GFCI protected is later 
code change. 
24 Bathrooms under 210-8-6 also 15 or 20 amps and are GFCI protected. There were also 
on a GFCI breaker in panel box. 
25. Mr. Smith told me at the time of the final inspection that he would take care of this item. 
26". In 91 code, 2 x 8 -]6 inch on center were allowed 13 feet 1 inch - max. The longest spans 
in the house do not exceed this. The headers have already been addressed in #17. 
27. When the footings were inspected, Mr. Smith assured me the grading would be adequate. 
When he moved in, in November, it was muddy and the grading had not been done. 
When ihe home was sold to the Moore's, the grading and landscaping were not done, 
the Moore's were not aware of the 30 inchricpt, 
28. 'This also was done by Moore's and was part of the land scraping. 
29. Outlets in the garage ware checked on final inspection with Mr. Smith, He said he was 
going to use his power tools in the garage and didn't want GFI. 
30. I miased this item on final inspecnon. 
RESIDENTIAL 
Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance 
CITY OF FILLMORE 
- / £* / 
Name of Owner-
Address of Owner: 
Property described as:. 
Otherwise known as: 
Dan Smith 





/ No. of buildings on lot 
j/fiMr j>M/¥ 
1143 Building Permit No.: 
Telephone No.: 7 4 3 - 5 1 7 0 
Zone: 
Occupancy Group: . 
Altered New W 
.Building No. _No. of Units 
TYPE OF OCCUPANCY 
_ _ 
FAMILY OCCUPANCY 
Number of families approved to reside per building 
Number of boarders or roomers wi th automobiles approved to reside on premises wi th a family 
Numher of legal-sized off-street parking spaces 
BACHING SINGLES OCCUPANCY 
Number of baching singles approved to reside per unit 
Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces. The number of occupants owning or operating 
vehicles cannot exceed this number. 
1 declare under penalty of perjury that 1 am the owner or authorized agent of the property subject of this request, that the fore-
going statements and answers are true and correct, and that the stated conditions wi l l be maintained on the premise^ 
Signature Date 
Any change \n intensity of use on the building or premises, or an increase of more than five percent (5%) in the number of occ-
upants in an apartment or mult iple residential building wi l l require the issuance of a new certificate. 
Chief Buildi(iglnspector 
Remarks: 
Section 4-4 Zoning Ordinance No, 77-3 Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance. tt shaLl be unlawful 
to use or occupy or to permit the use or occupancy of any building or premises until a certificate of 
occupancy and zoning compliance shall have been issued for the premises and/or building by Fillmore City. 
Failure to comply with any section of this ordinance is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not 
more then $1000 or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or both aa is set forth in Chapter L 
Sec. H-LG0. 
O R M 123 GEM Prxntmg Co S L C Utah 
Legend Yes(X) No(0) 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE 
/A / 
he undersigned Buyer . _ hereby deposits Wth-QiuKcmg^ 
EARNEST MONE»Y, the amount of . J flU/h ^J^^rj^./^, _, rj_ ,7 M„ — ^ ' ^ //CO Dollars {S^/gQO. £>Q ) 
he form of ?Jf\Lr_k_. 
ich shall be deposited in accordance with applicaole State Law 
Received by . 
- / / ? ' - J 
>kerage Phone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
C^t^^r/m_ 
I PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at 
County of 
bject to any restrictive covenants zoning regulations utiii 
cordance with Section G Said property is owned by 
in the City of 
f t  t  i 
Utah 
r
 other easements or nnhts of way government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
__ as sellers and is more particularly described 
«(hL-Qr t t  
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
O UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY 
]yT IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY 
O Vacant Lot Q Vacant Acreage 0 Other 
9 Commercial E l Residential 0 C o n d o _D Other 
(a) Included i tems Unless excluded below this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title 
*Jjjt<j^\s MjTgL j) Excluded i tems The following items are specifically excluded from this sale. Xl 'J^STkG A^y^T^ /L^i{ 4~^ 
(c} CONNECTIONS, JJTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
Q well O connected hJ other 
STirngation water / secondary system * „ 
# of shares M» i J_ ^ o m ^ a r V f ^ V~< * \ 
__! public sewer Ufconnected 
g_J) septic tank connected 
0 other sanitary system 
\jf public water "_? connected 
0 private water 0 connected 
Q / V antenna £3 master antenna Q prewired 
natural gas J_J connected 
0 electnaty _ connected 
O ingress & egress by private easement 
t_Tdedicated road E_f paved 
Q curb and gutter 
other rights 
(d) Survey A certified survey Q shall be furnished at the expense of _ _pnor to closing Ws shall not be furnished 
(e) Buyer Inspection Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section t (c) above and 6 below accepts it in its present physical 
condition except . . 
2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The total purchase l price for the property ts_ 
~ '\df, ^j Dollars ($ l _ M O'^O ' &Q which shall be paid as follows 
COO-OO which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
representing the approximate balance ol CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing 
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer 
which obligation bears interest at O % per annum with monthly payments of $ __J . 






representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ . 
which include d principal, CIS interest Q taxes Q insurance, C3 condo fees D other 
representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing to be paid as follows 
Other . 
$ }j3,
 {)QO 00 TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
to assume and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees 
to make application withm t v r fit days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at 
A V //{ % If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within A/ f A days after Seller s acceptance 
\ loan discount 
an interest rate not to exceed 
of this Agreement this Agreement s/iall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written ziotice Seller agrees to pay up \o /[/ 'h{ mortgage 1 
points not to exceed $ _ _ In addition, seller agrees to pay $ /* / r* to be used for Buyer s other lodn costs 
/ ' 
TiJr:. - - / c ; 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (O) 
This Is a legally binding contract Read the entire document carefully before signing 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
i INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing heating, 
-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, win-
w and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, walt-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit 
's). fencing, trees and shrubs 
B INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to rts condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrorr 
its production Buyer accepts the property in 'as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer desires any additional inspt 
jd inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer 
, SELLER WARRANTIES Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
will not be remedied prior to closing, (b) all obligations agamst the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
» brought current on or before dosing, and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system and appliances shall be sound or in 
itisfactory working condition at dosing 
D CONDITION OF WELL Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller s knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
tnttnued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water nght 
E CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller s knowledge, in good working order and Seller 
is no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards 
F ACCELERATION CLAUSE- Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Soller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
"*K!S of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
jprove the sale. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent pnor to closing In such case, 
I earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" dause are^ "Ih 
Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void 
G TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days pnor to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
a preliminary title report on the subject property Prior to closing. Buyer shall grve wntten notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title 
hereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree-
ent at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties 
H TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued 
/ such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided lor in said standard form, and 
ie encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
la l l , unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any 
ancellation charge 
1 EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing 
copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property Unless reasonable wntten objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent pnor 
> closing. Buyer shall take title subject to such leases If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing thts Agreement shall be null and void 
J CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Dunng the pendency of this Agreement. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases 
ntered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer 
estate contract . T r a n s f e r of Sel ler 's ownersh ip interest .^naTTbe made as set for th in Section S. Sel ler agrees to funu^n good and marketab le tit le t o the property, sub jec t 
o encumbrances a n d e x c e p t i o n s noted here in , ev idenced by __. a current pol icy of title insurance in the amount of purchase p r i ce C^ an abstract of title brought current, 
v i th a n attorney's op in ion (See Section H). 
4. INSPECTION O F T I T L E . In accordance with Section G. Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to dos ing . Buyer shall take tit le 
lubj&ct to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer CI has F f h a s not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement 
5. VESTING O F T I T L E . Ti t le shall ves t in Buyer as fo l lows: cZ-<i- d,0\.e- <^7/ J (Z^f CZ^-tL^n * 
6. SELLERS W A R R A N T I E S . In add i t i on to warrant ies conta ined in Sect ion C, the fo l low ing items are also warranted: : 
" ^ l ^ ^ J ; 
Except ions to the a b o v e a n d Sect ion C shal l be l imited to the fo l lowing: 
7 . S P E C I A L C O N S I D E R A T I O N S A N D CONTINGENCIES. Th is offer is m a d e subject to the fol lowing special condit ions and/or con t ingenc ies w h i c h must be sa t is f ied 
prior to c los ing : : :
 : ; : \ 
8 . C L O S I N G O F S A L E . Th is Agreement shall be d o s e d on or before 
___k^__2_ . . 1 9 Vk-at a reasonab le loca t ion to be designated b y 
Se l le r , subject to S e c t i o n Q. Upon d e m a n d . Buyer shall deposi t wi th the esc row c los ing of f ice all documents necessary to c o m p l e t e the pu rchase in accordance w i t h 
th is Ag reemen t . P r o r a t i o n s set forth in Sect ion R shall J>e w a d e as of 0 date of possession C_f date of c losing @ other . 
9 . P O S S E S S I O N . Se l le r shal l del iver possession to Buyer o n _ _ 
10. A G E N C Y D I S C L O S U R E . At the s ign ing of this Agreement the l ist ing _4gent t  si \ /_^_k -agent fv / JBiT 
iless extended by wr i t ten ag reemen t of par t ies . 
represents ( ) Seller { } B u y e r . 
a n d the se l l ing a g e n t represents ( ) Sel ler ( )>8uyer. Buyer and Seller con f i rm that prior to s ign ing this Ag reemen t 
> d isc losure of t h e agency relat i6nship(s) was prov ided to him/her. { ) ( } Buye r ' s initials ( ) ( ) Seller's in i t ia ls . 
, - . ; G E N E R A L P R O V I S I O N S . U N L E S S OTHERWISE INDICATED A B O V E . THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE R E V E R S E SIDE HEREOF HAVE B E E N 
A C C E P T E D BY T H E B U Y E R A N D S E L L E R AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS A G R E E M E N T BY REFERENCE. 
12. A G R E E M E N T T O P U R C H A S E A N D TIME L IMIT FOR A C C E P T A N C E . Buyer of fers to purchase the property on the above terms and condi t ions. Seller s h a l l . ; 
*" < 'r^") ^t J x *^ Off £ " * " f- "" '*+-''•'•' '*-*-!'' •"" '•"" 
h a v e unti l _____2________-(AM/PM) _T^p, t / , 19 7 ^ to accept this offer. Un less accepted, this offer shall lapse anr j t h e Aaent shaH^e tu rn the E A R N E S T 
t ^ O N E Y to tt fe B u y * r ^ ' ^ / .. \ . - j . _^ - > ^ - v ^ • &S O ~ " 
A / / / 
:^ ,if 
( B u y e r ' s S igna tu re ) 
U- sf. K^ 7< IS fj V V ^?~.U?fi (Date) (Address) 




( b u y e r ' s S igna tu re ) (Date) (Address) (SS'N/TAX ID) ;< 
C H E C K O N E 
[ ^ A C C E P T A N C E O F O F F E R TO P U R C H A S E : Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing of fer on the terms and conditions spec i f ied above 
E ? R E J E C T I O N . Se l l e r hereby R E J E C T S the foregoing offer. (Seller's initials) 
(?£ C O U N T E R O F F E R . Sel ler hereby A C C E P T S the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the except ions or modif ications as specif ied be low or in t he a t tached Addendum, a n d 
p resen ts sa id C O U N T E R OFFER for Buyer 's acceptance. Buyer shall have until (AM/PM) 19 to accept the t e r m s 
spec i f ied be low. 
i ignature) (Q_de) s 
Y ^ d'J/Q f-(^ JMsMLlMS. •7Vl-'.ri7o Jtif • ' ? V - '/OS 
(Se l ler 's S i . 
Y~> 








_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2 > < 
(Se l le r i t r ) (Time) (Address) 
- ^ r j ^ / 7 1 f y t < 
C H E C K O N E : 
D A C C E P T A N C E O F C O U N T E R OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER O F F E R 
• R E J E C T I O N . B u y e r hereby R E J E C T S the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer ' s Initials) 
D C O U N T E R O F F E R . Buyer hereby A C C E P T S the C O U N T E R OFFER wi th modi f icat ions on attached Addendum. 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX I D ) 
(Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buye r ' s Signature) (Date) (Time) 
D O C U M E N T R E C E I P T 
State ^ a w requi res Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller wi th copies of this Agreement bear ing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives mus t therefore be comple ted) . 
A.E. I a c k n o w l e d g e receipt_of a f ina l copy of the forego ing Agreement bearing all s ignatures : 
inM_TiiQC n c cc» « CD - / c i r :w/ i -n iocr SIGNATURES SELLER SIGNATURE OF 8U?YER 
- - • x> =<?. C ? 
J3e J, : 
,bzxe ' ^~ 
J_i : i -' < 
Dale 
B. C3 1 persona l ty caused a f inal c o p y of the foregoing Agreement bear ing all s ignatures to be mai led on _ 
Cer t i f ied Mai l a n d re tu rn receipt a t t ached hereto to the D Sel ler Q Buyer . Sent by - -
Dale 
- . 1 9 - -by 
K AUTHORITY OF SIGN ATORS If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants 
s or her authority to do so and to bind 8uyer or Seller 
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS- This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
id all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree 
ent This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties 
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be m writing and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement 
)t expressly modified or excluded therein 
N OEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
to institute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition 
contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
jyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
eluding a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap-
icable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in-
rpleader action in court to resolve a depute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the prmaoal broker to draw from the 
irnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
j interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
es incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action 
0 ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement 
P RISK OF LOSS. Al! risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
e date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of h^e, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
0%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property 
tor to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees m writing to repair 
replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
^ TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport. ^ 
G. flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations delays caused by lender, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
ite shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter, 
ne is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
jlivered by all parties to the transaction 
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (V2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing 
le insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current vear, insurance, tf acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
1 assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
closing 
S REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING 11 this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed tree of defects other than those ex-
jpted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
jntaimng Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
>tate contract therein 
T NOTICE Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
the event with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
automatically terminated and this Agreement is m full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the 
uyer or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice 
U BROKERAGE For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term Brokerage * shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office 
DAYS For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days ' shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
AGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM 
A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ. (#889) 
NATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ. (7522) 
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, a P.C. 
192 East 200 North Suite 203 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 652-8000 
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of ] 
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and ] 
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee ; 
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
Defendants. 
) DEFENDANTS' SECOND SET 
> OF REQUESTS FOR 
) ADMISSIONS TO PLAINTIFFS 
) Case No. 000700142 MI 
) Judge Eyre 
DEFENDANTS7 FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSIONS TO PLAINTIFFS 
Defendants, Dan and Carol Smith, by and through their attorney, A. Bryce Dixon, Esq., 
of DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, a P.C, hereby request that Plaintiffs and their attorney 
answer, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 36, in writing and under oath, within 30 days 
of receipt hereof, the following Requests for Admission: 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that Jason Bullock and Mark O'Barr are home inspectors. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that Plaintiffs had the right to have a home inspection 
performed before the sale of the home. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that Plaintiffs had the time and opportunity to have a home 
inspection performed before the sale of the home. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that Defendants did nothing to prevent Plaintiffs from 
exercising their right to ask for and obtain a home inspection before the closing of the sale of 
the home. 
As to all Items 1 thru 42: 
DEFECT ITEM #1 
REQUEST NO, 5: Admit that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru 
42 in your expert witness report were discovered without destructive testing. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that said defects were discovered through inspection by 
person(s) knowledgeable in the trade of home building or home inspection. 
REQUEST NO.7: Admit that said defects could have been discovered before the sale of 
the home by a home inspector. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that a home inspection would have revealed said defects. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru 
42 in your expert witness report at the time of the sale of the home were not a latent defects as 
the phrase "latent defect" is used in the court's order regarding the Smiths' motion for summary 
judgment. 
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that said defects were not a material defect as the phrase 
"material defect(s)" is used in the court's order regarding the Smiths' motion for summary 
judgment. 
2 
Gregory B. Hadley (3652) 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
2696 North University Avenue, #260 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 377-4403 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4411 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




DAN SMITH, et al., 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED 
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS' 
SECOND SET OF REQUEST FOR 
ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 00700142 MI 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs and do hereby amend their Answers to Defendants' 
Second Set of Request of Admissions to include the following: 
ANSWER TO NO. 1 
Admit 
ANSWER TO NO. 2 
Admit 
ANSWER TO NO. 3 
Admit 
ANSWER TO NO. 4 
Admit 
ANSWER TO NO. 5 
Admit 
ANSWER TO NO. 6 
Admit 
ANSWER TO NO. 7 
Admit 
ANSWER TO NO. 8 
Deny 
ANSWER TO NO. 9 
Admit as to defects 2 - 8 , 10, 13 - 25, 28, 29, 30 - 37, 40, and 41. 
T T 




VY uiiiii.il lYujuic <uiu lviaiy iviuuie vs. Ua nia, ei ai. 
Deposition of Mary J. Moore, taken on February 19, 2003 
Page 17 
1 MR. HADLEY: Counsel, not to break your 
2 stride, we went through — she's still working through 
3 the papers, but there's some documents in there from 
4 Tamko. 
5 M R DEXON: Are there? 
6 M R HADLEY: Yes. 
7 M R DIXON: Let's take a look at i t 
8 Q. Can you find it for me? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. Well, I guess you don't have them. They 
12 were all together there. But I have — 
13 MRDDCON: Is this your stuff? 
14 M R HADLEY: Oh, there is more. There you 
15 go. 
16 THE WITNESS: I started out by putting rain 
17 gutters — finishing the rain gutter on my home, and 
18 Jim Sampson discovered it, and we got ahold of them and 
19 Tamko. That started it. 
20 M R DIXON: 
21 Q. All right. There's a complaint form that 
22 says that you are filling out to Tamko, correct? How 
23 did you find out that Tamko was the manufacturer of the 
24 shingles? 
25 A. I asked Allen Roper at the lumberyard here. 
Page 19 
1 So your allegation at this time is that the 
2 shingles were faulty, correct? 
3 A. We thought like the shingles were faulty. 
4 Q. Why did you think that the shingles were 
5 faulty? 
6 A. Because they were cracking, raising and 
7 curling. 
8 Q. Where did you see raising and curling? 
9 A. This gentleman that we hired, Jim Sampson, 
10 to install the rain gutter on the north side above the 
11 garage, came down and stopped on top of the garage. We 
12 realized it didn't come down, but it didn't connect 
13 into the rain gutter. We wanted it to go in and hook 
14 into the rain gutter so there would be no problems. He 
15 came and installed that, saw the roof, said something 
16 about it. 
17 I said, What's the problem? 
18 He says, They're very brittle. 
19 I said, Who would I talk to? 
20 He sent me to Allen Roper. 
21 Q. Okay 
22 A. Allen Roper got me started on this end, and 
23 then that gentleman came down and did an inspection and 
24 wrote — came back. And he — or he and Jack Peterson 
25 came back then. 
Page 18 Page 20 
1 Q. And how did he — 
2 A. And he — 
3 Q. How did Allen Roper know that they were 
4 Tamko shingles? 
5 A. There's a paper with — in there that has a 
6 receipt from them. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. And Allen came over and looked at my roof 
9 and told me to contact these people. In fact, he 
10 helped me do it. 
11 Q. All right. So in your complaint you state 
12 that the shingles were purchased from Roper Lumber and 
13 the date the home was purchased, February 15th, 1994, 
14 and this is Mr. Roper helping you fill out this 
15 complaint form; is that what you're saying? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. 
18 MR. DIXON: Let's mark the complaint form as 
19 Exhibit 1 up here. 
20 (Whereupon, Exhibit I was marked 
21 for identification.) 
22 M R DIXON: 
23 Q. And you state that the labor was correct, 
24 the shingles faulty, you should replace all shingles 
25 and labor to replace. 
1 Q. So Mr. Sampson actually replaced three 
2 singles, correct? 
3 A. Tamko asked him to take them off and replace 
4 them so that they could be mailed in for testing. 
5 Q. Okay. 
6 A. And we did that. 
7 Q. Now, is that the first that you had ever 
8 heard of any problems with the shingles on the roof, 
9 was when Mr. Sampson brought tiiat to your attention? 
10 A. Yes. I don't go on the roof. 
11 Q. You didn't have any leaking through the 
12 roof, right? 
13 A. No, I had not. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. None that I was aware of, anyway. 
16 Q. And this was on the north side of the house 
17 just above the garage, correct? 
18 A. Correct. 
19 Q. Did Mr. Sampson say there were any other 
20 shingles that looked bad? 
21 A. Yes, he did. 
22 Q. What other shingles did he say looked bad? 
23 A. He said my roof looked bad. The shingles 
24 were getting brittle. And it was not lack of their 
25 materials: it was lack of ventilation. 
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1 A. Put the stuff around the -
2 Q. Around the turtle vents? 
3 A. No, around the roof. That comes over the 
4 garage. Like this is the garage roof, it's the piece 
5 that goes on the edge around the garage. 
6 Q. All right 
7 A. I don't know what it's called 
8 Q. Did you hire Jack Peterson to do that? 
9 A. No, T did not. 
10 Q. Why did you call Jack Peterson about that? 
1 i A. Tamko asked for me to contact the city 
12 inspector to see what was required, what we needed for 
13 the home. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. He gave us an idea and so did Jack. 
16 Q. All right. But I don't quite understand why 
17 Jack Peterson would be willing to work on the house. 
18 Did you hire him to do work on the house? 
19 A. No, he told Tom the roofer that he would put 
20 that on. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. Because Tom the roofer does not do that; 
23 Jack can. 
24 Q. Did he expect to be paid for that? 
25 A. He would have been paid if he would have 
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1 A. Yeah. I tried like the stuff you put down 
2 drains to clean things. Dan had told me about the 
3 clean-out valve. I had plunged i t I had tried 
4 everything I knew how to try. It's not a consistent 
5 thing, it just happens every once in a while. You 
6 think you have it cleared up and then it happens again. 
7 Q. Well, this is in 2002. This is, you know, 
8 how many years after you bought the house? Eight years 
9 after you bought the house. 
10 A. It might plug up once or twice and not for 
11 several months. It might plug up 20 times in a month. 
12 Q. This is the first time your toilet plugged 
13 up is 2002? 
14 A. Oh, no. 
15 Q. Eight years after you bought the house and 
16 you want to charge — 
17 A- I told you I tried --
18 MR.HADLEY: Let him finish his question. 
19 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 
20 MR. DIXON: 
21 Q. When did it first plug up, then? 
22 A. That I do not remember. 
23 Q. Well, just approximately how soon after you 
24 bought the house did you have a toilet problem? 
25 A. Six months. Approximately. 
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1 sent me a bill. He would have. 
2 Q. All right. Let's go to the toilet flooding 
3 over several times. What damage did that do? 
4 A. Well, it floods over. It gets under the 
5 moulding. At one time it was so bad it leaked down 
6 into the basement It got on the carpet in the 
7 bedroom. 
8 Q. Okay. Do you know why the toilets flooded? 
9 A. I didn't know for years why the toilet 
10 flooded. I just felt like I didn't know how to flush 
11 the toilet properly. I don't know why it didn't flush. 
12 Q. And did you find out the reason eventually 
13 why the toilets were flooding? 
14 A. I believe somebody told me venting. But I 
15 wouldn't — Tm not — 
16 Q. Okay. All right What other damage have 
17 you suffered? 
18 A. We had a very bad leak in the front windows. 
19 Very, very cold. 
20 Q. Excuse me, before we go on to the toilets, 
21 did you hire anyone to repair the toilets? 
22 A. I made attempts. I think we got them here. 
23 Q. It appears that the check for this repair of 
24 the toilet problem is dated July 29th of 2002? Is that 
25 right? 
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1 Q. And periodically ever since then you've had 
2 these toilet problems? 
3 A Just here and there. You would think it was 
4 fixed. It wasn't 
5 Q. All right You say you got bad leaks in the 
6 front window, right? 
7 A. We had a lot of air coming, and there was a 
8 gap in front of our window. 
9 Q. Okay. I don't understand gap. Could you 
10 describe it for me. 
11 A. Evidently the caulking that had been there 
12 had gone in the wall. I don't know where it went. But 
13 we kept filling it with caulking trying to seal it off. 
14 It was very cold. 
15 Q. Okay. So you're talking about the front 
16 room window, the biggest window or the smaller windows? 
17 A. The big one. 
18 Q. The big window in the front room looking 
19 north, correct? 
20 A. (Nods head). 
21 Q. Yes? 
22 A. Yes. Okay. I'm thinking when I do that. 
23 Q. That's fine. 
24 And you say that on the inside of the window 
25 where there was some caulking, the caulking wasn't 
•L-_, ^^-^JUJJ^lUAkeU-iJa-Ji 
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1 I still don't go touch my living room window every day. 
2 Q. Well, ma'am, let me tell you when we get any 
3 leaks in our house, my wife is all over the place 
4 feeling for leaks. She wants to see if there's water 
5 here, water there. She wants to know where that water 
6 is coming from. And I can't imagine you as a 
7 conscientious homeowner, who keeps a very nice home, 
8 SCQS water damage, or evidence of some kind of water 
9 damage, and you not feeling all around to see how wet 
10 it might be. 
11 You just didn't feel all around? 
12 A. But it was already dry when I discovered it. 
13 So there was no way of knowing. 
14 Q. Okay. So you have never seen -- what Tm 
15 trying to find out, have you ever seen any damage on 
16 the vertical section of sheet rock on either side of 
17 any window in your house? I know that you're saying 
18 that there's some water damage at the bottom. But have 
19 you ever seen any on the vertical sections, the part — 
20 the sides of the windows, interior? 
21 A. I'm not sure. 
22 Q. Okay. When was the first time you saw any 
23 flaking of paint caused by water damage, first winter, 
24 second winter, third winter? First summer? First 
25 rain? 
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1 Q. So the towels kept the water away? 
2 A. Kept the cold air. 
3 Q. So after that first winter when you noticed 
4 some water damage, did you ever notice any water damage 
5 after that? 
6 A. I can't remember 
7 Q Okay. So if you can't remember, it hasn't 
8 been a very big problem, has it, ma'am? 
9 A. I haven't spent a lot of time going around 
10 my windows. 
11 Q. It's not been something that you've been 
12 very concerned about, has it? 
13 A. I had other things I've been concerned more 
14 about. 
15 Q. Has it been something that you've been 
16 concerned about or not? 
17 A. Slightly. 
18 Q. All right. What other damage have you 
19 noticed to your house? Let's talk about the stuff that 
20 you are concerned about, then. Serious damage, then. 
21 Is there any*7 
22 A. Well, the biggest damage would be the 
23 foundation. 
24 Q. Okay. How do you think your home has been 
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A. Probably the — end of the first winter. 
Q. Okay. Where did you see the water damage, 
on each of the windows or just in one window? Or 
windows on one side of the house? Where? 
A. The guest bedroom was the first one I 
noticed. 
Q. Okay. 
A. On the ~ 
Q. North side of the house? 
A. North side of the house, yes. 
Q. What about the living room, did you notice 
any water damage, paint peeling, in that first winter 
there? 
It's got a hard thing on it. 
What's that? 
It has a hard base on it. 












It formed mold up in the window. 
All right. Now, as each winter passed, did 
you see more and more evidence of water damage at the 
base of the windows in your home? 


























A. When it was explained the depth of the frost 
line, they said that it could damage the base of my 
home. It wasn't below the frost line. 
Q. Ma'am, has your home been damaged? 
A. I'm saying I don't know if it's damaged 
underneath 
Q. Okay. Is your house sagging at all? 
A. Something does I don't know what's causing 
it. 
Q. Is it out of - have you had one of these 
experts in any of these 42 items say that the house is 
going out of kilter, going out of whack, starting to 
tip, and are there cracks in the interior of the house 
caused by the foundation settling, or something like 
that? Is that happening? 
A. I wouldn't know that if I saw it. Unless I 
felt the house shake. 
Q. Well, ma'am, I'm asking for what you have 
observed by way of damage. You're telling me that some 
of these experts have told you there's some damage on 
the foundation, or there's — there may be some damage, 
but you haven't observed any damage, have you? 
A. I have observed cracks in my home. 
Q. Where? 
A. I have one mat goes through from outside to 
u _ » ~^4L.~i.*£r*± ^rt^oJi.-*-*±iU^jtiki>*„ *T7^5ZZZ-£ZZ 3JESE 
11 (Pages 41 to 44) 
Robert Stanley Court Reporting, Inc. 
Post Office Box 3079 St. George, Utah 84771 (435) 688-7844 
71664d35-6eae-4c46-9d4b-bff62550fbf0 
•Villiam Moore and Mary Moore vs. Dan Smith, et al. 
Deposition of Mary J. Moore, taken on February 19, 2003 
Page 45 
1 the inside of the back of my house. I have one that 
2 goes from the outside inside from the garage side of my 
3 house. 
4 Q. A n d -
5 A. We have tried to caulk them. 
6 Q. Do you attribute these to the fact that the 
7 footings of the house are not deep enough? 
8 A. No idea. 
9 Q. When you said the foundation, I think you 
10 said the footings not being buned low enough below the 
11 frost line, right? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Now, I want to know what you have seen, that 
14 you can observe, that tells me about that damage, about 
15 how you personally feel about this, because you've been i 
| 16 damaged j 
17 A. I can tell you how I feel about it. I can't 
' 18 tell you about any damages — 
19 Q- Okay. So you have — , 
1 20 A. — because I don't know one damage from the 
21 other. 
22 Q. So you haven't observed any damage to the 
23 foundation, the footings, personally, correct? 
24 A. I don't know what you attribute to — 
25 Q. Well, do you even know what the footings 
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1 are? 
j 2 A. Not particularly. 
1 3 Q. Do you know what the foundation is? 
I 4 A. The house is supposed to be setting on it. 
1 5 Q. Okay. Do you know what the difference 
I 6 between footings and foundation isl 
| 7 A. No, I do not. 
8 Q. Okay. Well, let me see if I can — mind 
j 9 you, I think Mr. Steenblik yesterday testified that you 
1 10 told him that you could see the footings in the house 
j 11 when you first moved in. Did he tell the truth in his 
j 12 testimony? 
I 13 A. Yes, he did. But you have to understand, I 
J 14 didn't know mat there were footings until it was 
1 15 pointed out to me that they were footings. 
16 Q. All right. So you saw what you— 
17 A. I saw the cement there. And that to me was 
I 18 cement. I call it cement 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. They call it footing, or whatever, and 
21 that's what I was — that's why it was called footing 
22 tome. 
23 Q. The rough cement at the very bottom of the 
1 24 house you could see? 
25 A. (Nods head). 
P 
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1 Q. All right. I 
2 A. I saw. If 
3 Q. When you fust moved in? J| 
4 A. I saw, yes. Jj 
5 Q. Now, did you see that before you moved in, | 
6 after you moved in? k 
7 A. No. 1 
8 Q. When? § 
9 A. Probably that spring. B 
10 Q. When you fust started to landscape, right? if 
11 A. Raking the weeds and stuff out. If 
12 Q. Okay. And did you ever put a shovel down to [j 
13 it and come to kind of a hard part and felt the cement | 
14 of the footings? fi 
15 A. We didn't work up around the house. We were f 
16 trying to get sand burs, and that's all done by hand. B 
17 And we just sit and pull sand burs and to load the If 
18 pickup with sand burs. | 
19 Q. How much of the footings was exposed, could | 
20 you say? I mean, was it like a circle of— 1 
21 A. The cement? If 
22 Q. Yeah, the cement — g 
23 A. Along the edge of the house? 1 
24 Q. Yes. g 
25 A. The back side of the house, the door — from K 
0 
re 
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1 the back door to the west, you could see chunks of it B 
2 all along there. ft 
3 Q. Okay. Now, did your husband see that, too? fe 
4 A. No. | 
5 Q. Just you? 1 
6 A. Well, I was doing pulling weeds in the yard. | 
7 He was out helping move stuff out from the farm to the B 
8 house. Moving weeds out. Eventually I'm sure he saw g 
9 it. But there was poured cement in several places in 11 
10 our yard. B 
i l l Q. Okay. Well, you knew that up there where g 
[ 1 2 the footings were that that's cement that you couldn't i 
13 dig down to, right? H 
14 A We never tried to dig up around the house. 8 
15 Q. You knew you needed to put some dirt over jj 
16 that in order to plant in that area, right? | 
17 A. No. Up around our home was not a priority. fi 
18 We had set the flower bed out in the front. That was | 
19 going to be our flower bed We put our trumpet vines fi 
20 in. We just wanted grass. p 
21 Q. But you had to put some dirt in to grow | 
22 grass? You couldn't grow it on top of concrete, right? | 
23 A. We don't like things up against the house, B 
24 it draws bugs in. | 
25 Q. Okay. Did you ever try to cover up those I 
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footings that were exposed when you saw them? That j 
cement that was exposed, did you try to cover it up 
with the dirt on top of it? 
A. No, because I thought it was just cement. 
When I did the other I did. 
Q. Well, there's something on top of it right 
now, right? Isn't there kind of a dirt — 
A. Last — last summer I put — when it rained, 
or anything, the water ponded under that deck. 
Q. Under the deck? 
A. And I carried sand over there in five gallon 
buckets and put it so that I could put some wood on it 
and set on it and be outside and enjoy the outside 
world. 
Q. And so, if I'm understanding correctly, this 
part where the footings — 
A. Now that you say they were footings, there 
was cement showing, yes. 
Q. In that area right under the deck, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you covered it last year? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that yes? 
A Yes. 
Q. Okay. Until that time those footings had 
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been exposed to the elements for the eight years or so, 
right? 
A. The cement was. 
Q. Now, in your affidavits I think you have 
said that you did landscaping of the house, correct? 
A. We planted grass. And I planted flowers in 
that — by the railroad ties. 
Q. In the front? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in the back the landscaping you did was 
to plant grass, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q. Did you ever try to plant grass right up 
next to the house? 
A No. 
Q. How did you plant the grass? Did you put 
sod down, or did you just throw seed out? 
A. We would take areas and pull weeds and put 
down grass, and pull weeds and put down grass. 
Q. With seeds? 
A. With seeds. 
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Q. Is that yes? 1 
A Yes. I 
Q. And did you try to get up close to the house | 
or not? p 
A. No. 1 
Q. How far away from the house did you keep the | 
grass? Three feet? Three and a half feet? fc 
A. About this far out, because — | 
Q. Well, I'll represent that we're talking — | 
A. Lawn mower type width. | 
Q. We're talking about a width of about three Jj 
and a half kcl | 
Okay. How much did all that landscaping | 
cost you? | 
A. I don't know. | 
Q. Well, you planted some flowers and you ll 
planted some grass by seed. Didit cost you $10,000 to | 
do that landscaping? | 
A. My son brought a trailer load of lime after I 
we got the grass growing, put it on there. We B 
hauled — B 
Q. You put lime on this alkaline soil we have h 
here? g 
A. It's a - I 
Q. I bet you it wasn't lime. | 
^ K 
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A. It was white and it was --1 don't know what | 
it was. It's just to make things green. And we | 
fertilized it. Bill brought up manure and stuff to put | 
in the yard and gardened. | 
Q. Well, ma'am, you see that Project Analysts | 
want to spend $ 10,000 to re-landscape your yard. You If 
didn't spend that much in the first place, did you? | 
A. I never spent that much. | 
MR. HADLEY: I object to the question as | 
argumentative. | 
MR. DIXON: | 
Q. Do you think it's fair for you to charge the | 
Smith's $ 10,000 for brand new landscaping when you | 
didn't put in maybe 2 or $300 into your landscaping in j$ 
the first place? U 
MR. HADLEY: Object, argumentative. | 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I pulled an awful lot of | 
weeds out of that place and I hauled an awful lot of J] 
weeds out of that place, and I got the garden dug up | 
and dug a lot of old cement and junk out of that and | 
hauled it out. Q 
MR. DDCON: | 
Q. $10,000 worth? 1 
A. I don't know, I'm pretty valuable, too. | 
Q. Okay. Now, did you ever have any | 
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1 Q. Do you remember having thought we better get 
2 a certificate of occupancy before we buy this house to 
3 make sure that the house is okay? 
4 A. No, because we had been told there was one 
5 given. 
6 Q. Who told you that? 
7 A. I don't remember which it was, Dan or Carol, 
8 that Jack had given them the safety inspection for the 
9 home. 
10 Q. And did they tell you that before you signed 
11 this earnest money agreement? 
12 A. Well, T would say during the time that we 
13 were doing it. 
14 Q. Okay. Did you know that you were buying the 
15 house as is? Have you ever heard that phrase before, 
16 to buy a house as isl 
17 A. When it's an older home, yes, I do, but not 
18 a brand new home. 
19 Q. Did you know that there was an as is 
20 provision in this contract? Do you remember reading it 
21 before you signed it? 
22 A. I don't remember discussing it, no. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. But again, it was a brand new home. 



























A. We know people. I don't know, friends. 
Q But you had acquaintances that you could 
have asked, right? 
A. Yes, we do. 
Q. And you could have shown them this earnest 
money sales agreement before you signed it, correct? 
A. We trusted Dan and Carol. 
Q. You could have shown this to anybody who was 
expert in real estate matters to have them review it, 
correct? 
A. I could have. 
Q. You could have shown it to a lawyer, 
correct? 
A. I could have. 




I didn't feel like it was necessary. 
And why exactly did you feel it was not 
necessary? 
A. I trusted that he was a contractor, knowing 
what he was doing; that Jack Peterson had inspected the 
work going on. It was a brand new house. 
Q. Did Carol Smith or Dan Smith ever tell you I 
guarantee you that this house is free from defects? 
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whether you should get some kind of warranties from Dan 
and Carol Smith on anything? 
A. We thought everything was warrantied. 
Q. Did you ever discuss with your husband the 
need to include a specific warranty provision in the 
agreement? 
A. She read it, explained it, and we thought we 
understood what she explained to us. 
Q. Okay. Now, you did not have a Realtor help 
you with the purchase of this house, did you? 
A. No. He had not listed it yet. 
Q. Okay. Did you consult with anybody to 
advise you on the purchase of this house? 
A. They said they knew how to do the paperwork. 
Q. Okay. So that means no, you did not get any 
advice from anybody, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. You could have gotten advice from somebody 
if you thought it necessary, right? 
A. Had we thought it was necessary, yes. 
Q. You could have consulted some kind of real 
estate expert, a real estate agent, correct? 
A. We could have. 
Q. Did you have any friends that were expert in 



























A. Repeat it. 
Q. Did they ever say I guarantee you this house 
is free from every defect? Did they say those words? 
A. No, they did not. 
Q. Did they say anything of the kind? 
A. They never discussed anything to that sort. 
MR HADLE Y. I'm sorry, I couldn't hear that 
answer. 
MRDDCON: Did you get that? 
THE WITNESS: I don't remember discussing 
anything of that sort of defects. Again, all we really 
looked at was a brand new home. 
MR DIXON: 
Q. Did you perform any kind of inspection of 
the home before purchasing it? 
A. Dan walked us through the house and showed 
us the different — and Carol, the closets, the 
pantries. What impressed me was the room big enough to 
put our bed in, because that's where we had run into 
problems before. He had told us he had built homes, 
and it was a beautiful home. That was it 
Q. Okay. Did you ever consider having someone 
look the house over before buying it to make sure that 
it was up to code? 
A. It was a brand new house. 
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1 Q. You shook your head, you said no, you never 
2 considered that? 
3 A. It was a brand new house. 
4 Q So you did not consider that? 
5 A. It was a brand new house. 
6 Q. I need you to say whether you considered it 
7 or not. 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Okay. I want you to tell me about any other 
10 conversations that you remember with either Dan or 
11 Carol Smith before closing this deal. Tm trying to 
12 exhaust your memory, anything you can possibly 
13 remember. 
14 A. Not particularly with Dan, but with Carol. 
15 We went up and planted some flowers in the — inside 
16 the rail, the tire rails. There was never anything 
17 particularly important. It was never to do with papers 
18 or anything. 
19 Q. Have you ever asked Carol Smith for a copy 
20 of the certificate of occupancy? 
21 A. I don't recall ever asking her. I asked her 
22 about the roof stuff. But that's all I recall asking 
23 her that. 
24 Q. Okay. So did you and your husband both read 
25 the earnest money agreement before signing it, 
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1 A. Right. I put a bed up there, and that's 
2 just in case somebody comes. 
3 Q. Okay 
4 A. I have extra beds, so I make extra- I made 
5 an extra bedroom down there. My brother comes and 
6 visits once m a while. 
7 Q. Have you done any work downstairs, hired any 
8 contractors to do anything? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Have you hired anybody to do any work on the 
11 windows downstairs? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Did anybody ever cut anything away from the 
14 windows downstairs? 
15 A. No. The only thing's that done to our 
16 windows, I put the plastic over the one and put the 
17 curtains. And she put the curtains in. 
18 Q. You didn't have to hire anybody to landscape 
19 the yard for you? What landscaping there is you did 
20 yourself, correct? 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 Q. Or you and your husband together, correct? 
23 A. That's true 
24 Q. Did you ever have any neighbors come and 
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Exhibit 2? 
A. Kind of like this. And we were over there. 
And she would go through and explain it as it was. 
Q. Okay. So you all read it together; is that 
right? 
A. Kind of that way. 
Q. When you and your husband bought the house, 
did he have any trouble getting up and down stairs? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he eventually start to have trouble 
getting up and down stairs? 
A. Probably down into around late 2000. 
Q. What happened to him that caused him to have 
trouble getting up and down stairs? 
A. He still went up and down the stairs. We 
just were more cautious with him. He was walking up to 
2001 up and down those stairs. 
Q. Okay. Did he spend time in the basement 
right up until the time that he —just before he died? 
A. We live upstairs. 




We had no need for the basement. 
All right I see that there's a bedroom 
down in the basement, correct? 
1 A. My friends used to come and sit in the weeds 
2 with me and help pull weeds, if that's called 
3 landscaping. We got a lot of visiting in. 
4 Q And that's the kind of maintenance you would 
5 do, you would pull weeds, right? 
6 A. It's my form of entertainment. 
7 Q. Did you mow the lawn, too, or did your 
8 husband mow the lawn? 
9 A. I loved to mow the lawn. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. He liked the garden. I liked the yard 
12 Q. How did you first come to find out that 
13 there was a problem with the foundation - or the 
14 footings? 
15 A. When they were digging the fence posts to 
16 put the gates in. They called me out and asked me if I 
17 was aware of this, and I said what And they explained 
18 it. 
19 Q. What did they explain? 
20 A. That it should be deeper. And they told me 
21 to go and call Annette at the city building and see 
22 what the depth was, which I did And I came back and I 
23 told them. 
24 And they says, Well, they're not deep 
25 enough. Your footing is in danger — I mean, your 
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1 done some damage to your home? That you're aware of 
2 I mean, as a homeowner living in that house day in, day 
3 out, for eight years now — 
4 A. I was not aware of any problem in my home, 
5 even with small things and the roof, until Jason's 
6 inspection. Little things happen you do and you deal. 
7 All new homes have problems. 
8 Q. So if Jason had never come out you would be 
9 living in that house very happily right now? 
10 A. Oh, no. If they had not dug my fence and 
11 found the situation as it was, I would have had 
12 different problems in my home, not understanding why I 
13 had the problems. So I would have dealt with them the 
14 best 1 could 
15 Q. What problems do you think you would have 
16 had? 
17 A. My toilet is still a problem to this day. 
18 Q. Other than your toilet, what else? 
19 A. I can't think of all the things that I have. 
20 Q. Well, what about the smoke detectors? Did 
21 you ever really want a smoke detector in your house? 
22 Didn't you tell Dan Smith one time that you wanted him 
23 to take out the smoke detectors? 
24 A. No, I did not. 




























Q. Okay. So a year after you moved into the 
home you found out that the smoke detector in your home 
wasn't working or was not wired properly, right? 
A. Yeah, I guess. 
Q. How did you find that out? 
A. Jack Peterson, I believe, checked it. 
Q. How did Jack Peterson come to check that? 
A. He and Mike came to take my son to work with 
the volunteer firemen. 
Q. And Jack Peterson happened to come into the 
home at that point in time? 
A. They came to talk with my son. 
Q. Jack Peterson did? 
A. Well, he was part of the fire department, 
yes. 
Q. And so he came into your home — 
A. Him, Mike. And they both work for the fire 
department. 
Q. Did they do some kind of fire inspection on 
the home? 
A. They just asked me about my fire alarm, and 
I said I didn't know what kind it was. They checked it 
and said it wasn't wired. They brought me a another 
fire alarm, another thing. I stuck it on the wall, put 
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1 didn't like the sound they make? 
2 A. I wouldn't place my life on a smoke 
3 detector. But, no, I would never — I do know that you 
4 have to have one in your home. 
5 Q. All right. So one is enough. 
6 A. And he had one in. 
7 Q. Did it ever go off? 
8 A. It never worked 
9 Q. It never worked? You never heard the smoke 
10 detector go off? 
11 A. Not that I know of. I have heard the one on 
12 the wall go off. 
13 Q. When was that placed?' 
14 A. When was that one put on the wall? 
15 Q. Yes. 
16 A. The fire department gave it to me, and I 
17 went and put it on the wall. 
18 Q. When did you do that? 
19 A. Back when I found out that the other one 
20 wasn't wired. 
21 Q. When did you find that out? 
22 A. About a year. I'm not sure of the date. 
23 Q. A year after what? 
24 A. Tm not sure of the date. About a year 


























a battery in it. 
Q. And that one's worked? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Have you ever disconnected it for any 
reason? 
A. The top one? 
Q. No, the one on the side. 
A. You mean other than put a battery in it? 
No. 
Q. Okay. When Jack Peterson came and checked 
that smoke detector, did he tell you that you ought to 
have a smoke detector in every bedroom in your house? 
A. No, he did not 
Q. Did that worry you about the smoke detector 
not being in the house, the one that had come with the 
house, that it wasn't functioning properly? 
A. I thought it was a little cheesy. 
Q. You thought that? 
A. (Nods head). 
Q. Yes? 
A. I thought it was a little cheesy. 
Q. Did you talk to Dan Smith about that? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So are there any — we got the 
toilets, we got the water damage, we got the roof 
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Fillmore to you and to us; is that what you think? 
M R HADLEY: No. Why don't you tell them 
where you would have faxed this to. 
THE WITNESS: I would assume I would have 
faxed this to you. 
M R HADLEY: From where? 
THE WITNESS: From here. 
MR. HADLEY: Well, from here, where? This 
building? 
THE WITNESS: No, over there. 
MR HADLEY: You got to be more specific. 
Where is over there? Tell us exactly. 
THE WITNESS: Where we're going to meet 
The city building. 
M R DIXON: 
Q. Okay. So you would believe that you would 
have used the city fax machine to fax this to your 
attorney; is that right? 
A. They may have faxed this out Their place 
would have been from Josh. 
Q. Do you recognize this handwriting down at 
the bottom, it says, "Check 3904 Hadiey Associates, pay 
$270, review inspection on house, August 10th, 2000"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you understand what that means? 
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A. I believe that was for them to review the 
inspection on my house. 
Q. So you're asking Fillmore City ~ 
A. I'm asking — 
Q. Oh, you're asking Greg Hadiey to review the 
inspection? 
A. Weil, it was Jim Haslam. 
M R DIXON: All right. For some reason I 
assumed that you would be giving me a document between 
your client, and I always thought ~ 
M R HADLEY: Right And that's what I 
looked at. In fact, Jim would have sent it to you, my 
former associate. 
M R DIXON: Well, we've got it now. It's 
not anything that's — it's just a chronology — this 
is a chronology of the events, right? A chronology, a 
time line of the events? 
M R HADLEY: Would you let me voir dire in a 
second? I think I'll help you. 
M R DIXON: All right 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR HADLEY: 
Q. Is that your handwriting? 
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Q. Each and every letter, each and every word, | 
each and every sentence? | 
A. Yes. I 
Q. The lower left-hand corner? 1* 
A. Yes. I 
Q. Check number, Hadiey & Associates, all of 1 
that's your handwriting? y 
A. Yes. I 
Q. And you faxed this to my office? | 
A. Yes. | 
MR HADLEY: Okay. | 
THE WITNESS: And my misspellings. | 
MR DEXON: Okay. I guess we established | 
that. But you're right. Thank you for doing that | 
EXAMINATION (Resumed) 1 
BY MR DIXON: | 
Q. Okay. And this is a time line. Is | 
everything in this correct, to the best of your | 
knowledge? | 
A. May I finish reading it? i 
Q. Oh, please. I'm sorry. Go ahead. p 
A. Yeah. So what was the question? If 
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MR DIXON: | 
Q. All right. Is this accurate? p 
A, Yes. P 
Q. And so November 7th, 1997, the roof lifting, B 
those are the shingles on the roof over the garage that | 
you spoke of before, correct? | 
A. That is correct. | 
Q. And Jim was here to check rain drain, that's | 
the Jim Sampson that you referred to earlier, correct? p 
A. Yes. [I 
Q. Now, December 14th, 1997 says, Furnace quit. p 
Judy said check circuit breaker was on, said try i t B 
And then what's the next word? | 
A. Heat. | 
Q. Heat. Tell me about that. | 
A. The furnace wasn't working. She told me to | 
go down and throw the — do something in the switch- | 
And I did. And the heater started coming on. I had | 
heat. 1 
Q. Okay. Who's Judy? | 
A. My friend. p 
Q. Okay. A neighbor? | 
A. She lives a couple blocks down the street. | 
Q. Okay. 1 
(Discussion off the record.) | 
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1 MR. DEXON: All right. 
2 Q. Tt says, "Shane calked windows because it 
3 was down in wall, cold air." 
4 A. I explained that to you earlier. 
5 Q. Okay. 
6 A. That was the window I was telling you about, 
7 the caulking kept falling in the wall. 
8 Q. And that's in his bedroom? 
9 A. No, that's in the living room. 
10 Q. In the living room, okay. 
11 All right. Then you've got a conversation 
12 with Jack Peterson here in September of 1998, and it 
13 says, Dan Smith — and that Jack said that Dan Smith 
14 contractor should be responsible. 
15 Responsible for what? Did he tell you he 
16 should be responsible for something in specific? 
17 A. I would say we were discussing the roof. 
18 Q. Responsible to replace the roof for you? 
19 A. Tom's Roofing came and said — discussed the 
20 roof on August and asked Jack if there was a — I'm 
21 trying to find where you were reading from. 
22 Q. Jack--
23 MR. HADLEY: Right there. That entry. 
24 THE WITNESS: Oh. When it says he said, I 
25 was referring to Jack. 
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1 Q Right. Any other thing you remember? 
2 A. The home, the roof, the inspection, the 
3 toilet Jack and I talked pretty much until the — 
4 until the city told him he couldn't talk to me anymore. 
5 Q. I'm going to show you Exhibit 8 to the 
6 Steenblik deposition, which is a photograph; a 
7 photograph of a window. Where is that window? 
8 A. That window would be either in the spare 
9 bedroom or in my son's bedroom. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. It doesn't say on the back. 
12 Q. It says water — that's evidence of water 
13 damage. Is that your handwriting on the back of that 
14 exhibit? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. All right. 
17 A. And the reason I'm saying is this is the 
18 wide seal in front of the window. 
19 Q. Okay. That's where the water damage is, 
20 correct? 
21 A. And I don't know which bedroom it is without 
22 being at home. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. I mean, I don't remember. 
25 Q. Now, when did you first notice the water 
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1 MEL DIXON: 
2 Q. Yeah. That Dan Smith should be 
3 responsible — 
4 A. Jack Smith contractor should be responsible. 
5 Q. For the roof; is that right? 
6 A. Uh-huh. 
7 Q. Is that yes? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Okay. And so Jack came back and uien 
10 measured the house for ventilation, correct? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And what did he tell you about that? 
13 A. We put the turtle vents in. 
14 Q, Okay. And did he say that that would 
15 satisfy the vendlauon requirement of the code? Did 
16 he say anything like that? 
17 A. I really don't remember. 
18 Q. What about November 13 th, 1998, it says, 
19 "Jack about appraisal." Look at November 1998 it says, 
20 "Jack about appraisal." What does that mean? 
21 A. I don't know. 
22 Q. Okay. Any other conversations you remember 
23 with Jack Peterson than what we've talked about here 
24 today? 

























damage in that area that's shown on Exhibit 8? Did it 
happen just that year the first time? 
A. It was kind of like a blister of just a 
little and then a little and then a little. And it 
just wasn't something that was noticeable when I was -
unless I was there cleaning. And then it just seemed 
like it was getting kind of big and bad. But I didn't 
know what to do with it. 
Q. Okay. So you noticed it ~ 
Before, but I didn't know how to fix it. 






It was smaller. 
It was smaller? Would that have been the 
first year or two after you moved in the house? 
A. I would say the first year it started. 
Q. What about Exhibit 7 to the Steenblik 
deposition, it's called the cracking around the 
foundation, I think. When did you first notice that? 
A. This part was probably the first spring we 
were there, but it was tiny. And each year it just got 
bigger and started exposing the wood. I didn't — I 
didn't know it was exposing the wood until they came 
and I --1 could just see like a little plaster off. 
And I asked them if it was important, and they checked 
^itS^n3SJi^u~*LL-l*i'i< ,H)i -J oTTTSSSSESJiOKPSSS^ 
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1 safety inspection on it 
2 Q Did you ask him to inspect anything else 
3 specifically other than the footings and foundation7 
4 A Probably things that t had had problems 
5 with 
6 Q So did you ask him to check on the roof7 
7 A No, I knew the condition of the roof 
8 Q Okay You knew already about the roof 
9 Did you ask him to check on the windows7 
10 A I don't believe so 
11 Q Did you ask him to check on the electrical 
12 system9 
13 A I really don't know 
14 Q Okay The only thing you really remember 
15 asking him to check specifically was the footings and 
16 foundation problem7 
17 A He just walked through the home and was 
18 making a list of things, then turned and said we needed 
19 to get an inspector in before we do anything 
20 Q Ma'am, that wasn't the answer to my 
| 21 question My question was, was there anything other 
22 than the footing and the foundation problem that you 
23 specifically asked Mr Zeigler to look at7 
24 MR HADLEY I'm going to just object I 
25 believe it's been asked and answered about five minutes 
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1 ago But answer the question 
2 MR DIXON 
3 Q I thought you answered no, that that was the 
4 only thing Is that what you think, too7 
5 MR HADLEY No, I thought she said and 
6 anything else that needed — 
7 MR. DIXON 
' 8 Q That's what I'm asking about specifics now 
9 I'm not talking about the anything else category, I'm 
1 10 just saymg specifics 
11 A Specifics, anything that t had had problems 
12 with prior to And then the plumbing would have been 
13 questions on — Tonya had a question on the board 
14 across the top — I don't know what it's called — 
15 downstairs We just — he walked through and made a 
16 list of things and told me he couldn't help me until I 
17 had an inspection done 
18 Q Okay Well, he actually gave you a bid, 
19 though, $31,000 I don't understand, if he gives you a 
20 bid for $31,000, isn't he saying I'll be glad to do 
21 this work for $31,000 and you could have said yes, sir, 
22 go to work7 It's what I don't understand, why would he 
23 give- you a bid for $-31,000 if he said he can't help 
24 you7 
25 A He told me to get a safety inspection done 
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1 That's what he felt like would repair the things that I 
2 needed to be done j 
3 Q Well, didn't you understand what he gave you | 
4 a bid for $31,000, ma'am, that he was proposing to j 
5 repair these particular problems for the figure of { 
6 $31,0007 1 
7 A I do p 
8 Q You did7 1 
9 A I wanted to fix the problem | 
10 Q Okay But never did, not any of them7 f 
11 A No 
12 Q Okay All right I 
13 MR DIXON Let's have this one marked p 
14 This one marked This one marked This one marked L 
15 This one marked We have that one f 
16 MR HADLEY Can we go off the record just a I'-
ll second7 [ 
18 MR DIXON Yes K 
19 (Discussion off the record) | 
20 (Whereupon, a recess was taken |* 
21 at 10 08 a m to 10 12 a m ) 
22 (Whereupon, Exhibits 8 through 19 jj 
23 were marked for identification) h 
24 MR DIXON 
25 Q Exhibit 8, ma'am, is this the bill that H 
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1 Tom's Roofing gave you for re roofing the garage7 f 
2 A Yes 1 
3 Q And that's the check that you wrote to Tom's j 
4 Roofing for that7 1 
5 A Yes 
6 Q It says cold roofing the garage Do you 
7 understand that they took the old shingles off and put 
8 new shingles on, or did they roof right over the old 1 
9 shingles7 U 
10 A Took the old ones off R 
11 Q Why did you have that roof redone7 This P 
12 appears to be the one repair that you had ever done in 
13 the house, doesn't it, of any substantial nature7 
14 Right7 
15 A Because Jack Peterson told us what needed to 1 
16 be done with Tamko Roofing r 
17 Q Okay Exhibit 9 whafs that7 I 
18 A The water softener I put in 1 
19 Q What does that have to do with the Smiths7 
20 A It's just trying to take care of the home -- L 
21 MR HADLEY If I - \? 
22 THE WITNESS --was the reason it was 
23 installed \i 
24 MR HADLEY Let me interject Part of what ! 
25 you folks had requested was that any improvements she r 
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1 may have done to the home. 
2 MR. DIXON: That's what I'm asking. 
3 MR. HADLEY: So this was an improvement, not 
4 really to repair anything. 
5 MR. DDCON: 
6 Q. All right. So you're not implicating the 
7 Smiths in any way with the need for a water softener, 
8 are you? You're not blaming them in any way in 
9 connection with Exhibit 9, are you? 
10 A. Blaming? 
11 Q. Let me ask it this way: Do you think that 
12 it was some error or mistake or negligence or defect in 
13 the building that caused you to need a water softener? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. You wanted a water softener for your own 
16 purposes, correct? 
17 A. To maintain pipes and hot water tank, and 
18 stuff like that, yes. 
19 Q. Now, do you know if when the people came out 
20 to install the water softener did they complain about 
21 any defects or anything? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did they say that there is some problem with 
24 the grounding of the water pipes, or anything like 
25 that? 
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1 A. No 
2 Q. When I ask for a defect, I'm talking about 
3 did they observe some kind of construction defect. 
4 Such as the guys who did the fence, when they told you 
5 about the frost line and foundation problem, did the 
6 people who installed the central air conditioner, did 
7 they call to your attention any such problems? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Well, I guess just to make sure, do you 
10 believe that the Smiths should reimburse you for this 
11 central an conditioning system that you installed? 
12 A. If they get the home, you bet. 
13 Q. Well, let me ask it this way, then. Do you 
14 believe that there is some defect in the construction 
15 of the house that made it necessary for you to install 
16 central air conditioning? I assume the answer is no. 
17 I'm just trying to tie these things up. I just want to 
18 make sure that you're not claiming that this air 
19 conditioner is somehow related to any defects in the 
20 house. 
21 You're not claiming that, are you? Are you 
22 claiming that7 No Is the answer no? 
23 A. I don't know what you're looking for. 
24 MR. HADLEY: Let me make a comment. Don't 
25 worry what he's looking for. Just answer the question. 
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1 A. They did not. 
2 Q. Okay. And it was Roper Lumber Company from 
3 whom you purchased the water softener and had it 
4 installed, correct? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Okay. Exhibit 10. What is Exhibit 10? 
7 A. Refrigeration unit. 
8 Q. So that's an in-window air conditioner? 
9 A. No, it isn't. 
10 Q. What is a refrigeration unit, like a 
11 refrigerator? 
12 A. No. It's like a ~ it's an outside 
13 refrigeration unit. I don't know what you call it. 
14 Q. Okay. So you're upgrading the air 
15 conditioning system in the house? 
16 A. I put air conditioning in. There was none. 
17 That is our air conditioning for the home. Central 
18 air. 
19 Q. So this Exhibit 10 reflects that you're 
20 having central air conditioning installed into the 
21 home, correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. When the people came in to install the air 
24 conditioning, did they report to you any defect of any 
25 kind? 
1 THE WITNESS: Is he saying has the house 
2 caused the problem? 
3 MR. HADLEY: No, he's saying did you install 
4 the air conditioning because the house was causing you 
5 problems? 
6 THE WITNESS: No. 
7 MR HADLEY: Okay. 
8 MR DIXON: 
9 Q. All right. Now, Exhibit 11, could you tell 
10 me what Exhibit 11 is, please? 
11 A. Security door on the front. And dead bolt 
12 on the back. And TV antenna. 
13 Q. All right. If I understand you correctly, 
14 you're saying that you had a new door put on the front 
15 of your house? 
16 A. (Shakes head). 
17 Q. What happened? 
18 A. I put a security door on the outside of the 
19 regular door. 
20 Q. Okay. And then the second one was a dead 
21 bolt on the back door? 
22 A. Yes, sir. 
23 Q. Had you been broken into that you were 
24 afraid of this? 
25 A. No, sir. 
9 (Pages 145 to 148) 
Robert Stanley Court Reporting, Inc. 
Post Office Box 3079 St. George, Utah 84771 (435)688-7844 
dc3c5a29-3444-46c5-b50d-a511 c6ee2415 
William Moore and Mary Moore vs. Dan ^mith, et al. 
Deposition of Mary J. Moore (Vol. II), taken on March 17, 2003 
Page 149 
1 Q. Just precautions? 
2 A. Yes From country to town. 
3 Q And the antenna was put up on November 29th, 
4 1994, correct? 
5 A. That's correct. 
6 Q. And that's when you found out that the attic 
7 access was too small? 
8 A. Yzs, sir. 
9 Q. Okay. Exhibit 12, tell me what that is, 
10 please. 
11 A. The installation of the water line from the 
12 irrigation to the house put into faucets so we could 
13 water, outside watering with irrigation water. 
14 Q. Pardon me for not understanding entirely, 
15 but - -and let me ask some specific questions about 
16 that. 
17 Did you have a water line taken from the 
18 water meter or the main water line entering into your 
' 19 house to someplace around the yard and have faucets put 
20 in there? 
1 21 A. You're asking if that's what that is? 
22 Q. Yes. 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Does this have to do with the installation 
25 of a water line of some sort? 
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1 A. Yes, it does. 
2 Q. Tell me where the water line ended up. 
3 A. In the back. Southeast comer of the 
4 backyard and the west. Southwest side of the back of 
5 the house. For outside watering. 
6 Q. Was that for an underground sprinkler 
7 system? 
1 8 A. No. 
9 Q. Was it for a faucet, a water faucet, two 
10 water faucets? Is that yes? 
11 A. Yes. Two. 
12 Q. So this would be a PVC pipe that came out of 
13 the ground and had a water faucet on the end of it, 
14 something like that? 
15 A. It's a metal piping that comes up out of the 
16 ground. 
17 Q. Okay. It's metal piping that comes up out 
18 of the ground? Is that yes? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And you had those water lines brought to the 
21 back of your house for purposes of attaching hoses 
22 thereto in order to water the lawn back there? 
23 A. With the irrigation water. 
24 Q. Okay. I take it so that you have water 



















































Page 151 1 
A. Yes. f 
Q. Where did you hook into the irrigation f 
water? p 
A. The main line on the irrigation. |= 
Q. Where is that in relationship to your house? t 
A. In the back pasture behind our home. h 
Q. So you brought where those fruit trees are fJ 
there back there? | 
A. They're back. 11 
Q. At the very back? 1 
A. Yes. | 
Q. So there's an irrigation ditch or line back U 
there? || 
A. Line. | 
Q. It's a covered line? jl 
A. Yes 1 
Q. All right. Does it run continuously, or do | 
get your turn from time to time? | 
A. You get a turn. (1 
Q. Ail right So when you get that turn, the K 
water will run up and you can turn it on — do you have fi 
a pump? Do you have to pump it up? fa 
A. No. J 
Q. And that's to water the backyard? (; 
A. The garden, the back and front yard. The Ij 
Page 152 If 
pasture. 
Q. Okay. How close to the house do these water L 
lines get? t 
A. (Indicating). K 
Q. About three feet, two and a half feet? P 
A. Two and a half feet from the southwest If 
corner of the house. I: 
Q. Okay. And what about the southeast comer, h 
did it go up that close to the house, too? || 
A. No, it's in the back of the backyard. | 
Q. Okay. Now, if I recall correctly, the If 
southwest comer was where you first saw the footings [| 
exposed, right? 1 
A. No. It was on the east side. | 
Q. The southeast side is where you saw the | | 
footings exposed? | 
A. What's the footing? 1 
Q. The footings are the concrete in the ground. | | 
Do you remember we talked about that last time, you j | 
told me you had seen that when you were - If 
A. That was on the south. | | 
Q. The south? | 
A. Not the southwest side. | 
Q. Just directly south in the middle of the | 
house, so to speak? u 
ft 
10 (Pages 149 to 152) 
Robert Stanley Court Reporting, Inc. 
Post Office Box 3079 St. George, Utah 84771 (435) 688-7844 
dc3c5a29-3444-46c5-b50d-a511c6ee2415 
William Moore and Mary Moore vs. Dan bmith, et aL 
Deposition of Mary J. Moore (Vol. II), taken on March 17, 2003 
Page 165 
1 the home? 
2 A. [ don't understand the question. I'm sorry. 
3 Q. Well, you had some conversations with the 
4 Smiths before you purchased the home, correct, before 
5 the closing? 
6 A. We called the Smiths. We were told the home 
7 was for sale. We called the Smiths and they said yes, 
8 it was. 
9 Q. Okay. And then after that you had some 
10 discussions about the home, correct? 
U A. What kind of discussion? 
12 Q. That's what I'm asking you. 
13 A. We went and saw the home. 
14 Q. Ail right. Now, when you saw the home in 
15 the Smiths presence, did they tell you anything that 
16 you relied upon in purchasing the home? Do you know 
17 what it is to rely upon something? To believe and act 
18 on? 
19 A. That they had built the home? 
20 Q. Is that one of the things that induced you 
21 to buy the home from them? 
22 A. No. We -- the home was a new home. They 
23 had told us when they started it, when they moved into 
24 it 
25 Q. Okay. What did they tell you when they 
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1 A. No, T was not. 
2 Q Were you able to get anything from her at 
3 that time? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Now, the first time you noticed that the 
6 roof was lifting was on November 7th of 1997, correct? 
7 Was that about the time you talked to Carol? 
8 A. When Jim Sampson came is when I noticed it. 
9 Q. Okay. It says August 25th, 1999, Scott from 
10 Salt Lake came — 
11 A. From Tamko. 
12 Q. Said it was ventilation, get a safety 
13 inspection. No copy from city. Jack said it wasn't 
14 required to keep them. Jack said not enough 
15 ventilation. He's our safety inspector. 
16 Is this the time you're talking about? 
17 A. Yes. And I would say about that time is 
18 when I called Carol. 
19 Q. Okay. Could it have been a few days before 
20 or after? 
21 A. After the man from Salt Lake came, probably. 
22 Q. Okay. And you say his name was Jim Sampson? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Scottl 
25 A. Scott. He was the Tamko man-
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1 started it and when they moved into it? 
2 A. I believe it was in September that they 
3 started it, and they moved in in November. And it was 
4 February. 
5 Q. Okay. So the home had been lived in for 
6 only about three months, right? 
7 A. Yes, sir. 
8 Q. Okay. And that's true, you have never --
9 isn't it? It is true that the Smiths lived in the home 
10 for about three months; is that right? 
11 A. As far as I know it is, yes. 
12 Q. You don't think that's false, do you? 
13 A. No reason to believe it was false. 
14 Q. Okay. Now, in any other conversations with 
15 you, did they tell you anything about the house to make 
16 you buy the house, to lead you to buy the house? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Okay. Let me just clarify. Did you ever 
19 ask Carol Smith for a copy of the final inspection of 
20 her home? 
21 A. I think I did when we discussed the roof. 
22 Q. At the time of the roof? 
23 A. If they had a copy of the final inspection 
24 on the home. 




























Q. Is it possible that you called her at the 
time when you were concerned about the shingles, and 
you wanted to find out who the manufacturer of the 
shingles was? 
A. No. 
Q Okay. Do you believe that the house is 
unfit for occupancy now9 
A. Unfit for occupancy. It's got an awful lot 
of problems with it. 
Q. That wasn't my question. It's a yes-or-no 
question. 
A. Is it unfit for occupancy? Yes. 
Q. Okay. Has anyone ever told you to move out? 
A. No. 
Q. Has Jack Peterson ever suggested that you. 
move out? 
A. No. 
Q. Has Mr. Radford told you you should move oat 
immediately? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Steenblik? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Bullock? 
- < - » - <<K, -1«>*?i-**-v»s»'«/** -• •i.-^i.-iix'^tiwSVZinWXSt^i-ii 
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James K. Haslam (6887) 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200 
Provo Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 377-4403 
Facsimile: (801)377-4411 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, 
•plaintiffs, 
Vs 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee 
of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
and CAROL SMITH, individually and as 
Trustee of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos 
Trust, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY MOORE 
Civil No. 000700142 Ml 
Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF MILLARD ) 
Mary Moore, having first been duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one, and I have personal knowledge of the 
matters stated herein except as to any matter stated on information and belief only 
2. I am a named plaintiff in the above-encaptioned case. 
3. In February of 1994, my husband, William Moore, and I entered into an 
agreement to purchase a home from Dan and Carol Smith. 
4. We closed that transaction on May 2, 1994. 
5. The Smiths were paid a total of $83,000.00 for the sale of the home. 
6. The home was intended to be the final home for me and my husband, 
who is retired. 
7. Neither my husband nor I have ever been a contractor or engineer, nor do 
we have any special knowledge concerning building codes, home construction, safety 
inspections, or anything like that. 
8. Despite the fact that Dan Smith had buiit the home just a few months 
before selling it to us, he did not ever disclose the fact that the home contained certain 
defects, not in compliance with the applicable building code, rendering the home unsafe 
for human occupancy. 
9. In deciding to purchase the relatively new home, my husband and I relied 
upon the certificate of occupancy, which had been issued by the City of Fiiimore in 
January of 1994, along with Dan Smith's representations that he was selling us 
improved, residential real property, safe for occupancy. 
10. Although my husband and I visually inspected the property, the defects 
and problems that have subsequently been discovered were not of the kind that such 
an inspection would have revealed to us. 
2 
11. We subsequently took possession of the home, landscaped the yard, and 
have generally maintained the home since that time. 
12. A little more than six years after the purchase, my husband and I had 
retained a company to install a fence on our property. 
13. On May 16, 2000, when the fence workers were digging holes and putting 
in poles for the fence next to the home, the workers called my attention to the fact that 
the home's foundation was not the proper depth into the ground. 
14. That same day, I contacted the City of Fillmore to find out what the 
requirements were for foundation depth and learned that our home's foundation was 
not deep enough into the ground. 
15. I became deeply concerned over this information and retained a 
contractor to determine what would be required to fix the problem. 
16. On August 5, 2000, Ken Zeigler of Ken Zeigler Co. came to our home to 
determine what would need to be done to fix the foundation. 
17. At that time, Mr. Zeigler informed me that he would require that we first 
obtain a safety inspection and recommended that we use Jason Bullock of Sunrise 
Engineering, Inc. for that purpose. 
18. On August 8, 2000, Mr. Bullock came to our home and performed a safety 
inspection. 
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19. Mr. Bullock indicated to me that there were several problems with the 
home's construction that were not in compliance with the building code. The next day, 
Mr. Bullock provided us with a list of these items that were not constructed in 
compliance with the building code. A true and correct copy of this list is attached hereto 
as Exhibit TV'. 
20. It was at this time, that my husband and I first learned of the severity of 
the problems in our home's construction. 
21 . We visited with Mr. Haslam of Hadley & Associates and filed the complaint 
in this esse on August 24, 2000. 
22. Thereafter, my husband and I retained a plumber and electrician to 
inspect the home. Again, severe defects in both the plumbing and electrical systems 
were discovered and reported to us. 
23. Mark O'Barr, the electrician who inspected our home, subsequently 
provided me with a letter, addressed to our attorney, addressing some of the defects he 
uncovered. A true and correct copy of Mr. O'Barr's tetter is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B". 
24. I attempted to discuss these problems with Jack Peterson, the Fillmore 
City Building Inspector. Mr. Peterson was not particularly helpful, although he provided 
me a letter in October of 2000, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit U C\ 
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25. 1 do not believe that we have yet discovered all of the significant defects in 
the construction of our home, and my husband and I are attempting to obtain the funds 
to hire an engineer to conduct a complete inspection and to provide a detailed report. 
26. I do not believe that my husband and I could have discovered these 
structural defects prior to August of 2000. 
27. Unless my husband and I can obtain some relief through this court action, 
we will likely not be able to pay to have the defects corrected, or to sell the home for 
anything close to what we paid for the home, and we currently have no other place to 
live. 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Mary Moore, this / ^ day of 
March, 2001. 
£002 HH dX3 WiC^ 
t£9fr8 m €3H0M"n». 
S3AON ^JNCO 
^ 
Notary Public er 
CONNIE NOYES 
p / # ^ x ^ \ H0TAHV?U8UC-STATE ol UTAH 
W%^-1* ^\ ** SOUTH WAIN 
W - / csuLMORE. UT 84b31 
^ - ' :;0MM EXP 10-4-2003 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed by U.S. mail, first class, postage 
prepaid, the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARY MOORE this /3 day of March, 2001, 
to the following: 
A. Bryce Dixon 
Nathan K. Fisher 
Dixon & Truman 
192 East 200 North, Suite 203 





Inspection Request 8/7/2000 
Sunrise Engineering, Inc. 
Inspector: Jason ML Bullock 
ICBO Lie. #89388 
Items found not to be in code compliance at a final inspection. 
1. Fascia has not been completed below roof, exposed decking 
2. Ledger to rear deck has not been fastened properly with bolts. 
3. Joists that bear over header for deck have not been anchored. 
4. Foundation on SE corner is cracked and braking apart. 
5. All handrails must return to wall at top and bottom. 
6. No soffit venting, lack of attic ventilation has caused roof shingles to deteriorate. 
7. Open outlet box under kitchen cabinets with exposed electrical wiring, 
8. Attic access opening does not meet required code minimum opening of 22"x30". 
9.~No counter-flashing around windows or doors, looks to have a lot of water leakage damage. 
10. Bathroom fixtures not caulked. 
1L No truss bracing or angle braces. 
12. No smoke detectors in bedrooms and the only smoke detector in house is a battery detector, 
code requires all smoke detectors to be hard wired with battery back up. 
13. Stair risers exceed 8" max with 3/8 variance for entire run of stairs. 
14. No 5/8 type x Sheetrock under stair lids. 
15. No Pressure reducing valve has been installed. 
16. Copper lines in house are not grounded. 
17. 2x6 headers in basement exceed limits and are over spanned. 
18. Missing nuts and washers on anchor bolts for sill plate in basement. 
19. 4' cantiiever at front of house requires doubled up end joists with a 2-1 span back into house. 
20. No combustion air, vent clearance problems. 
21. Dishwasher appears to not be plumbed. 
22. Water heater is not seismically strapped to foundation, 
23. Kitchen circuits are required to be on 2- 20 amp gfci circuits with 12/2 awg. 
24. Bathrooms required to be on a separate 20-amp circuit for gfci's. 
25. Electrical panel has not been labeled. 
26. House has over spanned headers and joists throughout the house. 
27. Footings appear to be at grade level in some places and do not meet min 30" frost line depth. 
28. Grading from house does not meet 2% slope for the first 10ft. away from house. 
29. Outlets in garage are not on gfci 
30. No gfci in basement. 
Jason M. Bullock ^ 
LrTfddTL fa- /^*<J^cj£ 
/SUNRISE ENGINEERINJNC 
EXHIBIT "B" 
October 12, 2000 
To: 
Hadley & Associates 
Attn: Jim Haslam 
Dear Mr. Haslam 
On Oct. 9, 2000 I visited the home of a client of yours Mrs. Mary Moore. My visit 
was in response to a phone call that I had received from Mrs. Mcore the week 
before. During our phone conversation she had informed me of an inspection of 
her home that had taken place back in the first pan of August by a work associate 
of mine Mr. Jason Bullock (Mr. Bullock is an ICBO certified 4AVay Building 
Inspector). Mrs. Moore said that Mr. Bullock had made a recommendation to her 
to give me a call to se^ if I would come ever and be able to answer some 
questions that she may have on the electrical portion of his inspection, and also 
look over the electrical installation in her home that I might add some insight to 
Mr. Bullocks inspection. 
My findings were as follows: 
Kitchen area; 
1. There is an outlet inside a lower cabinet on the east wall that has no cover plate 
on it. Wiring is exposed and susceptible to damage or someone to personal injury-
Violation of National Electrical Code (NEC) Article 370-23 (C) 
2. The Peninsular cabinet that extends past the 24 inches allowed by the NEC 
does not have an outiet located in it. 
Violation ofNEC Article 210-52 (C) (3) 
3. The Garbage disposal has no disconnecung means inside the cabinet with in 
sight of the disposal where service personnel can unplug the appliance while 
working there on, 1 recommend an outlet and an approved appliance cord in 
accordance with Article 422-16 (B) (1) (a-d) be installed in olace of the metal flex 
mat has been installed. The metal flex is in violation of the NEC and is not 
suitable for wet locations-
Violation of NEC Article 350-5 
4.1 n the master bedroom and dining room, ihe outlet spacing and locations do not 
comply with the NEC 
Violation of NEC Article 210-52 (A) (1), (2) (a-c). 
5 The namral gas pipe is not bonded to the grounding system. 
Violation of NEC Article 250-104 (B) 
6 There is no ground buss in the mam lighting panel in the basement The ground 
wires from the electrode as well as all the lighting circuit ground wires are ned 
together under the same split-bolt connector The NEC states that the arrangement 
of grounding connections snali be such that the disconnection or removal of a 
ground wire will not break the integnty of the ground system ALso the NEC 
states that wires of dissimilar metals because of their different characteristics 
(such as copper and aluminum, also none of the aluminum wire connections have 
Notox, Penitrox or any other kind of anti-oxidant compound applied to their 
connections) shall not be placed under the same connector. Therefore my 
recommendation would be to install a grounding kit in this panel and terminate 
each wire in the proper manner underneath its own screw on the ground-buss 
provided in this kit. 
Violation of NEC Article 110-14. 
7. There is only one smoke detector in this house, which the Uniform Building 
Code book clearly shows that this is an inadequate amount. The 1991, 1994 and 
1997 editions of the Uniform Building Code book (UBQ Volume 1; Section 
1210-4 of the 91 and Volume 1; Section 310.9.1.4 of the 94 and 97 state that there 
shall be asmoke detector located in each of the bedrooms, in the corridors ieadmg 
to the sleeping areas and any room opening to the hallways that lead to the 
sleeping areas whose ceiling exceeds that of the hallway by 24". One shall also be 
mounted at the top of a stairway when the house has a basement, and if the 
basement has a sleeping area the same rule will apply as the upstairs. The smoke 
detectors shall also be interconnected with each other so if one detector goes off 
all of the others will as well. 
8. The garage outlets are considered a wet location area uherefore they should be 
put on a GFCI circuit 
Violation of NEC Article 210-3 (A) (2) 
9. The wire connections outside at the main breaker have had some of the strands 
cut off so that the wire can tit into the lugs provided with the main breaker, hy 
doing so the installing electrician has taken away from the integnty of ;he 
electrical conductor installed. Cutting the end off and re-stripping the wires end 
and putting the necessary anti-oxidant compound on die bare aluminum wire and 
re-terminating [he wire.can fix this. 
I was also asked to give an estimated cost as to how much it would cost the 
homeowner to have these items done. I feel that the homeowner could have these 
services done foi an estimated cost of $ 1250.00 - S 1,565 00. 
[f you have any questions please feel free to call meat (435) 743-6151. 
Sincerely Yours 
EXHIBIT "C" 
L Jack Peterson 
95 East 500 South 
P O Box 84 
Fillmore, Utah S463 I 
To whom it may concern* 
I was contacted by Dan Smith and went over the property and the layout of the home on 
the L Ith of August 1993, and inspected the footings on Fnday 13th. ft was called to his attention 
at that time that the footings were not at proper depth, but he stated this would be taken care of 
when the back fill was put around the house The basement walls were inspected on the 16th and 
the rough plumbing on the 18th The rough electrical and plumbing, along with the framing 
inspection, was done on the 8th and 9th of September 1993 I checked the building progress on 
both the 28th and the 29th of October I also visited the job site another occasion and Dan and I 
discussed the venting of the attic Dan felt that it was adequate 
Dan and Carol were living in the home when we asked to do the final inspection on the 
home on the 8th of November At that time they hadn't built the deck on the back of the house 
and the final grading hadn't been done as well At the time the final inspection was done, I 
discussed with Dan the fact that the access into the attic did not meet the minimum code 
requirements and that the smoke detectors had not been installed . None of these items had been 
corrected at the time that the house was sold to the Moore's The Moore's did the landscaping 
around the house not realizing that the back fill around the house did not meet the 30 inch depth 
requirement 
Respectfully submitt^cTby 
lOack Peterson, Fillmore City Budding Inspector 
illiam Moore and Mary Moore vs. Dan ^truth, et al. 
^position of Jason Matthew Bullock, taken on February 20, 2003 
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1 A. Man 
2 Q Can you estimate on a weekly basis how many 
3 you would do? 
4 A. I don't do as much as I used to. I'm 
5 strictly more — I get out maybe twice a week now on 
6 full eight-hour days. I mean, take, for example, 
7 yesterday, I did probably 15 different homes up in 
8 Herriman. But realistically you could probably say 
9 close to — probably a thousand. 
10 Q. Okay. So in an interior inspection process 
11 for a UBC code inspection for an average size 
12 residence, single family residence, about how much time 
13 would the inspector spend on the premises inspecting 
14 that home? 
15 A. It depends on the inspection. 
16 Q. No, I'm talking about all the inspections 
17 combined. 
18 A. It depends on the inspector. Oh, to be safe 
19 on an entire home with all the small inspections 
20 involved, your big inspections are going to be your 
21 four-way inspection and your final inspection. Usually 
22 a couple hours. You're probably looking between 10 to 
23 12 hours. 
24 Q. Okay. Have you ever been involved in 
25 inspections of homes for people who are considering 
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1 would catch on a final. 
2 And then there was some other things that 
3 just caught my eye that I brought up in my list. 
4 Q Now, how would that type of inspection 
5 differ from the inspection you have done for people who 
6 are considering buying a home? 
7 A. If somebody is gonna buy a home and we go 
8 out and we do a full fledged inspection, there's, I 
9 feel, probably more involvement when they're going out 
10 to buy a home. You know, I was just contacted, came 
11 over, and walked through the house for her. 
12 There's quite a lot more detail if 
13 somebody's gonna pay the fee for us to walk through a 
14 house that's gonna be bought. 
15 Q. Okay. Do you remember the — or have the 
16 documents with you to show how much you charged Mary 
17 Moore for your initial inspection? 
18 A. Boy. The initial inspection I -- I can't 
19 even remember, to be honest. I believe it was around 
20 $60. 
21 Q. Okay. And that's a pretty good estimate 
22 because you know what you did on the onginal 
23 inspection? 
24 A. Give or take probably $10,1 bet. 
25 Q. Okay. 
Page 30 Page 32 
1 buying a home and they want — and they want to find 
2 out if the home --
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. -- is a — is a sound home? 
5 A. I am 
6 Q. All right. In your employment with Sunrise 
7 Engineering have you done that? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. That is one of the services that Sunrise 
10 Engineering offers the public? 
11 A. Yeah. 
12 Q. How many of those have you done, 
13 approximately? 
14 A. Residentially, we don't do a whole lot. We 
15 do more on the commercial end. Residentially, oh, 20. 
16 Q. Okay. Now, when you came to Mary Moore's 
17 home, what kind of inspection did you originally do for 
18 her? 
19 A. Originally when Mary contacted me, she had 
20 talked to Ken Zeigler that was a contractor, and I came 
21 out more or less — just came back - more or less I 
22 will walk through the home as a final. I'm not going 
23 to spend five, six hours, you know, nitpicking. I 
24 basically went through and walked through and basically 
25 what I would check on a final; go through things that I 
1 A. I mean, it was more or less, I guess, a 
2 courtesy. 
3 Q. Does that figure include the drafting up of 
4 the report that you did, the 30 items? 
5 A. In that $60 there? 
6 Q. Yes. 
7 A. Yeah. 
8 Q. Okay. Now, what would you do in a 
9 pre-purchase home inspection that you did not do in 
10 that inspection? 
11 A. I would involve more guys. I would probably 
12 have two additional guys. I usually try to bring in 
13 guys that are considered, I guess, expert, expertise, 
14 in that field. I have guys on my staff that have 
15 either been plumbers, mechanical contractors, that I 
16 have hired that have got licensed through ICBO. So 
17 I — I respect their knowledge of, yeah, I hold all 
18 these licenses but I respect their knowledge to come 
19 in. And we would come through and just do a 
20 thorough ~ we go through everything. We go through 
21 furnaces. We take everything apart. Which on Mary's 
22 house I did not do. You know, obviously you can't come 
23 in and start checking walls and cutting sheet rock. 
24 Q. You have done no destructive testing? 
25 A. No. No. 
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1 Q. Let me finish my question, since I know you 
2 knew what I was going to say, but [ need to make sure 
3 that it's all the way finished 
4 A. Sure. 
5 Q. Have you done any destructive testing on the 
6 Mary Moore home? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Have you done the type of inspection on Mary 
9 Moore's home that you would have done -- and I say 
10 "you," meaning Sunrise Engineering and you supervising, 
LI would have done had you been hired pre purchase to 
12 inspect the home? 
13 A. That I would have done? 
14 Q. Yes. Have you accomplished as of yet that 
15 thorough an inspection of the Moore residence? 
16 A. I would say no. I've obviously — IVe gone 
17 back at later dates and inspected some additional 
18 things that were not part of that list, the original 
19 30. But if I was, you know, to bring down -- the only 
20 other guy I got involved on this was Mark O'Barr. 
21 Q. Was the original list of 30 alleged defects, 
22 was that list drawn up after your first inspection? 
23 A. Right after my first inspection? It was 
24 actually drawn up at the time I was walking through the 
25 home. 
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1 you know, we have a list that we would go through. A 
2 checklist, call it, that we go through and check 
3 specific items on everything. Whether it's the Mary 
4 Moore house or Joe Blow's house, we have a list that we 
5 would go through. 
6 Q. And you have never gone through that entire 
7 list on the Mary Moore home, have you? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Okay. Is there any reason why you haven't 
10 done that? 
11 A. At the time of the inspection that Mary — 
12 at the time Mary called me, when I came over I just 
13 told her that I would be go through — she asked me to 
14 come through and basically do this as if this was a 
15 final inspection on a house that had just been built 
16 and go through a final inspection of what I would do on 
17 any new residential home where I would walk through on 
18 a final inspection. And we usually take an hour and a 
19 half to two hours there. 
20 Q. Okay. Did she tell you about anything in 
21 particular that she was concerned about? 
22 A. She pointed out some things, open electrical 
23 box. But to be honest with you, I cannot remember. If 
24 I recall, I walked through the house and do what I'm 
25 supposed to do. I'm here. And there may -- I know 
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1 Q. Okay. How long did you spend in that 
2 inspection? 
3 A. Probably a little over an hour on that 
4 inspection. 
5 Q. Okay. And how many hours would be spent on 
6 a pre-purchase inspection? 
7 A. It depends on the home, really. 
8 Q. In a home such as Mary Moore's. 
9 A. Really to go through it thoroughly, you're 
10 probably looking six hours. Six to eight hours. 
11 Q. I guess there are degrees of thoroughness 
12 that a person could ask in a pre-purchase inspection, 
13 correct? 
14 A. Sure. 
15 Q. She could have hired you for the $60 and 
16 felt that that might be okay, correct, depending on 
17 what the person wanted? 
18 A. Depending on what the person wanted, what 
19 was necessary. 
20 Q. And they may have concern about certain 
21 areas and ask you to concentrate on certain things, 
22 right? That might affect how much work you do, right? 
23 Not any one inspection will ever be exactly the same in 
24 a pre-purchase situation, I suppose? 


























maybe the electrical box was pointed out. But it's 
something that I would have eventually looked at. 
Q. Did she tell you why she was asking for a 
home inspection? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. Did she tell you anything about any footings 
issues? 
A. As far as coming out, she pointed — when we 
got outside, you could see where the footings were. 
And she just brought up that as a concern of hers, 
safety issue. 
Q. Okay. Did she elaborate on that? Did she 
explain what she was concerned about? What did she say 
to you about the footings? 
A. I don't think she would know as a homeowner 
of what the concerns to be there. I mean, this is — I 
feel she's just a homeowner that is looking — you 
know, you've got an exposed footing there, and by code, 
you know, it's required to be 30 inches in depth for 
frost line. I really don't think she would know that 
that's an issue. 
Q. That wasn't my question, sir. My question 
was simply what did she say about that? 
A. More or less that she pointed out the fact 
is this something that maybe I should be concerned 
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1 Q. That would be great I appreciate it 
2 Thank you 
3 Okay. Based upon the second inspection 
4 where Rex Radford was present, did you make any changes | 
5 to the original report based upon the things that were i 
6 observed there? 
7 A. Yes. And those are the changes that I have ! 
8 given to you today. As a result of our inspection j 
9 we- -we observed closely the construction of the 
10 windows- I had made a statement in the original report j 
11 that the window was installed on the outside of the 
I 12 siding. On closer inspection we determined that that 
13 was not the case. The windows still leak. It's 
14 apparent that the window installation does not keep out 
15 the weather. So I did not change my opinion as to the 
16 cost of repairing the window defect, but merely changed 
17 what I had observed on closer inspection. 
18 T h e -
19 Q. Go ahead, please. 
. 20 May I ask this about the window? And it 
21 just may be slipping my memory right now. If I recall 
22 correctly, it was Jason Bullock who originally 
23 determined that the windows were defective in their 
24 installation. Isn't that correct? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Were you sort of relying on Jason Bullock's 
2 original inspection of the windows and sort of adopting 
3 his inspection, and is that the reason for the error? 
4 A. No. The reason that I went down to the home 
5 to inspect the home was — was to independently observe 
6 the conditions of the home as it was built, the 
7 construction, and then to do an independent check 
8 against the building code that I would agree that those 
9 were, in fact, construction defects. 
10 So I could have -- I didn't want to just 
11 agree with the list of construction defects without 
12 being able to independently verify that they were, in 
13 fact, construction defects, after having observed the 
14 actual conditions and construction of the home. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 MR. HADLEY: Can I make a comment? 
17 MR. DIXON: No. 
18 M R HADLEY: Okay. I was actually going to 
19 ask you a question. 
20 MR. DIXON: Thank you for asking. I'll let 
1 21 you ask the questions at the end 
22 MR. HADLEY: All right (Laughter.) 
23 MR. DIXON: You would probably help me more 
24 than anything. I just want to make sure --
25 M R HADLEY: I just wanted to clarify what a 
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1 defect is. £ 
2 MR. DIXON: I'll be asking that. We'll be 1 
3 talking about that. That's a good point. We do need r: 
4 to get to a definition. : 
5 Q. But right now Fm just trying to get to the r 
6 scope of your reports, and I'm going to go into these U 
7 in a little more detail later on. I don't want to get |j 
8 too far into it. | 
9 I think you've answered the question, you [1 
10 didn't just assume that everything that Jason Bullock r 
11 said was correct, you tried to make an independent t 
12 analysis of what Jason Bullock said of what alleged n 
13 defects that Jason Bullock had found, and you went and [: 
14 checked each one of them out and tried to make an [| 
15 independent review to see if they were indeed defects, If 
16 correct? P 
17 A. That is correct. r 
18 Q. And, if I understand you correctly, the way | 
19 you have defined defects in your report is a deviation Fj 
20 from the building code, correct? \l 
21 A. Well, I think we defined it in the report. \\ 
22 But I'm not sure if that's where we defined it or not. | 
23 Q. I'm not sure if you used the word [I 
24 "deviation." Let's look for that. I think that was r 
25 the essence; is that right? I: 
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1 A. It says — in our report, page 3,1 believe ; 
2 first paragraph, site visit, "During our inspection we r 
3 observed the existing conditions at the home relative \\ 
4 to each item listed by Sunrise as, 'found not to be in p 
5 code compliance', throughout the remainder of this l" 
6 report the listed items found not to be in code | : 
7 compliance will be referred as 'defects'." [ 
8 Q. So the deviation from the code I said, and : 
9 the reasons you found were not in code compliance, but \] 
10 that means the same thing, doesn't it? V 
11 A. Yes. | 
12 Q. All right. Now, is that definition of a B 
13 construction defect a generally accepted definition in I! 
14 the field? \: 
15 A. Something could be a defect without - H 
16 without being necessarily a code compliance problem. fa 
17 Q. Because there might be just standards II 
18 observed by the construction industry that are not p 
19 embodied in the code, and if a person didn't meet that | | 
20 standard, that could be considered a defect; is that a J| 
21 fair statement? If 
22 A. That is correct If 
23 Q. Okay. But likewise, though, that's because K 
24 there might be substantial, I guess, safety issues or g 
! 25 structural integrity issues that might be considered to f. 
!___ _ | 
12 (Pages 45 to 48) 
Robert Stanley Court Reporting, Inc. 
Post Office Box 3079 St. George, Utah 84771 (435)688-7844 
ca833fab-5492-4ad -86cc-1 afbl ae9c74d 
William Moore and Mary Moore vs. Dau mith, et al. 




















































destructive testing, removing any sheet rock, or 
whatnot, to observe it was a question in my mind and it 
still is. 
Q. Because you have never done any destructive 
testing to answer that question, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Ceiling access 19 inches by 16 inches. 
A. That's a recording of — of the measurement 
that I took of the ceiling access while I was there. 
Q. Okay. And bathroom, no vent, is that what 
that says? 
A. Yes. 
Q. No vent at all? 
A. That's -- that may be a - a recording of 
what was reported as — as a condition. 
Q. Is that what you had found? 
A. Is that what I found? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I believe that there is a vent in — in that 
bathroom. I don't know whether — I don't believe that 
that vent is necessarily the only — or the proper 
vent. 
Q. Okay. Support for pipe, what does that 
mean? 
A. As I was reviewing the construction in the 
Page 78 
home, I had a concern about whether the pipe had enough 
pipe supports. | 
Q. Those are the little ties to keep the pipe | 
from rattling around? 
A. And from sagging. 
Q. Sagging? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you include that in your report? 
A. No, I didn't I didn't - I didn't address | 
that as a code violation. It was merely a comment to 
me about it appeared not to have enough support. 
Q. So you didn't make any definite conclusions ' 
one way or the other on that one? 
A. No. 
Q. The next one is -- I don't know if I can 
read that. Slop five? 
A. Slope. 
Q. I was going to say slope, and I didn't see 
the E in there. I didn't want to -
What does that mean? 
A. Just a question about slope of the sanitary 
sewer lines. 
Q. Okay. Did you make any ~ you didn't render 
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Q. Engineered trusses at 2 foot off center? U 
A. 2 foot on center. I measured the spacing of jl 
the trusses to assure that they were, in fact, 2 foot f? 
on center. And 1 observed such to be the case. Ij 
Q. And you found that there was 8 inches of | | 
cellulose insulation in the attic? jl 
A. Yes,uh-huh. I did. | 
Q. And that was adequate? | 
A. Pardon me? h 
Q. Was that adequate? § 
A. I didn't make a determination about whether if 
that was adequate. | | 
Q. Okay. The next page, which would be 3-B, it [| 
appears that you start going through the list of 30 | 
items at this point, right? | 
A. Yes, uh-huh. If 
Q. Maybe I can just — now we've gone from 30 fe 
to 42. Are the 12 additional items 12 additional J| 
defects or just a different breakdown of the original pj 
30? p 
A. Some of the additional items are related to fe 
stuff that was pointed out by Mark O'Barr in his B 
supplementary electrical inspection. g 
Q. Let me just ask it this way, did you find 1 
any defects that either Mark O'Barr or Jason Bullock R t 
hi 
Page 80 fe] 
originally identified? j | 
A Yes, I did I 
Q, Tell me which ones those were. I 
A. 40--38, 39 and 40. | 
Q. Okay. All right. Tell me how you found 1 
that there was insulation in the eave space. | 
A. By observation. I could see that the J| 
insulation was covering the — all the way to the If 
underside of the sheeting — sheathing. And [ also was [| 
able to observe that the venting in the attic was | 
inadequate, did not meet code. In order to meet code | 
my repair analysis recommended putting additional | 
venting in the eaves. And without removing that fa 
insulation from the underside of the joist, it would be | 
ineffectual to put eave ventilation in if the air can't | | 
get there. Ij 
Q. Right. And that's why you recommend these g 
baffles to keep the eave space from - | 
A. Right. So that the roof temperature stays | 
cold in the winter so you don't get ice dams forming. 11 
Q. But how do you keep the eave space clear of fcj 
the insulation? Is that — B 
A. You put the insulation baffles in. J| 
Q. The insulation baffles, is that what that's If 
for? 1 
h 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNIV, STATE OF UTA fi 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the 
Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and CAROL 
SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the Carol L 
Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
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RULE 5 \ FOR A DIRECTED 
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Judge: LYRE 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OT ORAL MOTION UNI ER RULE 50 FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
Plaintiffs allege two theory? of recovery: fraudulent nondiscl >surc and breach of 
contract. The two remaining allegtd defects are both subject to the fi audulent nondisclosure 
claim. Only the final grading issue is subject to the breach of contxac, claim. Both theories of 
recovery should be dismissed and & directed verdict granted because he Statute cf Limitations 
dictates this result and because Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidei cc necessary to sustain 
those claims. 
L STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Finish Grading Claim 
The coun has already ruled that UCA 78-12-21,5 is the statute of limitations applicable to 
this case. See order dated October 1,2003 annexed hereto. Subsect on 21.5 (3) pVovides that all 
claims in contract have a six year limitations period running from the earliest of either the date of 
the Certificate of Occupancy or the date of possession of the improve nen~ In this case it is 
admitted that the Certificate of Occupancy was granted on January 2t
 k 1994 and that possession 
took place in November of 1993 < The Moores occupancy was May < f 1994. The complaint 
was filed in August of 2000, over six years from either date. Thcrefo e the statute of limitations 
bars the contract claim. 
The plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations does not be* in to nin until discovery of 
the alleged building code violation. That argument fails as a matter c F law end as a matter of 
fact. Legally it fails because subsection 3 clearly Implies that the dLs< ovcry ru> does not apply to 
contract or warranty claims. 2L5 (3) (a) provides for a six year perio I of limitations for actions 
in contract, then 21.5(3) (b) provides; "All other actions.., shall be < ommenced from the earlier 
of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a :ause of action should have 
been discovered by reasonable diligence/1 The juxtaposition of these two paragraphs clearly 
implies that only the non-contract claims are subject to the discovery *ule, Contract claims exist 
for six years and no more. This is to allow builders some certainty ar d peace of mind that they 
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will not be afflicted with stale contract claims. If Plaintiffs* argumen prevailed that would BIIOW 
the Moores to sue six years after they discovered the contract claim, rhat is clearly excessive. In 
fact, the legislative preamble language immediately preceding these t vo provisions explains the 
legislative purpose of drawing definite limitations periods: "The iegis lature finds that (a) 
exposing a [builder] to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, c: breach of duty after the 
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexp< ctedly creates costs and 
hardship to the [builder] and the citizens of the state,,, ,(d) the possi Dility of injury and 
damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven years followin j completion [of the 
building] . .;and (e) ,, it is in the best interest of the citizens of the « late to impose the periods 
of limitation and repose provided in this chapter . . ." Clearly the in ent of this six year statute 
of limitations is that it be construed in f&vor of the builder. Thus, the discovery rule should not 
apply to the six year limitations period for contract claim*. 
Moreover, the contract makes it clear that the breach occurs il at all at the time of the 
closing, It was a: that time that any alleged building code violations i smalned unremedied. 
Therefore the statute must run from the date of closing. The closing ^ /as in May of 1994, 
Therefore, the breach of contract claim is barred. 
If there was a breach it was that there was a building code vie lation at closing, Even if 
the discover)'rule applied, reasonable diligence would have required 'laintifft to inquire of the 
building official whether there were any building violations, Had the' done this they would have 
Page 3 of 6 
discovered cither that there were none or they would have discovered some violation from which 
time the statute of limitations would have begun to run. Clearly, for *lrs, Moon: to wait over sU 
years to make such an inquiry is not reasonable diligence, 
Therefore the statute of limitations bars her contract claim. 
Alleged Defective Windows Claim 
UCA 78-12-21.5 (3)(b) bars the fraudulent nondisclosure clai lib as well This two year 
statute of limitations begins to run upon discovery of the alleged deft ;t or on the "date upon 
which a caufle of action should have been discovered through reason; ble diligence," 
Mrs. Moore admitted that she saw the water intrusion and damage to ihe paint at the window sill 
in the first winter after she moved in. That is when she had notice of the claim, She admits and 
Jack Peterson confinns that she called him to check out die water into aston Although he said the 
windows were not defective sbe still had notice as early as 1954 and 10 later rhan 1995 or 1996 
of water intrusion, 
n. FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE CLAIMS 
To prevail plaintiffs must prove that Dan and Carol Smith km w of the existence of these 
two building code violations. The sole evidence of this is that Dan S nith must have known there 
were building code violations since he was required, as a builder of a home, to know the 
contents of the building code. Carol Smith did not build the home ' Tierc is no evidence that 
she has any such requirement so she should be dismissed at the thresl hold. 
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Fraud requires clear and convincing evidence. No such evide ice exists that showg that 
Dan Smith knew there were material defects and that he refused to di close them. Regarding the 
final grading issue, his un-rebutted evidence is that he explained to V r Moore that the final 
grading had not yet been accomplished. Jack Peterson, the Budding c Eficial, haa testified that he 
granted Dan Smith permission to do the final grading when the wead w cleared in the spring. 
The condition of the grading when the Moot es bought the property is not a hidden thing. The 
status of the din was obvious. There is no evidence therefore that Tv r. Smith held back that 
information. 
Regarding the windows, there is no evidence that Dan Smith \ new there was a building 
cods violation, There it no evidence that Dan Smith was cited or red tagged for any building 
code violation, ho witness for the Plaintiffs has been able to say wit] any certainty what the 
defect is. Theiefoie, Dan Smith cannot be found to have withheld in smutiun concerning a 
defect of which Plaintiffs have no knowledge. 
ITT. BRFACH OF CONTRACT 
The contractual provision that applies is found in paragraph C:. This paragraph clearly 
applies to either one of two types of cases. Either the building officii I has cited the home builder 
for a violation or the home builder has concealed the violation from t te building official. Thett 
U no such evidence, The evidence Is that the home builder could not accomplish the final 
grading because it was too muddy, He intended to do the final gradir g in the spring. The 
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contractual provision requires there to be BL violation. There was no v olation beoaiase Dan Smith 
obtained permission from the building official to do the grading in th< spring, 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plainuff* have not produced evidence sufficient for this case t > go to the jury, Therefore 
und«r URCP 50 a diiected verdict should be granted 
DATED this of March, 2005 
DIXON, TRUMAN & IISHER, P.C. 
By;. 
A. BRYC^DDgON 
Attorneywr Defends ats 
192 East 200 North, Suite 203 
St George, UT 847'0 
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MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION UNDER RULE 50 FOR A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR REMITTITUR 
Plaintiffs prevailed on its two theories of recovery, fraudulent nondisclosure and breach 
of contract, with respect to one of 42 alleged defects. Defendants moved for a directed verdict at 
the conclusion of plaintiffs' case. The court allowed the case to go to the jury without ruling on 
the motion. Now the Defendants request a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under URCP 
50. 
Both theories of recovery are defective because the Statute of Limitations bars them. The 
contract claim as a matter of law fails. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence to support the 
claim on final grading. 
I. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Finish Grading Claim 
The court has already ruled that UCA 78-12-21.5 is the statute of limitations applicable to 
this case. See order dated October 1, 2003. Subsection 21.5 (3) provides that all claims in 
contract have a six year limitations period running from the earliest of either the date of the 
Certificate of Occupancy or the date of possession of the improvement. In this case it is admitted 
that the Certificate of Occupancy was granted on January 28, 1994 and that possession took place 
in November of 1993. The Moores occupancy was May 2, 1994. The complaint was filed in 
August of 2000, over six years from either date. Therefore the statute of limitations bars the 
The plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until discovery of 
the alleged building code violation. That argument fails as a matter of law and as a matter of 
fact. Legally it fails because subsection 3 clearly implies that the discovery rule does not apply to 
contract or warranty claims. 21.5 (3) (a) provides for a six year period of limitations for actions 
m contract, then 21.5(3) (b) provides: "All other actions . . . shall be commenced from the earlier 
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of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have 
been discovered by reasonable diligence." The juxtaposition of these two paragraphs clearly 
implies that only the non-contract claims are subject to the discovery rule. Contract claims exist 
for six years and no more. This is to allow builders some certainty and peace of mind that they 
will not be afflicted with stale contract claims. If Plaintiffs' argument prevailed that would allow 
the Moores to sue six years after they discovered the contract claim. That is clearly excessive. In 
fact, the legislative preamble language immediately preceding these two provisions explains the 
legislative purpose of drawing definite limitations periods: "The legislature finds that (a) 
exposing a [builder] to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the 
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and 
hardship to the [builder] and the citizens of the state .. . .(d) the possibility of injury and 
damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven years following completion [of the 
building]. . .;and (e) . . . it is in the best interest of the citizens of the state to impose the periods 
of limitation and repose provided in this chapter.. . ." Clearly the intent of this six year statute 
of limitations is that it be construed in favor of the builder. Thus, the discovery rule should not 
apply to the six year limitations period for contract claims. 
Section 4 of 78-12-21.5 supports this statutory construction. It provides for a period of 
repose after which no claim can be brought regardless of discovery. In doing so, it refers to 
section 3(b) but not to section 3(a). It provides that "Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an 
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action may not be commenced against a provider more than nine years after completion of the 
improvement.. . ." It is significant that this statute of repose is given "notwithstanding" 
subsection (3)(b) but not subsection (3)(a). If (3)(a) could be construed to enlarge the period of 
limitations beyond 9 years then it would have been referred to. The language of Subsection 4 
would have read: " Notwithstanding Section 3 . . ." It would not have limited its reference to 
subsection (3)(b). Since the legislature did not intend Subsection (3)(a) to be subject to the 
discovery rule there was no need to refer to it in the statute of repose. 
Moreover, the contract makes it clear that the breach occurs if at all at the time of the 
closing. It was at that time that any alleged building code violations remained unremedied. 
Therefore the statute must run from the date of closing. The closing was in May of 1994. 
Therefore, the breach of contract claim is barred. 
If there was a breach it was that there was a building code violation at closing. Even if 
the discovery rule applied, reasonable diligence would have required Plaintiffs to inquire of the 
building official whether there were any building violations. Had they done this they would have 
discovered either that there were none or they would have discovered some violation from which 
time the statute of limitations would have begun to run. Clearly, for Mrs. Moore to wait over six 
years to make such an inquiry is not reasonable diligence. 
The Plaintiffs argue that this court has considered and rejected this claim previously. It 
has not considered this issue in isolation. The statute of limitation issues were always considered 
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in conjunction with the fraudulent nondisclosure issues. This is the first time the court has been 
able to focus solely on whether the discovery rule applies to contracts without the distraction of 
41 other defects and fraudulent non-disclosure claims. The Plaintiffs in effect have confused the 
one simple issue that should have been the subject of this lawsuit. By throwing so much 
irrelevance at the court, Plaintiffs have succeeded in obscuring the true nature of their claim for 
breach of contract. Finally, with all the irrelevance blasted away, the court can see clearly to 
grant judgment based on the clear meaning of the statute of limitations. 
II. 
FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE CLAIMS 
To prevail plaintiffs must prove that Dan and Carol Smith knew of the existence of the 
alleged violation of the building code. The sole evidence of this is that Dan Smith must have 
known there were building code violations since he was required, as a builder of a home, to 
know the contents of the building code. 
Fraud requires clear and convincing evidence. No such evidence exists that shows that 
Dan Smith knew there were material defects and that he refused to disclose them. Regarding the 
final grading issue, his un-rebutted evidence was that he explained to Mr. Moore that the final 
grading had not yet been accomplished. Jack Peterson, the Building official, has testified that he 
granted Dan Smith permission to do the final grading when the weather cleared in the spring. 
Thus, there is no fraud. 
The condition of the grading when the Moores bought the property is not a hidden thing. 
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Even if Dan Smith had not informed Mr. Moore and even if the Moores did not remove dirt, the 
Moores knew when they bought the house that there was no landscaping. The height of the dirt 
against the foundation was clearly visible for all to see. They could see, for example, that the 
electric meter sat so high that someone needed,to stand on a box to read it. There is nothing 
hidden or latent about this issue. There is no evidence therefore that Mr. Smith held back that 
information. 
III. 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
The contractual provision that applies is found in paragraph C:. This paragraph clearly 
applies to either one of two types of cases. Either the building official has cited the home builder 
for a violation or the home builder has concealed the violation from the building official. There 
is no such evidence. The evidence is that the home builder could not accomplish the final 
grading because it was too muddy. He intended to do the final grading in the spring. The 
contractual provision requires there to be a violation. There was no violation because Dan Smith 
obtained permission from the building official to do the grading in the spring. 
Under URCP 50 a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted. 
REDUCTION OF DAMAGES 
Utah law on reduction of excessive damage awards by juries is as follows: "Juries are 
permitted wide discretion in awarding damages, and courts must accord considerable deference 
to the jury's determination. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 
Page 6 of 9 
(Utah 1985), Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 153 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993). Thus, a jury1s award of damages should not be disturbed "unless (1) the jury 
disregarded competent evidence, (2) the award is so excessive beyond rational justification as to 
indicate the effect of improper factors in the determination, and (3) the award was rendered under 
a misunderstanding." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corporation dba Firemaster, 883 P.2d 295, 
300, quoting Brown, 840 P.2d at 153. 
Disregard of competent evidence- The evidence was undisputed that there is no damage 
to the structure of the house from the alleged violation of the building code. The only testimony 
on damage was that of Steenblik who claimed that it would cost $30,680 to repair the defect. 
First, this is excessive because it would give the Moores numerous landscaping and home 
features that they did not pay for. For example, Steenblik's plan included large retaining walls 
both in front and back, $13,000 worth of sod in front and back, and rain gutters . The Moores 
bought the house "as is" without any such features. The jury must have disregarded the 
evidence that the home had no landscaping to begin with and that the house was bought "as is." 
The award is excessive beyond rational justification. The total cost of the house was 
$83,000. $30,860 is 37 % of the total cost of the house. That is clearly excessive. Mary Moore 
received one bid to put dirt up to the 30 inch frost line that covered everything for $7,000. See 
the second page of the exhibit where the price of $7,000 is quoted to take care of item "#27 & 28 
Footing and Grading," Item 27 isthe same item and item number that the final grading issue has 
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been identified by throughout this litigation. Defendants are willing to pay twice $7,000 or 
$14,000, to satisfy this judgment. That is twice as much as can be sustained by any reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence. The court should reduce the damages and allow this case to be 
disposed of properly. 
The award was rendered under a misunderstanding. The jury must have 
misunderstood the nature of damages because damages cannot be used to place the Plaintiffs in a 
position better than what they would have been had there been no breach. As shown above, this 
damage award does that very thing. 
CONCLUSION 
The statute of limitations in a contract claim cannot be tolled by the discovery rule. There 
is no clear and convincing evidence to support fraud. The Defendants are willing to accept a 
reduction of damages to $14,000. That is twice the true worth of the claim. 
DATED this 12J day of March, 2005. 
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C. 
By: 
BRYC^DKON 
Attorney for Defendants 
192 East 200 North, Suite 203 
St. George, UT 84770 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND FAX 
I hereby certify that I am an employee of DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER and that on 
March 22, 2005,1 placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing in the United States mails at St. 
George, Utah, with 1st class postage prepaid and addressed as follows and also faxed this 
document to: 
Gregory B. Hadley 
James K. Haslam 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200 
Provo,UT 84604 
An Employee of Dixon, Truman & Fisher, a P.C. 
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ADDENDUM 5 
PATRICK J. ASCIONE (USB #6469) 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN (USB #8897) 
LORELEI NAEGLE (USB #9577) 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 812-1000 
Fax: (801) 374-1724 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the 
Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and CAROL 
SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the Carol L. 
Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
U.R.Civ.P. RULE 60(b) 
Hearing Requested 
Case No.: 000700142 MI 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
COMES NOW Patrick J. Ascione, of the law firm Ascione, Heideman & McKay, L.L.C, 
substitute counsel for Defendants and does hereby file its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment in Accordance with U.R.C.P 60(b). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the sake of clarity and convenience Defendants set forth the following procedural history 
regarding this Court's rulings on the various summary judgment motions that have been filed in this 
IS31 
1. Defendants filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment on February 26, 2001 in 
which they argued that: (1) Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations; 
(2) Plaintiffs' claim of rescission was barred by the statute of limitations; (3) Plaintiffs' claim for 
violation of the consumer sales practices act was barred by the statute of limitations; (4) Plaintiffs failed 
to plead fraud and misrepresentation with sufficient particularity; (5) punitive damages should be 
dismissed because all underlying claims are subject to summary judgment 
2. August 16, 2001, this Court entered a ruling on Defendants' first Motion for Summary 
Judgment and held that: 
a. Plaintiffs' claim for negligent misrepresentation in this case was precluded as a matter of 
law by the merger doctrine as set forth in the case of Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 21 
P.3d 219 (Utah App. 2000). 
b. That the claims of fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation had been 
pled with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
c. That there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to claims of fraudulent 
nondisclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation that precluded summary judgment. 
d. Defendants may have had a legal duty to disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material 
defects in the home or building code violations, of which they were aware. 
e. The discovery rule should be applied to toll the statute of limitations in situations where 
its application was not otherwise expressly prohibited by law. 
f. The discovery rule does apply to those defects that would be considered latent and that 
there were issues of fact with respect to when the defects should have reasonably been 
discovered. 
g. Plaintiffs elected rescission rather than monetary damages for breach of contract. 
3. Defendants filed their next motion for summary judgment on May 6, 2003 arguing that: (1) 
Plaintiffs' claims were barred inasmuch as the Plaintiffs failed to have the home inspected and 
inasmuch as the applicable statute of limitation ran before suit was filed; (2) Plaintiffs admitted 
that the majority of their claims were patent defects and should therefore be dismissed. 
4. On August 21, 2003, this Court held that: (1) the Defendants were only legally obligated to 
disclose defects that were not discoverable by reasonable care; (2) that summary judgment was 
appropriate for all admittedly patent items and that summary judgment was not appropriate for 
defects 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 39; (3) that there were disputed material facts regarding 
Plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent misrepresentation; (4) that there were disputed material facts 
regarding Defendants' statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, this Court granted summary 
judgment only as to the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim of fraudulent nondisclosure as to all defects 
except 9, 11, 12,26, 27, 38 and 39. 
5. Finally in November 2003, Defendants filed four (4) additional motions for summary judgment 
as/to Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract; consumer sales practice act; mutual mistake of 
fact; and fraudulent misrepresentations. 
6. On April 26, 2004, this Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
Plaintiffs' claims under the Consumer Sales Practice Act and Fraudulent Misrepresentation, but 
denied the motion as to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. Furthermore, during the hearing on 
the motions, Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to the dismissal of the claim for mutual mistake. 
7. In addition, on April 26, 2004, this Court also denied Plaintiffs' Motion to reconsider its prior 
ruling on Plaintiffs' Fraudulent Nondisclosure and Negligent Misrepresentation causes of action. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant Defendants' Motion for relief from judgment based upon mistake of law 
and in the furtherance of justice. Mistake of law by the trial court may support a motion for relief from 
judgment. Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1995). Furthermore, this Court may grant relief under 
the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(6) governing relief from judgment for any reason other than those 
specifically enumerated by rule if relief is justified and motion is made with reasonable time. Kunzler v. 
O'Dell 855 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1993). 
The mistake upon which Defendants seek relief from judgment is determinative and precedential 
case law on the merger doctrine as applied to the prior decisions of this Court that effectively invalidates 
both Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract and claim for fraudulent nondisclosure. Defendants 
specifically affirmative that they do not seek to re-litigate issues that have already been raised and 
argued, but instead seek to draw the Court's attention to conclusive precedent on the issue of the co-
effect of the merger doctrine on Plaintiffs' claims and this Court's decision regarding the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent misrepresentation. 
L UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER THE PARTIES' EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT IS SUBSUMED AND EXTINGUISHED. 
As Judge Howard noted in his summary judgment decision in this case on August 16, 2001, the 
common law merger doctrine applies to this case. In particular, this Court stated that: 
Pursuant to the common-law merger doctrine, execution and delivery of a deed by a 
seller usually renders any prior contractual terms extinguished and unenforceable. 
Although certain specific exceptions allow a party to avoid application of the merger 
doctrine, a claim for negligent misrepresentation relating to alleged construction defects 
in a building does not fall within any such exception. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim for 
negligent misrepresentation in this case is precluded as a matter of law by the merger 
doctrine as set forth in the case of Robinson v. Tripco Inv. Inc., 2000 UT App 200, 21 
P.3d219. 
[Order on Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 16, 2001]. Robinson v. Tripco, as well as 
numerous other cases establishes that the merger doctrine applies in Utah. Although the merger doctrine 
has been described as "'an admittedly harsh rule of law' it applies in Utah because it 'preserves the 
integrity of the final document of conveyance and encourages the diligence of the parties."5 Robinson v. 
Tnpco, 21 P.3d at 223 (citing Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah App. 1996). 
The doctrine of merger . ..is applicable when the acts to be performed by the seller in a 
contract relate only to the delivery of title to the buyer. Execution and delivery of a deed 
by the seller then usually constitute full performance on his part, and acceptance of the 
deed by the buyer manifests his acceptance of that performance even though the estate 
conveyed may differ from that promised in the antecedent agreement. Therefore, in such 
a case, the deed is the final agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are 
extinguished and unenforceable. 
Furthermore, "the merger doctrine extinguishes the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and makes 
preeminent the warranty deed." Shafir v. Harrigan. 879 P2d 1384, 1392 (Utah App. 1994). 
The facts of Shafir are very similar to the facts of this case in that both cases involved the 
interpretation of Section "C" of a standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement. In particular, the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement in Shafir contained a general provision entitled "Seller Warranties" wherein the 
Seller warranted that "Seller had received no claim or notice of any building or zoning violation 
concerning the property which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing." IcL Likewise, in this 
case section (C) of the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement provides that "Seller had received no 
claim or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not or will not be 
remedied prior to closing." 
In Shafir, the Court specifically found that the warranty deed did not include a warranty of notice 
of building code violations, and therefore, the merger doctrine precluded the argument that the sellers 
had breached a warranty contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement Id. Thus, under the merger 
doctrine, Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants breached section C of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement would be precluded as a matter of law. 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO MEET THE FRAUD 
EXCEPTION TO THE MERGER DOCTRINE. 
As recognized by this Court in its summary judgment decision, there are several discrete 
exceptions to the merger doctrine including "fraud in the transaction". See Maynard, 912 P.2d at 450. 
However, the fraud exception only "applies when the party seeking to avoid merger can prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the other party committed fraud in the real estate transaction" Id In order 
to prevail under the fraud exception, "all the elements of fraud must be established." Secor v. Knight 
716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1986). The elements of fraud in Utah are: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that 
he or she had insufficient knowledge on which to base such representation; (5) for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby 
induced to act; (9) to his [or her] injury and damage. 
Maynard, 912 P.2d at 450 (emphasis added)(quoting Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 
1980)). Thus, in order for Plaintiffs to prove that the fraud exception to the merger doctrine should 
apply, they must necessarily provide clear and convincing evidence that any omissions by Defendants 
were (1) material; (2) withheld knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of inducing the Plaintiffs to act 
(3) that Defendants had a duty to disclose the material fact; and (4) that Plaintiffs acted reasonably and 
did in fact rely upon the concealment of the fact. 
On April 26, 2004, this Court determined as a matter of law that Plaintiffs had failed to establish 
a core element of fraud: willful or reckless intent to mislead the Plaintiffs. Upon motion by Defendants 
for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, this Court identified three 
alleged misrepresentations by the Defendants: 
(1) the earnest money sales agreement constituted a representation "that they [the Smiths] 
had no knowledge or notice of any building or zoning violations concerning the property 
that would not be remedied before closing;" (2) the Smiths made an implied fraudulent 
misrepresentation that there were no building code violations by providing the Plaintiffs a 
copy of the Certificate of Occupancy; (3) the Smiths impliedly misrepresented that the 
home was compliant with the building code by Dan smith having said (a) that he was a 
contractor; (b) by the Smiths living in the home, and (c) by the Smiths remaining silent 
regarding any possible building code violations. 
[Memorandum Decision dated April 26, 2004, pg. 4 (emphasis added)]. Thus, this Court identified not 
only the alleged misstatements or misrepresentations made by the Defendants but also the alleged 
omissions of the Defendants. This Court then went on to specifically find that; 
Defendants alleged misrepresentations by Plaintiffs do not meet the requirement that 
these representations were made recklessly for the purpose of inducing the other party to 
act upon it. There is not legally sufficient evidence before the Court [that] the 
Defendants acted willfully or recklessly to mislead the Plaintiffs. IcL 
Thus, this Court has already determined as a matter of law that Defendants did not have the requisite 
scienter for fraud. 
Because this Court has expressly determined that Plaintiffs could not establish willful or reckless 
intent to defraud, the fraud exception to the merger doctrine fails and the merger doctrine necessarily 
acts to merge and subsume the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Thus, Plaintiffs' breach of contract 
claim fails as a matter of law. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS OF FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE ALSO FAIL AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
If there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Defendants acted, willfully or 
recklessly to mislead the Plaintiffs, it necessarily follows that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
finding that Defendants acted willfully or recklessly in failing to disclose information. The 
misrepresentations identified in Plaintiffs' fraudulent misrepresentation claim, which were expressly 
dismissed by this Court for lack of legally sufficient evidence, are the same representations/omissions 
upon which Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim was based; namely, that the Defendants are liable 
for remaining silent about building code violations. 
The elements of fraudulent nondisclosure claim include proof that: (1) the nondisclosed 
information is material; (2) that the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, 
and (3) that there is a legal duty to communicate. Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 574 (Utah 
2001). However, it is clear that fraudulent nondisclosure is a claim of fraud by "suppression of the 
truth", Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1963), and requires all of the same elements of fraud 
including willful or reckless intent to induce the Plaintiffs to act. In light of the fact that this Court 
determined that there is not sufficient evidence to support a finding that Defendants acted with willful or 
reckless intent, Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claims also fail as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant Defendants 
Motion under Rule 60(b) for Relief from Judgment. 
DATED AND SIGNED this / / day of April, 2005 
ASCIONJE; HECDEMAN & M C K A Y , L,L.C. 
A 
PATRICK J. A; 
"Attorney for Defendants 
ADDENDUM 6 
RESIDENTIAL £ v ^ 
Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance 
CITY OF FILLMORE 
Name of Owner:. 
Address of Owner: 
Property described as:. 
Otherwise known as: 
Dan Smith 





J No. of buiidings on lot 
//rtM, rjfatf'K. 






Altered New W 
.Building No. JMo. of Units 
TYPE OF OCCUPANCY 
V 
_ FAMILY OCCUPANCY 
Number of families approved to reside per building 
Number of boarders or roomers with automobiles approved to reside on premises with a family 
Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces 
_ BACHING SINGLES OCCUPANCY 
Number of baching singles approved to reside per unit 
Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces. The number of occupants owning or operating 
vehicles cannot exceed this number. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that I am the owner or authorized agent of the property subject of this request, that the fore-
going statements and answers are true and correct, and that the stated conditions will be maintained on the premises-
Signature Date 
Any change in intensity of use on the building or premises, or an increase of more than five percent (5%) in the number of occ-
upants in an apartment or multiple residential building will require the issuance of a new certificate. 
^; m f-Date 
W_^ rfff Date 
Remarks: 
Section 4-4 Zoning Ordinance No. 77-3 Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance. It shall be unlawful 
to use or occupy or to permit the use or occupancy of any building or premises until a Certificate of 
occupancy and zoning compliance shall have been Issued for the premises and/or building by Fillmore City. 
Failure to comply with any section of this ordinance is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fin* of not 
more then $1000 or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or both as is set forth in Chapter I 
Sec. il-lOO* 
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ORM 123 GEM Printing Co S L C . Utah 
Legend Yes(X) No(O) 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE J-<r1L\u-a&*4 /$. /? 9¥ % 
undersigned Buyer 
_ „RNEST MON^Y, the amount of . ^ rtlJ/V <^^f} ^ ^i. » / i ^ 7 ^ * 1 / Ky //Q-Q 
he form of ? JfaLsk.. 
he 
EA  
_ hereby deposits W4*h-Druhc.» ag^ 
. Dollars ($ t~foOn. ^0 * 




OFFER TO PURCHASE 
rJ** J- ^/TJ 
. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST^MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the jproperty situated at I£>5 * ^ * 1OQ5* 
County of . Utah 
>ject to any restrictive covenants zoning regulations utilto_or other easements or rights of way government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
in the City of Jr^JLyr^^UL^ 
ordance with Section G Said property is owned 
is utiiyv_or otner ease ents or rights of ay govern ent patents 
by K.Ja,}\ as sellers and is more particularly described 
^HECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
O UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY 
BllMPROVED REAL PROPERTY 
O Vacant Lot 0 Vacant Acreage 0 Other 
(3 Commercial El Residential Q Condo 0 Other 
(a) Included items Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property 
CThe following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title 
zJit^jiA.i'tuiu^ i) Excluded items The following items are specifically excluded from this sale. $JsJ^sn& fuy2~r^ JLU, ¥ • * / w - f^ 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
E_Tpublic sewer [Unconnected 
EJ septic tank 0 connected 
@ other sanitary sysjem 
Qpublic water _J connected 
0 private water 0 connected 
G well O connected Q other 
[yjirrigation water / secondary system 
# of shares t 1/ '7____£____ 
0 JM antenna 0 master antenna O prewired 
szr natural gas Qconnected 
E_f electricity __ connected 
Q ingress & egress by private easement 
(_T dedicated road _T paved 
Q curb and gutter 
other rights 
o " i~ prior to closing _ ! shall not be furnished (d) Survey A certified survey £j shall be furnished at the expense of 
(e) Buyer Inspection Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below accepts it in its present physical 
condition, except 
_ PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The total purchase price for the property is 
2 £ _ 












)f 3 oz>o* °a _) which shall be paid as follows 
which represents the aforedescrtbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing 
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer, 
which obligation bears interest at _ G _ % per annum with monthty payments of $ __J 
which include D principal, D interest, D taxes, • insurance, Q condo fees, D other 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include Q principal, D interest, D taxes, Q insurance, D condo fees. O other 
representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows 
Other . 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
II Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
assume and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees 
make application within / y / /j , days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at 
"i interest rate not to exceed 'A/ j n~ % If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within /y f A days after Seller's acceptance 
this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon wnttennotice Seller agrees to pay up ft/ /[/ / /f mortgage loan discount 
Dints, not to exceed $ nf y fi In addition, seller agrees to pay $ A / ft to be used for Buyer's other loan costs 
y-
_np two of a four Daae form Seller's Initials^ \<kMJL&M Date ______ / i _ Buyer's Initials ( ) C 1 Date . 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (O) 
This Is a legally binding contract Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heattng, 
onditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, wirv 
and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, walMo-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit-
;), fencing, trees and shrubs. 
. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
ny representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom 
5 production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspt 
I inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
rill not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
wrought current on or before dosing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound .or in 
sfactory working condition at closing. 
. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
tinued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller 
no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
. ACCELERATION CLAUSE- Not less than frve (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
ds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
iimterest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
irove the sale. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case, 
samest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are*?*" "rth 
Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void. 
L TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
i preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing. Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title, 
ireafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree-
nt at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
1. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued 
such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided lor in said standard form, and 
encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
ill, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any 
icellation charge. 
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing' 
opy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior 
losing. Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objections) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
I. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing (eases shall be made, nor new leases 
ered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
3 lAsNUIIIVJN A M U l / U l l ( C I f\r%\^u. v#r 111 v.t-| > 
late contract Transfer of Seller's ownership interesi^nalTbe made as set forth in Section S Seller agrees to furrwsn good and marketable title to the property, subject 
encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by {ft a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price t j an abstract of title brought current, 
h an attorney s opinion (See Section H) 
4 INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to dosing. Buyer shall take title 
bject to any existing restrictive covenants including condominium restrictions (CC & R s) Buyer f j has f j . has not reviewed any condominium CC & R s prior to signing this Agreement 
5 VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows <Z. <J- £rXA_-i CJJ*- J <T^f Z4_4-<l£^ J 
6 SELLERS WARRANTIES In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted __ 
"""^- f * ^ < J 
cceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following . 
_Zi_ 
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS ANO CONTINGENCIES This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
lor to closing . . 
& CLOSING OF SALE This Agreement shall be dosed on or before * f \ftA^1 ^ 19 S4L* a reasonable location to be designated by 
alter, subject to Section Q Upon demand Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
is Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R shall .be "made as of 0 date of possession G f date of closing Q other 
9 POSSESSION- Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on _ 
the swgning of this Agreement the listing Jagent *J / / V 
represents ( ) Seller ( )ytJuyer Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
l disclosure of the agency relationship^) was provided to him/her ( ) ( ) Buyer s initials ( ) ( ) Seller's initials 
r * *r? / &tj / *t 7 y - unless extended by written agreement of parties 
10 AGENCY DISCLOSURE At ir signin  :& A / /  represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
£uy id the selling agent. 
,^ GENERAL PROVISIONS UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE. THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
CCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THJS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE 
12 AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller shall 
ave until ____2____1_-(AM/PI 
I0NEY to ttfe Buyer/ 
< .' > ' / / rV^ 
p*J_J?c£ 19 
f t -— 7 _^* *-xr* 
3uyer's Signature) 
* t : A-
m-
i 




I the Agent shal^teturn the HARNESTT 
?*?-




"t uyer's Signature) (Date) ' (Address) (SSN/TAX IDJ 
>IECK ONE 
GJ^CCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above 
E? REJECTION Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
£5 COUNTER OFFER Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance Buyer shall have until (AM/PM) 19 to accept the terms 
specified below 
) 
signature) (t}4le) -r ' fTime) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) Seller'  Signature) 
(Date/ f 
( ( r ) 
JOO-[Seller's Signature) (Time) (Address) JL£Lf 
CHECK ONE 
D ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
D REJECTION Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER (Buyer's Initials) 
D COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum 
n$*< 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
(Buyer s Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEtPT 
State ^aw requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement beanng all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed) 
A _f \ acknowledge receipt j)f a final copy of the foregoing Agreement beanng all signatures 
SIGNATURE OF SELLER 
-J 1'i 
SIGNATURE OF BU>YER 
7
 / • ' / . 
r-t)ate ' " 
B D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement beanng all signatures to be mailed on_ 
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller D Buyer Sent by 
Date 
Dale 
- . 1 9 - -by 
AUTHORITY OF SIGN ATORS If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants 
or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
C<$flHIi!ffE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree 
it This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties 
COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement 
expressly modified or excluded therein 
DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
> institute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition 
ontingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
er. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
jding a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap-
ible law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in-
leader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the pnncioal broker to draw from the 
lest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
fiterpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action 
ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement 
RISK OF LOSS Al! risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fi-e, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts o* God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
6) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property 
' to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair 
iplace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport s; 
flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter, 
is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
rered by all parties to the transaction 
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (V2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing 
insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, tf acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
ssumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
osmg 
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex 
ed herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
aining Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
te contract therein 
NOTICE Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
ie evenl with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to whicli the notice was to be given 
jtomatically terminated and this Agreement is m full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the 
er or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice 
BROKERAGE, For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office 
! DAYS For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term. ' days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
iE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM 
ADDENDUM 8 
Gregory B. Hadley (3652) 
James K. Haslam (6887) 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200 
Provo Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 377-4403 
Facsimile: (801)377-4411 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee 
of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
and CAROL SMITH, individually and as 




Civil No. 000700142 Ml 
Judge Fred Howard 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court for decision 
pursuant to a Notice to Submit for Decision filed by the Defendants, and a hearing was 
held before the Court on May 31, 2001, concerning this motion and Plaintiffs' 
Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. Appearing at the hearing were 
James K. Haslam, of Hadley & Associates, on behalf of Plaintiffs, and A. Bryce Dixon, 
of Dixon & Truman, on behalf of Defendants. The Court, having reviewed the motions 
and all memoranda, objections, and other materials filed in support and in opposition 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Millard County, State of Utaf 
\ 
thereto, and having heard oral arguments from the parties on the motions, and for good 
cause shown, hereby makes the following findings, conclusions, and rulings: 
Pursuant to the common-law merger doctrine, execution and delivery of a deed 
by a seller usually renders any prior contractual terms extinguished and unenforceable. 
Although certain specific exceptions allow a party to avoid application of the merger 
doctrine, a claim for negligent misrepresentation relating to alleged construction defects 
in a building does not fall within any such exception. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim for 
negligent misrepresentation in this case is precluded as a matter of law by the merger 
doctrine as set forth in the case of Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, 21 
P.3d219. 
With respect to Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the Court concludes that those causes of action, though not pleaded 
with great detail, have been pleaded in the Complaint with sufficient particularity by 
Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In any 
event, the Court would grant Plaintiffs' motion to amend the Complaint to plead these 
causes of action with greater detail if Plaintiffs desired to do so. Moreover, the Court 
concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to these claims 
that precludes the granting of summary judgment. Finally, the Court further concludes 
that Defendants, as the sellers of the home in question, may have had a legal duty to 
2 
disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material defects in the home, or building code 
violations, of which they were aware. 
With respect to the remaining claims, the Court believes that the discovery rule 
should be applied to toll the statute of limitations, even as to contract-based claims, in 
situations where its application is not otherwise expressly prohibited by law. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the discovery rule does apply 
in this case with respect to those defects that would be considered latent, and that there 
remain issues of fact with respect to when those defects should have reasonably been 
discovered. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to Plaintiffs1 
claims for breach of contract, rescission, and violations of the Consumer Sales 
Practices Act. 
The Court will consider, at the close of all discovery, a motion for summary 
judgment by Defendants, based on their limitations defense. 
Finally, over Plaintiffs' objection, the Court required Plaintiffs to make an election 
of remedies at the hearing between their contract-based claims asserting both a right to 
contractual damages and a right to rescission of the transaction. Plaintiffs elected to 
pursue the remedy of rescission. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs' claim 
of negligent misrepresentation, and that claim is hereby dismissed; 
3 
2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied as to all other claims; 
3. Plaintiffs may not seek monetary damages for breach of contract, but may 
pursue the remedy of rescission; and 
4. No further motions for summary judgment will be considered by the Court 
until after the close of discovery. 
DATED this / ^ day of / $ ^ ^ T , 2001. 




A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ (#889) 
AARON M. WAITE, ESQ (#8992) 
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C. 
192 East 200 North, Suite 203 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435)652-8000 
Facsimile: (435)652-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, ; 
Plaintiffs, \ 
vs. 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of ] 
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and ] 
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee ; 
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust, ] 
Defendants. ] 
I ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
1 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No.: 000700142 MI 
I Judge: EYRE 
ORDER ON DEFEND ANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment came before the court on July 21, 2003. 
Plaintiffs were represented by Gregory Hadley and defendants by Bryce Dixon. The court heard 
the arguments of counsel, read the briefs, took the matter under advisement and issued a 
"Memorandum Decision" dated August 21, 2003. Based on that decision the following is 
ordered adjudged and decreed: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part in 
accordance with the following. 
2. Plaintiffs admitted that all defects except defects 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 39 were 
patent and not latent defects and could have been discovered by a home inspection. 
(Court's decision at page 5.) In addition, the court determines that defect items 12 and 38 
o& z*\ 
are patent defects. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted regarding 
plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claims as to all defects except 9, 11, 26, 27 and 39. 
3. This construction defect case is governed by Utah Code Section 78-12-21.5 of which 
subsection (3)(a) provides that an action by or against a provider based in contract or 
warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of completion of the 
improvement. (Decision at page 6.) Subsection (3)(b) provides that all other causes of 
action against a provider shall be commenced within two years of the discovery of a cause 
of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been discovered through 
reasonable diligence. In accordance with UCA 78-12-21.5 (3)(b) the discovery rule 
applies in this case. Plaintiffs have created material issues of fact as to when such defects 
were first discovered and therefore summary judgment as to such defects is denied. 
4. Defendants did not address the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation in their motion for 
summary judgment. The defendants did however mention that Maack v. Resource 
Design & Construction, Inc. 875 P. wd 570 (Uta App. 1994) disposed of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim. However, Maack decided that issue on whether there was a 
presently existing material fact. There was none in Maack but there are such issues in the 
instant case. Therefore, plaintiffs fraudulent misrepresentation claims survive summary 
judgment. / 
DATED this 29th day of ^ ttgtrstf 2003. 
BY\THE COURT 
Honorable Judge Donald Ewe, Ja^7 
District Court Judge \ 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEYS 
TO. Gregory B.Hadley 
James K. Haslam 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 200 
Provo,UT 84604 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Plaintiffs, will submit the 
above and foregoing ORDER ON September 11, 2003, HEARING to the Honorable Donald 
Eyre, Jr., for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice. 
DATED this 29th day of August, 2003. 
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C. 
( • A * / / / 
L^l V^7 7/> / / J? A. BRYiCE DTON, ESQ. 
AARON M. WAITE, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the 29th day of August, 2003,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing in the United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first class postage prepaid 
and addressed as follows: 
Gregory B. Hadley 
James K. Haslam 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84604 
jt>lA>-^ 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUBICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE 5F UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee ot die 
Dan Irvin Smidi Inter Vivos Trust, and 
CAROL SMITH, Individually and as Trustee of 
die Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
Defendants. 
SPECliL VERDICT 
Civil #(00700142 Ml 
Judge E onald J. Eyre 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY; 
Please answer the following questions considering all tfc s evidence: 
1. a) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidei ce that Dan and Carol 
Smith breached their conn-act with William and: 4ary Moore? 
Yes g> No O 
b) If yes, what, if any, compensatory damages di 1 the Plaintiff suffer as a 
result thereof? S ZDjbf&XD 
c) If you answered "yes" to l a above, do you flat. chat the statute of 
limitations barred or prohibited the Plaintiff s breach of contra -t claim? 
Yes 0 No /3_ 
2. a) Do you find by dear and convincing evidence th* t the Deiendant, Dan 
Smith, fraudulently failed to disclose the material deieccinvoking the footings to the 
Plaintiffs at or about the time of the sale of the house? 
Yes f5 No 0 
b) If yes, what, if any, compensatory damage? di« 1 the Plaindf? suffer as a 
lesuli thereof: S ^P , laGO.cD 
c) If you answered "yes" to 2a above, do you fine that the statute of 
limitations barred or prohibited the Plaintiffs fraudulent non-c isdosure claim to the 
footings? 
Yes 0 No 6 
3. a) Do you find by clear and convincing evidence tl at the Defendant, Dan 
Smith, fraudulently failed to disclose the material defect invofc ing the windows to the 
plaintiffs at or about the time of the sale of the house? 
Yes _ C L NO 8 
b) If yes, what, if any, compensatory damages dii the Plaintiff suffer as a 
resulr thereof; $ ^ £/* 
c) If you answered ,,yes" to 3a above, do you fln<. that the statute of 
limitations barred or prohibited tht Plaintiffs fraudulent non-disclosure claim as to the 
windows? 
Yes No 
DATED this °\ day of March, 2005. 
JURY FOREPERSON ^Jfc10 \J 
SUPPLEMENTAL VERDICT FORM 
20O5HARIO AMIOi 2 1 
4a Since you found the defendant liable for fraudulent noud 9closure, should punitive 
damage* be assessed against the defendant, Dan Smith'? 
Yes v N J 
b. If yes, in what amount? 
Dated this Q_ day of March, 2005. 
Q&r^ h*6 
ADDENDUM 11 
rOl 37 K CITRIC r CC1 P .T-MLLA^r 
2005 HAR 10 AH 10* 19 
GrejjwryB.Hadley (3(552) 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
2696 North University Avenue, #260 
Piovo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (SOI) 377-4403 
Facsimile-(801) 377.4411 
IN THE FOl RTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF M LLARD COt'NTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
— — — • — . - I 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY 
MOORE, 
Plaintiffs, 
D\N SMITH, individually and as Trustee 
of the Daji Irvine Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
MI d CAROL SMITH, individually and as 




Civil No, OOO700H2MT 
Judge Donald J. E/re 
' **mm*mwm~ 
THIS ACTION came on for Trial before the Court and a Jury, Honorable Dona]d J. Eyre 
District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly tried and tl c Jury having duly rendered 
its verdict, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 
I. That Plaintiff recover from Defendants, jointly and se /crly, S £D.y.b 10.. 5 • 
\Mth interest ai the statutory rate. 
DATFD this tc^ day of March 2005. 
FILED B t _ * JL 
ADDENDUM 12 
founTH r«:rnicr COUPT-HILL^.-C 
2005 JUL-6 P N I 2 : 5 0 
Gregory B. Hadley (3652) 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
2696 North University Avenue, #260 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 377-4403 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4411 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




DAN SMITH, etal., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION UNDER RULE 50 FOR A 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR 
REMITTITUR 
Civil No. 00700142 MI 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
THIS MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion Under Rule 50 foi a 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for Remittitur. The Court having reviewed 
the various memorandum on file and having heard oral argument on the Motion on June 6, 2005 stated 
it's ruling from the bench. There now being no just reason for delay and for good cause appearing the 
Court does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE as follows: 
L Defendant's Motion Under Rule 50 for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the 
Alternative for Remittitur is denied. 
FILED BY. M. 
DATED this (£_ day of ftme2005. 
By the Court: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand-carried, a true and correct copy of the foregoing on this 
of June 2005 to the following: 
2--T day 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & McKAY, LLC 
2696 N University Avenue, Suite 180 
PO Box 600 




FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, 
:&fi^s£& \ STATE OF UTAH 
~ip^mmil\ COUNTY OF MILLARD 
l i ^ S f r l N o r m a Brunson, Clerk of the above named 
^ ; > ^ - ^ / Court, certify that the foregoing is a full, true=and 
^£^o^i>{ correct copy of the original as .led and now of 
>,>'^Z3Z3*'^
 record in th i s 0f}iCe. Consistmgjf __2±= 
pages. Dated this 
of 0 \oH j 
Signed X t d i n " C 




r )~ t f Deputy Clerk 
2374 
ADDENDUM 13 
fouTTH Cisr rxr ccu~ i -K ILLER-
2005 JUL! 9 AH I I : 39 
Gregory B. Hadley (3652) 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
2696 North University Avenue, #260 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 377-4403 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4411 
"iN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILL APT> COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




DAN SMITH, individually and as 
T: -jstee of the Dan lrvin Smith later 
Vivos Trust and CAROL SMITH, 
individually and as Trustee of the Carol 
L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT S' 
RULE 60(b) MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000700142 Ml 
Judge Donald J Eyre 
TI: ;S M VrTF p came Kefore the Court pursuant to Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Sr\ 
Aside Judgment. The Court having reviewed the various memoranda on file and ha\ mi; hea*d 
oral argument on said Motion on June 6, 2005, entered it's written Ruling denying the Motion •-.•. 
July 6, 2005 with the Court directing Plaintiffs Counsel to prepare an Order consistent with siud 
K ding. There now being no just reason for delay and for good cause appearing the Court JUL> 
hereby ORDER, ADH rDE a..d DECREE as follows: 
1. Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment is denied 
DATED this / K _ day of July 2005 
BYT HE COURT 
IVC^^Srds.S JUDC^DOMii£lJ EYRE^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/^oimsel for Defendants 
ie-
CERTIFICATE 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF MILLARD 
Norma Brunson, Clerk of the above named 
Court, certify that the foregoing is a full, true and 
correct copy of the original as filed and now of 
record in this office. Consisting of 2--
pages. Dated this \?^M day 
of____JIku4_. 20££? 
Signed f\ m im n 6 / U J nD&n Clerk 
by V-JlX 0 f\ oAcfSt^ Deputy Clerk 
ADDENDUM 14 
/ 
cn'J'\ 7,\ 0 , r .TP'CT CO!*" 7-*iH_L/ -" 
2005 AUG 25 AH S= 05 
FILED BY 
Gregory B. Hadley (3652) 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
2696 North University Avenue, #260 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 377-4403 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4411 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




DAN SMITH, individually and as 
Trustee of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter 
Vivos Trust and CAROL SMITH, 
individually and as Trustee of the Carol 
L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR AN ORDER AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES, EXPENSES 
AND COSTS 
Civil No. 000700142 MI 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
THIS MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs Motion for an Order 
Awarding Attorney Fees, Expenses, and Costs. The Court having reviewed the various 
memoranda on file and having heard oral argument on said Motion on June 6, 2005, entered it's 
written Memorandum Decision on August 1, 2005. There now being no just reason for delay 
and for good cause appearing the Court does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE as 
follows: 
1. Attorneys fees are awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of $40,000.00. 
2. Costs are awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of $10,000.00. 
3. The Judgment previously entered in the amount of $30,680.00 is augmented in the 
amount of $50,000.00 for a total Judgment in the amount of $80,680. 
DATED this2^" day of August 2005. 
BY (THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
.ounsel for De 
2 
ADDENDUM 15 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-12-25.5 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I I . Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions 
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
ARTICLE 2. OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
Copyright © 1953, 1960-1963, 1966, 1968-1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-1978, 1981, 
1982, 1984 by The Allen Smith Company; Copyright © 1986-1994 by The Michie 
Company. All rights reserved. 
78-12-25.5 Actions related to improvements in real property. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions, 
or breach of duty that causes injury to persons or property, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, 
strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or other source of law; 
(b) "completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an improvement to real 
property as established by a Certificate of Substantial Completion, a Certificate of Occupancy issued 
by a governing agency, or the date of first use or possession of the improvement, whichever is 
earliest; 
(c) "improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-
made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property; 
(d) "person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, proprietorship, 
or any other legal or governmental entity; and 
(e) "provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing studies, plans, 
specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates, topographic surveys, 
staking, construction, and the review, observation, administration, management, supervision, 
inspections, and tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the 
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and 
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state; 
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and 
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in 
defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected as to claims for 
breach of contract or warranty six years following completion of the improvement or the 
abandonment of construction and, as to all other claims, ten years following completion or 
abandonment; 
(e) it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to impose the periods of repose provided in 
this chapter; and 
(f) it is in the best interests of the citizens of this state to impose a period of limitation requiring that 
an action against a provider be brought within a two-year period following discovery of the act, error, 
omission, or breach of duty that forms the basis of the action. 
(3) An action against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the date of discovery of 
the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or the date upon which the act, error, omission, or breach 
of duty should have been discovered through reasonable diligence. If the act, error, omission, or 
breach of duty is discovered or discoverable before completion of the improvement or abandonment 
of construction, the two year period begins to run upon completion or abandonment. 
(4) Subject to Subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty may be commenced 
against a provider more than six years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of 
construction. In the event the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the sixth year of 
the six year period, the injured person has two additional years from the date of discovery to 
commence an action. 
(5) Subject to Subsections (3) and (4), no action may be commenced against a provider more than 
12 years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event the act, 
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error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the twelfth year of the 12-year period, the injured 
person shall have two additional years from the date of discovery to commence an action. 
(6) Subsections (4) and (5) do not apply to an action against a provider: 
(a) who has fraudulently concealed the act, error, omission, or breach of duty; 
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or 
(c) for breach of a written express warranty where the warranty period extends beyond six years as 
provided in Subsection (4). 
(7) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the periods 
prescribed by Subsections (4) and (5) solely because that person was a minor or mentally 
incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years from the date the 
disability is removed to commence the action. 
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action against any person in 
actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any 
defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is 
brought. 
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law or a 
valid and enforceable contract. 
(10) This section applies to all claims and causes of action that accrue after April 29, 1991, 
notwithstanding that the act, error, omission, or breach of duty occurred, or the improvement was 
completed or abandoned before April 29, 1991. 
History: C. 1953, 78-12-25 .5 , enacted by L. 1991, ch. 290, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 78 -12 - 25.5, as last 
amended by Laws 1988, ch. 6 1 , § 1, relating to th e seven-year limitation on actions for injuries due 
to defective improvements to real property, effective April 29, 1991, and enacts the present section. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, § 78-15- 3. 
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7. 




Statute of repose. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Seven-year limitation was applicable to the owner or tenant in possession at time of construction, or 
to their successors; those in possession and control of realty had a continuing duty to make repairs, 
and should discover any fault in construction within seven years; claim that the statute is 
unconstitutional is without merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). 
The former section violated the open courts provision of the Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, § 
11) because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy 
for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy is arbitrary and 
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 
1989). 
The former section denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property when the injury was 
caused by a latent defect and was therefore unconstitutional under the open courts provision of the 
Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, § 11). Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 
1989). 
Discovery doctrine. 
The discovery doctrine was inapposite in an action for injuries sustained when plaintiffs struck a pole 
on a city-constructed sled-run, where the defect, if it was such, was patent, and there was no injury 
inflicted that was unknown at the time of its infliction. Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 
1987). 
Statute of repose. 
The former section was a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, because it barred all 
actions against planners, designers, and builders of improvements to real property for injuries 
occurring after seven years from the date of construction, as well as actions based on injuries 
occurring within the seven-year period if no action is filed within that period. Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). 
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Lichtefeld v. Cutshaw, 784 
P.2d 143 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am.Jur.2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and Construction Contracts § 114. 
A.L.R. -- What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper 
performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914. 
Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49 A.L.R.4th. 
972. 
Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or property 
caused by underground flow of contaminants, 11 A.L.R.5th 438. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions 0^55(3). 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-12-25.5 
UT ST § 78-12-25.5 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-12-25.5 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I I . Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions 
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
ARTICLE 2. OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY 
Copyright © 1953-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed 
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
78-12-25.5 Actions related to improvements in real property. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions, 
or breach of duty that causes injury to persons or property, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, 
strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or other source of law. 
(b) "Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an improvement to real 
property as established by the earliest of: 
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion; 
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; 
(iii) the date of first use or possession of the improvement; or 
(iv) the date the map of the survey is filed under Section 17-23-17 with respect to real property. 
(c) "Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-
made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property. 
(d) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, proprietorship, 
or any other legal or governmental entity. 
(e) "Provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing studies, plans, 
specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates, surveys, staking, 
construction, and the review, observation, administration, management, supervision, inspections, and 
tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the 
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and 
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state; 
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and 
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in 
defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected as to claims for 
breach of contract or warranty six years following completion of the improvement or the 
abandonment of construction and, as to all other claims, ten years following completion or 
abandonment; 
(e) it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to impose the periods of repose provided in 
this chapter; and 
(f) it is in the best interests of the citizens of this state to impose a period of limitation requiring that 
an action against a provider be brought within a five-year period following discovery of the act, error, 
omission, or breach of duty that forms the basis of the action. 
(3) (a) An action against a provider shall be commenced within five years from the date of discovery 
of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or the date upon which the act, error, omission, or 
breach of duty should have been discovered through reasonable diligence. 
(b) If the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered or discoverable before completion of 
the improvement or abandonment of construction, the five-year period begins to run upon completion 
or abandonment. 
(4) Subject to Subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty may be commenced 
against a provider more than six years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of 
construction. In the event the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the first through 
the sixth year of the six-year period, the injured person has five additional years from the date of 
discovery to commence an action. 
(5) Subject to Subsections (3) and (4), no action may be commenced against a provider more than 
12 years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event the act, 
error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the seventh through the twelfth year of the 12-year 
period, the injured person shall have five additional years from the date of discovery to commence an 
action. 
(6) Subsections (4) and (5) do not apply to an action against a provider: 
(a) who has fraudulently concealed the act, error, omission, or breach of duty; 
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or 
(c) for breach of a written express warranty where the warranty period extends beyond six years as 
provided in Subsection (4). 
(7) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the periods 
prescribed by Subsections (4) and (5) solely because that person was a minor or mentally 
incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years from the date the 
disability is removed to commence the action. 
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action against any person in 
actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any 
defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is 
brought. 
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law or a 
valid and enforceable contract. 
(10) This section applies to all claims and causes of action that accrue after April 29, 1991, 
notwithstanding that the act, error, omission, or breach of duty occurred, or the improvement was 
completed or abandoned before April 29, 1991. 
History: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5 , enacted by L. 1991, ch. 290, § 1; 1997, ch. 149, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 78 -12 - 25.5, as last 
amended by Laws 1988, ch. 61 , § 1, relating to the seven-year limitation on actions for injuries due 
to defective improvements to real property, effective April 29, 1991, and enacts the present section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided Subsection ( l ) ( b ) and 
added Subsection ( l ) (b ) ( i v ) ; deleted "topographic" before "surveys" in Subsection ( l ) ( e ) ; substituted 
"five-year period" for "two-year period" in Subsections (2)(f) and (3)(b), "five years" for "two years" 
in Subsection (3)(a), and "five additional years" for "two additional years" in Subsections (4) and (5); 
substituted "first through the sixth year" for "sixth year" in Subsection (4) and "seventh through the 
twelfth year" for "twelfth year" in Subsection (5); and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, § 78- 15-3. 
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7. 




Statute of repose. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Seven-year limitation was applicable to the owner or tenant in possession at time of construction, or 
to their successors; those in possession and control of realty had a continuing duty to make repairs, 
and should discover any fault in construction within seven years; claim that the statute is 
unconstitutional is without merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). 
The former section violated the open courts provision of the Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I , § 
11) because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy 
for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy is arbitrary and 
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 
1989). 
The former section denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property when the injury was 
caused by a latent defect and was therefore unconstitutional under the open courts provision of the 
Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, § 11). Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 
1989). 
Discovery doctrine. 
The discovery doctrine was inapposite in an action for injuries sustained when plaintiffs struck a pole 
on a city-constructed sled-run, where the defect, if it was such, was patent, and there was no injury 
inflicted that was unknown at the time of its infliction. Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 
1987). 
Statute of repose. 
The former section was a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, because it barred all 
actions against planners, designers, and builders of improvements to real property for injuries 
occurring after seven years from the date of construction, as well as actions based on injuries 
occurring within the seven-year period if no action is filed within that period. Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). 
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Lichtefeld v. Cutshaw, 784 
P.2d 143 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AmJur.2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and Construction Contracts § 114. 
A.L.R. — What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper 
performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914. 
Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49 A.L.R.4th 
972. 
Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or property 
caused by underground flow of contaminants, 11 A.L.R.5th 438. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-12-25.5 
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ADDENDUM 17 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-12-21.5 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I I . Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions 
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY 
Copyright © 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a 
division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights 
reserved. 
78-12-21.5 Actions related to improvements in real property. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Abandonment" means that there has been no design or construction activity on the improvement 
for a continuous period of one year. 
(b) "Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions, 
or breach of duty arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an 
improvement, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or 
other source of law. 
(c) "Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an improvement to real 
property as established by the earliest of: 
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion; 
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; or 
(iii) the date of first use or possession of the improvement. 
(d) "Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-
made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property. 
(e) "Person" means an individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, joint venture, 
association, proprietorship, or any other legal or governmental entity. 
(f) "Provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing studies, plans, 
specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates, surveys, staking, 
construction, and the review, observation, administration, management, supervision, inspections, and 
tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the 
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and 
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state; 
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and 
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in 
defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected ten years following 
completion or abandonment; 
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to 
impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in this chapter upon all causes of action by or 
against a provider arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an 
improvement. 
(3) (a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within 
six years of the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. Where an 
express contract or warranty establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated 
within that limitations period. 
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the earlier of 
the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been 
discovered through reasonable diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable before 
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year period begins to run 
upon completion or abandonment. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an action may not be commenced against a provider more 
than 12 years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event the 
https://web2.westlawxom/result/documenttextaspx?utid=%7b95355C12-840B-46E6-82E... 5/16/2006 
cause of action is discovered or discoverable in the eleventh or twelfth year of the 12-year period, the 
injured person shall have two additional years from that date to commence an action. 
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an action against a provider: 
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the injury, damage, 
or other loss caused by his act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or 
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty. 
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the periods 
prescribed by Subsections (3) and (4) solely because that person was a minor or mentally 
incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years from the date the 
disability is removed to commence the action. 
(7) This section shall not apply to an action for the death of or bodily injury to an individual while 
engaged in the design, installation, or construction of an improvement. 
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action against any person in 
actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any 
defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is 
brought. 
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law or a 
valid and enforceable contract. 
(10) This section does not create or modify any claim or cause of action. 
(11) This section applies to all causes of action that accrue after May 3, 1998, notwithstanding that 
the improvement was completed or abandoned before May 3, 1999. 
History: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by L 1991, ch. 290, § 1 ; 1997, ch. 149, § 1 ; renumbered by 
L 1999, ch. 123, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. —Laws 1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 78-12- 25.5, as last amended 
by Laws 1988, ch. 6 1 , § 1, relating to the seven-year limitation on actions for injuries due to 
defective improvements to real property, effective April 29, 1991, and enacts the present section. 
Amendment Notes. —The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided Subsection ( l ) (b ) and 
added Subsection ( l ) (b ) ( iv ) ; deleted "topographic" before "surveys" in Subsection ( l ) ( e ) ; substituted 
"five-year period" for "two-year period" in Subsections (2)(f) and (3)(b), "five years" for "two years" 
in Subsection (3)(a), and "five additional years" for "two additional years" in Subsections (4) and (5); 
substituted "first through the sixth year" for "sixth year" in Subsection (4) and "seventh through the 
twelfth year" for "twelfth year" in Subsection (5); and made stylistic changes. 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as 
78-12-25.5, and rewrote the section. 
Cross-References. —Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, § 78- 15-3. 
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7. 






Running of statute. 
Statute of repose. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Former seven-year limitation was applicable to the owner or tenant in possession at time of 
construction, or to his successors; those in possession and control of realty had a continuing duty to 
make repairs, and should discover any fault in construction within seven years; claim that the statute 
was unconstitutional was without merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). 
The former section violated the open courts provision of the Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, § 
11) because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy 
for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy is arbitrary and 
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 
1989). 
The former section denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property when the injury was 
caused by a latent defect and was therefore unconstitutional under the open courts provision of the 
Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, § 11). Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 
1989). 
Given the legislative intent in enacting this section, and the remote chance of injury or damage after 
a period of years, the statute is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of eliminating the stated 
evils, and is constitutional under the open courts clause of the state constitution. Craftsman Bldr.'s 
Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999). 
Applicability. 
This statute applies to products liability actions when they relate to improvements in real property. 
Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999). 
This section merely prescribes certain situations to which the periods of repose do not apply; it does 
not purport to set up a substitute remedy. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 
1194 (Utah 1999). 
Discovery doctrine. 
The discovery doctrine was inapposite in an action for injuries sustained when plaintiffs struck a pole 
on a city-constructed sled-run, where the defect, if it was such, was patent, and there was no injury 
inflicted that was unknown at the time of its infliction. Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 
1987). 
Express warranty. 
Without evidence of an express warranty period, let alone one extending beyond six years, plaintiff 
was unable to satisfy this section. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194 
(Utah 1999). 
Running of statute. 
Plaintiffs slander of title and tortious interference claims against a builder did not accrue until after 
the house was sold at a foreclosure sale by the bank, when plaintiff first became able to demonstrate 
special damages. Valley Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 P.2d 361 (Utah 1997). 
Proviso in Subsections (4) and (5) that both are "subject to" the discovery provision of Subsection (3) 
means that if an injured party discovers, or should have discovered, his cause of action before the 
end of the repose periods, then the applicable time period is the discovery limitations period and not 
the six-or twelve-year period of the statutes of repose. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. 
Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999). 
Statute of repose. 
The former section was a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, because it barred all 
actions against planners, designers, and builders of improvements to real property for injuries 
occurring after seven years from the date of construction, as well as actions based on injuries 
occurring within the seven-year period if no action is filed within that period. Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). 
Fifteen year time between construction of building and collapse of its roof barred a cause of action 
because this section acts not as a statute of limitation but as a statute of repose, for which latency of 
a defect does not toll the limitation period. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 
1194 (Utah 1999). 
Where a faulty electrical system in an apartment building caused a fire approximately eighteen years 
after it was built, this section barred the plaintiffs' action. Olsen v. McMillen Elec, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 
51 (Utah 1999). 
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Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Lichtefeld v. Cutshaw, 784 
P.2d 143 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am Jur.2d. —13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and Construction Contracts § 114. 
A.L.R. —What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper 
performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914. 
Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49 A.L.R.4th 
972. 
Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or property 
caused by underground flow of contaminants, 11 A.L.R.5th 438. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-12-21.5 
UT ST § 78-12-21.5 
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ADDENDUM 18 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-12-21.5 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I I . ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY 
§ 78-12-21.5. Actions related to improvements in real property 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Abandonment" means that there has been no design or construction activity on the 
improvement for a continuous period of one year. 
(b) "Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions, 
or breach of duty arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an 
improvement, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or 
other source of law. 
(c) "Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an improvement to 
real property as established by the earliest of: 
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion; 
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; or 
(Hi) the date of first use or possession of the improvement. 
(d) "Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-
made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property. 
(e) "Person" means an individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, joint venture, 
association, proprietorship, or any other legal or governmental entity. 
(f) "Provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing studies, plans, 
specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates, surveys, staking, 
construction, and the review, observation, administration, management, supervision, inspections, 
and tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the 
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and 
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state; 
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and 
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in 
defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven years 
following completion or abandonment; and 
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to 
impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in this chapter upon all causes of action by or 
against a provider arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an 
improvement. 
(3)(a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six 
years of the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. Where an 
express contract or warranty establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated 
within that limitations period. 
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the earlier 
of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have 
been discovered through reasonable diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable 
before completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year period begins 
to run upon completion or abandonment. 
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(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an action may not be commenced against a provider more 
than nine years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event 
the cause of action is discovered or discoverable in the eighth or ninth year of the nine-year period, 
the injured person shall have two additional years from that date to commence an action. 
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an action against a provider: 
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the injury, 
damage, or other loss caused by his act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or 
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty. 
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the periods 
prescribed by Subsections (3) and (4) solely because that person was a minor or mentally 
incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years from the date the 
disability is removed to commence the action. 
(7) This section shall not apply to an action for the death of or bodily injury to an individual while 
engaged in the design, installation, or construction of an improvement. 
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action against any person in 
actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any 
defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is 
brought. 
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law or a 
valid and enforceable contract. 
(10) This section does not create or modify any claim or cause of action. 
(11) This section applies to all causes of action that accrue after May 3, 2003, notwithstanding that 
the improvement was completed or abandoned before May 3, 2004. 
Laws 1991, c. 290, 5 1: Laws 1997, c. 149, 6 1, eff. May 5, 1997: Laws 1999, c. 123, 5 1, eff. May 3, 
1999: Laws 2004, c. 327, 5 l r eff. May 3, 2004. 
Codifications C. 1953, § 78-12-25.5. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2004, c. 327, in subsec. (4) substituted "nine" for "12" throughout and substituted "eighth or 
ninth" for " eleventh or twelfth"; in subsec. (11) substituted "2003" for "1998" and "2004" for "1999". 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Product liability, see § 78-15-3. 
Survival of actions, see § 78-11-12. 
Wrongful death, statute of limitations, see § 78-12-28. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Consumer Protection o^37. 
Contracts o^329. 
Limitation of Actions 0^10, 95(16), 95(7). 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 241k l0 ; 241k95(16); 241k95(7); 95k329; 92Hk37. 
CJ S Architects 5 39. 
C J.S. Contracts 55 608 to 609, 
CJ.S. Credit Reporting Agencies; Consumer Protection §§ 98 to 99, 104, 107. 
CJ.S. Limitations of Actions §5 15 to 16, 204. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
American Law of Products Liability 3d PS, Primary Sources. 
ALR Library 
2002 A.L.R.5th 2 1 , Validity, as to Claim Alleging Design or Building Defects, of Statute Imposing Time 
Limitations Upon Action Against Architect, Engineer, or Builder for Injury or Death Arising Out of 
Defective or Unsafe Condition of Improvement to Real Property. 
1 A.L.R. 3rd 914, What Statute of Limitations Governs Action by Contractee for Defective or Improper 
Performance of Work by Private Building Contractor. 
Encyclopedias 
Am. Jur.2d Products Liability 5 1630, Generally. 
Am. Jur.2d Products Liability 5 1632, Validity. 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:77, Introduction. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47.79, Relationship to Other Statutes 
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:80, Validity of Repose Legislation. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:83, Parties in Possession or Control of Property. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:84, Exclusion of Fraud Cases. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:85, Commencement of Statutory Period Leading to 
Repose. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:86, Tolling and Extension of Time Limitation Period 
Express Warranty. 
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 47:89, Infancy, Mental Incompetency, or Imprisonment. 
Bruner and O'Connor on Construction Law 5 12:22, Duration of Performance Bond Obligation. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Commencement of period of limitations 5 
Completion of improvement 7 
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Construction and application 2 
Governmental entities 12 
Ignorance of cause of action 14 
Improvement 6 
Injury to person or property 11 
Landlord and tenant 13. 
Limitations statute applicable 4 
Provider 8 
Statutory amendments 3 
Subsequent purchaser rights 9 
Validity 1 
Warranties 10 
1 . Validity 
Builders statute of repose limiting period in which to bring actions for injury arising from 
improvements to real property, while not providing adequate alternative remedy, sought to eliminate 
clear social and economic evils of costs to construction industry of liability insurance and records 
storage in reasonable and nonarbitrary manner, and thus did not violate open courts clause of State 
Constitution. Const. Art 1, S 11 ; U C.A.1953r 78-12-25 5. Craftsman Builder's Supply. Inc v Butler 
MfQ. Co., 1999, 974 P.2d 1194, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 18. Constitutional Law <C^  328; 
Limitation Of Actions o^ > 4(2) 
Remand of suit by injured golfer for new trial was required on limitations issue, given intervening 
state Supreme Court ruling in another case that applicable architects and builders statute of repose 
was unconstitutional. U C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5; Const. Art. 1 , 5 11. Klatt v Thomas. 1990. 788 P.2d 
510. Appeal And Error o^ 1177(1) 
Architects and builders statute of repose violates open court's provision of Utah's Constitution in that 
it does not provide injured person with effective and reasonable alternative remedy for vindication of 
his or her constitutional interest, and elimination of cause of action was arbitrary and unreasonable 
means of achieving statutory objective of limiting stale claims and protecting construction industry 
from perpetual liability. Const Art 1, § 11 ; U C.A 1953, 78-12-25.5 Horton v. Goldmmer's Daughter, 
1989, 785 P.2d 1087. Constitutional Law <^ 328; Limitation Of Actions <^ 4(2) 
Architects and builders statute of repose violates open courts provision of Utah's Constitution in that it 
does not provide injured person with effective and reasonable alternative remedy for vindication of his 
or her constitutional interest, and elimination of cause of action was arbitrary and unreasonable 
means of achieving statutory objective of limiting stale claims and protecting the construction 
industry from perpetual liability. Const. Art 1, § 11 ; U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Sun Valley Water Beds 
of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc , 1989, 782 P.2d 188. Constitutional Law o* 328; Limitation 
Of Actions <** 4(2) 
Statute, which provides that no action to recover for damages arising out of defective or unsafe 
condition of an improvement to real property may be brought more than seven years after completion 
of the construction but which contains an exemption for persons who are in actual possession and 
control as owners of the improvement at the t ime that the defective and unsafe condition constitutes 
the proximate cause of an injury, is not unconstitutional. U.C.A.1953, 78- 12-25.5. Good v. 
Chnstensen, 1974. 527 P.2d 223. Limitation Of Actions o* 4(2) 
2. Construction and application 
In action alleging taking of plaintiffs' property by low-level overflights and concomitant noise, there 
was genuine issue of material fact as to applicability of Utah seven-year statute of limitations and 
whether some or all of plaintiffs' remaining properties not directly beneath approach-departure 
corridor had also been taken, precluding summary judgment. U.C.A 1953, 78- 12-25.5; 42 U S.C.A. 
§ 1983; U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 1986, 634 F.Supp. 100. 
Federal Civil Procedure o^ 2498.3 
httnsV/weh2westlawcom/result/documenttextasnx^utid=%7b95355C12-840B-46E6-82E... 5/16/2006 
Statute providing two-year limitations period for actions to recover for injury to person or property 
does not apply to actions to recover for purely economic injury. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Cathco v. 
Valentmer Crane Brunjies Onyon Architects, 1997, 944 P.2d 365, 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Limitation 
Of Actions Q* 30 
3. Statutory amendments 
Validity of caselaw precedent holding that economic damages did not constitute "injury to persons or 
property" for purposes of two-year limitations period to recover for such injuries was not affected by 
subsequent amendments to relevant statute, where phrase "injury to persons or property" was not 
altered. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Cathco v. Valentmer Crane Brunjies Onyon Architects, 1997, 944 
P.2d 365, 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Limitation Of Actions <^ 30 
4. Limitations statute applicable 
Builders statute of repose, and not products liability statute of limitations, applies to products liability 
actions which relate to improvements in real property. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-22.5, 78-15-3. Craftsman 
Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999, 974 P.2d 1194, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 18. 
Limitation Of Actions <^ 30 
Builders statute of repose, and not products liability statute of limitations, applied to products liability 
claims asserted against manufacturer of prefabricated metal building, and contractor which installed 
building, by building's owner after roof of building collapsed from weight of snow. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-
22.5, 78-15-3. Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999, 974 P.2d 1194, 364 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 18. Limitation Of Actions <** 32(1) 
Breach of contract action by real estate development company against architects to recover economic 
damages in connection with remodeling project was governed by six-year limitations period applicable 
to actions founded upon an instrument in writing, rather than by two-year limitations period 
governing actions to recover for injury to persons or property, including those based on contract 
theory. U.C A 1953, 78-12-23(2), 78-12-25 5 Cathco v Valentmer Crane Bruniies Onyon Architects, 
1997, 944 P.2d 365, 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Limitation Of Actions <^ 24(1) 
Statute providing six-year limitation period for action for liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing does not conflict with statute providing two-year limitation period for action to recover for 
injury to person or property, even though latter statute explicitly purports to cover actions based on 
contract theory, because two-year limitation period does not apply to purely economic injuries. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-23(2), 78-12-25 5 Cathco v Valentmer Crane Brunjies Onyon Architects, 1997, 
944 P.2d 365, 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Limitation Of Actions <c^  24(1); Limitation Of Actions o * 30 
5. Commencement of period of limitations 
Even assuming that property owner's claims against contractor that it had hired to perform 
remodeling work, for contractor's alleged slander of title and tortious interference in filing mechanic's 
lien on property, were subject to two-year statute of limitations on claims against provider of real 
estate design or construction services for "injury to persons or property," statute of limitations did not 
begin to run when contractor first filed its mechanic's lien, but only when property was sold at 
reduced price, when special damages sustained by property owner could be ascertained. U.C.A.1953, 
78-12- 25.5(3). Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 1997, 944 P.2d 361, 324 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26. Limitation Of Actions <^ 55(1); Limitation Of Actions o 55(5) 
Seven-year limitation period for injuries caused by defective or unsafe improvement to real property 
began to run when all construction and improvements on city's tubing hill were completed, even if 
statute could be applied to city as "improver" of hill. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Jackson v Layton City, 
1987, 743 P.2d 1196. Limitation Of Actions <^ 55(4) 
Under statute requiring claims for damage to real property caused during construction of 
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improvements to be brought within seven years of completion of construction, the limitations period 
for consultant engineer's alleged negligence in supervising the construction of a water well 
commenced running at the completion of construction and not at the time of discovery of negligence. 
U C.A 1953, 78-12-25 5 Hooper Water Improvement Dist v Reeve, 1982, 642 P 2d 745. Limitation 
Of Actions <^ 55(5); Limitation Of Actions <^ 95(10.1) 
6. Improvement 
Developer's activities in determining the boundaries, size, location, and placement of the Plat B lands 
were not an "improvement to real property" within the meaning of statute of repose barring action 
against provider more than twelve years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of 
construction; the activities did not constitute a building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or 
other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property. U.C.A 1953, 
78-12-25 5( l ) (c , e), (5) (1998). State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Sundance Development Corp., 2003, 
78 P.3d 995, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 2003 UT App 367, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 90 P.3d 
1041. Limitation Of Actions <^ 30 
The definition of "improvement" under the statute of repose barring action against provider more than 
twelve years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction focuses upon the 
activity of a provider and, therefore, contemplates more than determining the boundaries, size, 
location, and placement of lands. U.C.A 1953, 78-12-25 5( l ) (c , e), (5) (1998). State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co. v. Sundance Development Corp., 2003, 78 P.3d 995, 485 Utah Adv. Rep 32, 2003 UT App 
367, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 90 P.3d 1041. Limitation Of Actions o^ 30 
7. Completion of improvement 
Developer's filing of plat did not result in completion of improvement and improvement within the 
meaning of statute of repose barring action against provider more than twelve years after completion 
of the improvement or abandonment of construction. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5( l ) (b)( iv) , ( l ) ( c ) , (5) 
(1998). State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Sundance Development Corp , 2003, 78 P.3d 995, 485 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 32, 2003 UT App 367, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 90 P.3d 1041. Limitation Of 
Actions ps- 30 
8. Provider 
One cannot be a provider within the meaning of statute of repose barring action against provider 
more than twelve years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, unless 
the activity listed in the definition of a provider is performed for, or in relation to, an improvement; 
thus, while surveying and staking for or in relation to an improvement may implicate the statute of 
repose, surveying and staking for some other purpose does not amount to an improvement, and the 
surveyor or staker will not come within the definition of provider in such situations. U.C.A.1953, 78-
12-25.5(l)(c, e), (5) (1998). State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sundance Development Corp., 2003, 78 
P.3d 995, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 2003 UT App 367, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 90 P.3d 
1041. Limitation Of Actions <c^  30 
9. Subsequent purchaser rights 
Under statute which provided that no action to recover for damages arising out of defective and 
unsafe condition of improvement of real property could be brought more than seven years after the 
completion of the construction and which also provided that the limitation would not apply to any 
person in actual possession and control of the improvement at the time that the defective and unsafe 
condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of injury, owners who purchased 
house from former owners who had had carport built on to the house could not, more than seven 
years after the carport was completed, bring action against the contractor for damage incurred when 
the carport fell after a heavy snowfall. U.C A 1953, 78-12-25.5. Good v Chnstensen, 1974, 527 P.2d 
223. Limitation Of Actions <^ 10 
10. Warranties 
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Contract for construction of prefabricated metal building, which contained specifications for roof which 
would support 40 pounds per square foot, did not contain express warranty extending beyond six 
years, as would come within exception to builders statute of repose, where even assuming that 
language constituted a warranty, no indication was given as to the period of such a warranty. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5(6)(c). Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc v. Butler Mfg. Co , 1999, 974 P.2d 
1194, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 22r 1999 UT 18. Limitation Of Actions o^ 47(1) 
11. Injury to person or property 
Property owner's claims against contractor that it had hired to perform remodeling work, for economic 
losses that it sustained due to contractor's alleged breach of contract, repudiation of contract, unjust 
enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in abandoning project before 
remodeling had been completed, did not involve claim for "injury to persons or property," within 
meaning of two-year statute of limitations on claims for "injury to persons or property" against 
provider of real estate design or construction services. U.C.A.1953r 78-12-25.5(3). Valley Colour, Inc. 
v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 1997, 944 P.2d 361 f 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 26. Limitation Of Actions <^ 21 
(1); Limitation Of Actions <c^  28(2) 
12. Governmental entities 
Seven-year limitation period for injuries caused by defective or unsafe improvements to real property 
did not apply to personal injury action filed against city for injuries sustained on tubing hill where city 
was owner in possession of property. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Jackson v. Layton City, 1987, 743 P.2d 
1196. Municipal Corporations o 857 
Plaintiffs could not invoke claim that seven-year limitation period for injuries caused by defective or 
unsafe improvements to real property violated "by due course of law" provision of State Constitution 
where plaintiffs had effective remedy against city as owner in possession of property that could have 
been filed within four years from date of injury. U.C.A.1953, 78-12- 25(2), 78-12-25 5; Const. Art. 1, 
§ 11. Jackson v. Lavton City, 1987, 743 P.2d 1196. Constitutional Law <^ 308; Limitation Of Actions 
o * 4 ( 2 ) 
13. Landlord and tenant 
Builders statute of repose, prohibiting commencement of cause of action against provider more than 
12 years after completion of construction, barred tenants' negligence action against participants in 
construction of apartment building for damage to personal property which resulted from fire caused 
by faulty electrical system, where construction of apartment building was completed approximately 18 
years prior to fire and filing of complaint. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Olsen v. McMillen Elec, 1999, 976 
P.2d 606, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 , 1999 UT 19 Limitation Of Actions <^ 170 
14. Ignorance of cause of action 
While provisions of builders statute of repose, which limits period in which to bring actions for injury 
arising from improvements to real property, are made subject to two-year limitations provision, this 
does not make repose provisions subject to discovery rule, but rather, simply means that if an injured 
party discovers, or should have discovered, his cause of action prior to running of the applicable 
repose period, then period for bringing suit is the two-year limitations period, and not the repose 
period. U.C.A 1953, 78-12-25.5. Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999, 974 P.2d 
1194, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 18. Limitation Of Actions &* 95(3) 
Discovery doctrine did not apply to personal injury action against city arising out of accident on city's 
tubing hill where defect, if any, was patent and plaintiff was aware of collision, even if discovery rule 
could be read into seven-year limitation period for injuries caused by defective or unsafe 
improvements to real property. U.C.A 1953, 78-12-25.5. Jackson v. Layton City, 1987, 743 P.2d 
1196. Limitation Of Actions O^ 95(4.1) 
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ADDENDUM 19 
INSTRUCTION NO- 7 / 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred and invalid if they did not file their suit 
within the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs filed their suit on August 24, 2000. 
Utah law provides that an action for construction defect based in contract or warranty 
shall be commenced within six years of the date of the closing of the sale of the house. 
Utah law provides that an action for fraudulent nondisclosure shall be commenced within 
two years of the time that Plaintiffs discovered their a cause of action for fraudulent non-
disclosure or the date upon which such cause of action should have been discovered through 
reasonable diligence. 
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